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ABSTRACT
NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
MAY 19 9 7
SEAN I. KAY, B.A., KENT STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A. KENT STATE UNIVERSITY
NLA. FREE UNIVERSITY OF BRUSSELS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Eric. S. Einhorn
This dissertation examines the general proposition that
formal international institution promote national security
in Europe. Analytically, the features of international
institutions are the independent variables and the degree of
security is the dependent variable. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) is the primary focus of the
analysis. The project draws from realist and
institutionalist approaches to the study of international
relations to assess what institutional characteristics of
NATO have developed over time which may contribute to
national security into the 21st century. The dissertation
is organized into seven chapters. The empirical research is
based on primary and secondary sources including personal
interviews conducted with senior policy makers and academic
sources in Europe and the US ongoing since 1991. The
dissertation is divided into seven chapters including a
theoretical and methodological overview; the origins of
NATO; NATO during the Cold War; NATO's post-Cold War
vi
institutional adaptation (including the Partnership for
Peace and the Balkan crisis); NATO enlargement; and NATO's
internal transformation and the future of the transatlantic
relationship. This dissertation moves the debate over the
relationship between international institutions and security
in international relations theory. The general conclusion
is that variations in institutional form can have a dramatic
impact on the degree of security, positive or negative, in
the European context and that a major test of that claim is
coming in the next several decades
.
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CHAPTER I
NATO AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
NATO does not need an enemy to exist. The Alliance
remains as relevant today as it ever has. NATO's members
work together in the Alliance because they can bring their
combined energy to bear in shaping European security
NATO's key strategic objective is to help create political
conditions which make crises and conflicts less and less
likely. This is what we mean when we speak about building a
new European security architecture: building a set of
political relationships where each state feels secure and at
ease
.
-NATO Secretary General
Javier Solana, Lisbon, Portugal
2 5 November 1996.
Since the end of the Cold War, formal international
institutions including the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)
, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) , the Western European Union
(WEU)
,
the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU)
have been tasked by their member states to help them map a
course through the general uncertainty, and at times
dangerous instability, of contemporary Europe. Among these
institutions, increasing pressure has fallen on NATO to
enhance national security in Europe into the 21st century.
While NATO has received increasing theoretical and policy
analysis, little attention has been given to what
institutional characteristics of NATO contribute to national
security. NATO was established in 1949 as an institutional
arrangement incorporating balance of power alliance
characteristics while promoting reassurance and community
among its member states. However, there is little evidence
l
of NATO's institutional functions acting independently to
cause peace and security. As NATO neared the end of the
Cold War, it was fundamentally a military alliance with
institutional attributes that facilitated the exertion of
American power balanced against the Soviet Union. These
constraints of alliance make adapting NATO's institutional
form after the Cold War a formidable challenge. However,
this dissertation shows that for NATO to increase security
in the future it must be carefully, but dramatically,
transformed
.
So long as there is no major threat to its members'
interests, the degree to which NATO can contribute to
security in the future will be dependent on its
institutional form. In examining that proposition, this
project seeks to answer five main questions about
institutions and security in Europe:
*What are the sources of national security in Europe?
*What is the relationship between international
institutions and national security?
*To what extent do variations in institutional form
affect the degree of security in Europe?
*What institutional attributes of NATO have enhanced
security over time?
^Through what institutional form is NATO most likely to
increase security in the future?
Analytically, this project uses contemporary realism to test
NATO's institutional relevance independently enhancing
security in Europe. Many institutionalist scholars and
senior policymakers in NATO capitals have concluded that
NATO can contribute to security by aiding information
exchange among the member states, promoting transparency in
national security planning, enhancing reassurance among
states, and socializing national decision-makers toward more
peaceful national security policies. Alternatively,
realists are skeptical of the role that NATO can play after
the Cold War. Realism predicts that, as an alliance, NATO
will sooner or later dissolve in the absence of an immediate
and credible threat. The US will return home and Europe,
led by Germany, will seek a more independent role promoting
its own security interests. Realists warn that a reliance
on institutions for national security promotes a dangerous
false promise of peace.
This dissertation draws from insights provided by
realist and neoliberal institutional analysis to offer
propositions about NATO and the future of European security.
The central argument is that NATO can enhance European
security by enlarging to include Poland and the Czech
Republic and creating a hedge between Germany and Russia -
two major powers with a long history of security competition
over this region. For enlargement to succeed, NATO's
institutional architecture will have to be adapted so that
its primary task is to preserve the existing general peace
in Europe and that it should not be viewed as a threat to
the security or stability of any state - particularly
Russia
.
To understand the relationship between NATO's
institutional attributes and the degree of security in
Europe, this dissertation surveys NATO's history and post-
Cold War development. Analytically the different features
of international institutions are the independent variables
and the degree of security is the dependent variable. The
project shows that, to the extent that NATO did promote
security in the past, its institutional form was a dependent
variable adapted in response to external events and member
state demands. In the absence of the Soviet threat, NATO
members have sought to adapt its institutional form by
expanding its mission and tasks with mixed results. To
date, NATO has not been sufficiently adapted to the
requirements of post-Cold War European security to justify
optimism for its playing a strong role enhancing European
security in the absence of a threat
.
Chapter II demonstrates the salience of realism and
institutionalism as analytical tools for understanding the
sources of national security in Europe. It shows that there
are major differences within the realist and
institutionalist schools about the potential for
institutions to affect security and over what institutional
form is likely to promote security in Europe. This chapter
establishes the framework for an institutional analysis of
NATO carefully tested against realist propositions about the
sources of national security.
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Chapter III provides a study of NATO's formative
period. This chapter shows that the creation of NATO was
the culmination of momentum toward institutionalized
security cooperation after World War II between the US and
its wartime allies. The chapter demonstrates that NATO was
intended to be an institutional mechanism to promote
reassurance and self-help in Western Europe in conjunction
with its primary function as a collective defense alliance
organized against the Soviet Union. The actors who
constructed NATO were building upon a broadening
intellectual understanding of how to promote national
security in Europe. An analysis of the negotiations leading
up to the NATO treaty demonstrates the value that its
founders placed on its institutional characteristics. In
particular, the founders articulated a priority of using
NATO to promote burdensharing and self-help among the West
European countries and an expansion of shared western
values
.
Chapter IV shows how the Cold War forced an adaptation
of NATO into its classic institutional form. There was
considerable institutional activity in NATO during the Cold
War, and it was during this period that the "0" was put in
NATO. This chapter shows that NATO's institutionalization
had value as a means toward the exercise of power and
deterrence but that the institution did not act
independently. The key determinants of its institutional
form were the structure of the international system and the
demands of collective defense. In each of three cases,
collective defense, burdensharing
, and enlargement, NATO
institutional activity was dependent upon other variables -
primarily the distribution of power in the international
system.
Chapter V examines variations in NATO's institutional
adaptation after the Cold War beginning with efforts to
build interlocking institutions via the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE - renamed OSCE in
December 1994) , the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) , and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) to promote
stability in Central and Eastern Europe during a period of
dramatic change. It demonstrates the false promise of
institutions to address the early period of the Balkan war
in spite of the fact that institutions were identified by
member states as the primary means for resolving the
conflict. However, it also shows that despite these
failures, NATO did eventually play a major role promoting
peace in Bosnia in late 1995 and that some of its
institutional characteristics had a decisive impact. Yet
little had actually changed - NATO only functioned when the
US led it in its traditional alliance functions.
Chapter VI surveys NATO planning for post-Cold War
enlargement to include new members from Central and Eastern
Europe. This chapter traces the development of the policy
and summarizes realist and institutionalist arguments for
and against NATO enlargement. It shows that there is
6
considerable disagreement among analysts making for some
unique cross paradigm policy advocates on both sides of the
issue. The chapter concludes that the best premise for NATO
enlargement is to create a hedge, via the expansion of
American political reassurance, between Russia and Germany.
If the primary objective is to enlarge the western community
of nations, there are other institutions better suited for
this activity - including NATO's own Partnership for Peace.
Chapter VII examines NATO's internal adaptation after
the Cold War. Attaining an operational burdensharing
arrangement is necessary to keep the American commitment to
Europe politically sustainable in the absence of an
immediate threat to vital US national interests. The
chapter traces the failure of Europe to assume greater
responsibility for its own security through an independent
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and explains
the objective of restructuring NATO's operational functions
via Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) . Chapter VII shows
that, once operational, the CJTF can serve as the basis for
an institutional framework for crisis management promoting
European security into the 21st century. Organizing for
such missions and providing facilities for multilateral
consultation would become the primary peacetime activity of
NATO. The movement of France back toward NATO integrated
military planning demonstrates that trends favor such a
development. However, Chapter VII also shows that any
successful burdensharing arrangement in NATO faces
7
considerable constraints and must be based on a
reinvigorated transatlantic relationship.
Chapter VIII provides general conclusions about NATO
and the future of European security and establishes a
framework for a broader research agenda. This chapter
advances the importance of testing institutional form
against realist concerns about the ability of institutions
to create security. The general conclusion of the project
is that NATO faces considerable constraints in its post-Cold
War adaptation and, to date, NATO has not been sufficiently
transformed to justify optimism about its relevance for the
future. Failure to adapt may cause its member states to,
over time, increasingly question its value to their
security. NATO can have an important role to play in the
future of Europe. However, considerable work remains to be
done to move from theory to practice in European security.
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CHAPTER II
NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
European Security after the Cold War
This dissertation addresses the proposition that formal
international institutions promote national security in
Europe. Analytically the features of international
institutions are the independent variables and the degree of
security is the dependent variable. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) is the primary focus of the
analysis. The project draws from realist and
institutionalist approaches to the study of international
relations to assess what institutional characteristics of
NATO have developed over time which may contribute to
national security into the 21st century.
After the Cold War, European security has become a
multi-dimensional concept that includes military, political,
economic, societal, and environmental issues.
1
Nevertheless, national security remains the primary factor
1 . The complex task of defining security is surveyed by Barry Buzan who lists over a dozen
attempts to give a specific definition to security. Barry Buzan, People States and Fear: An
Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-C old War Era, 2nd edition. (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991) 16-17. Also see Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas,
World Security: Trends & Challenges at Century's End (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991);
and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed.. On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
For specific attempts to conceptualize and redefine security in the European context
see Barry
Buzan et al The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the post-Cold War
Era
(London: Pinter Publishers, 1990); Richard H. Ullman, Securing, Europe (Princeton University
Press 1991)- Michael E. Brown, ed.. Ethnic Conflict and International
Secu rity (Princeton,
NJ- Princeton University Press, 1993); Stephen [wan Griffiths, Nationalism
and Ethnic
Conflict: Threats to European Security (Stockholm, Sweden: SIPR1, 1993); and
Simon Duke,
The New European Security Disorder (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
motivating states in the international environment. What is
new about today's quest for national security are formal
international institutions which are an important element of
the environment in which states assess their national
concerns and implement national security strategies. NATO,
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
, the
Partnership for Peace (PFP)
, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
,
the European Union (EU)
,
the Western European Union (WEU) , the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and the United Nations (UN) have
all been promoted by states as mechanisms to reduce the
potential for conflict in post-Cold War Europe. Among these
institutions, NATO has emerged as the core of a future
institutional security arrangement in Europe. However, NATO
is a military alliance whose successful Cold War
institutional characteristics were dependent on the alliance
function of collective defense. If NATO is to survive as an
institution in the absence of a threat, it will have to be
adapted fundamentally to meet the new challenges to national
security that states face after the Cold War.
European security has become interdependent to the
extent that events which affect the national security of one
state can have profound impact on others. For example, the
Balkan crises of the early 1990s were not an immediate
threat to general security in Europe. However, if the war
had spread it had the potential to draw in larger countries
and decrease security in Europe at a much more general
level. Because of this complexity of the new European
security environment, a state pursuing its own security may
cause regional instability - which can lead to security
competition, possibly draw in large states, and lead to war.
Thus national security is more than territorial defense or
promotion of key interests. It includes confidence on the
part of states (and their leaders) of relative safety within
an uncertain international environment. Confidence is
enhanced when a state is reassured that events occurring in
one state or region will not have an adverse effect on it.
National security in Europe is challenged by the need
to manage the collapse of the last great 20th century empire
- the Soviet Union. Russia could become a resurgent
nationalist military power seeking to restore order and
dominance in the former Soviet Union and thereby protect 22
million ethnic Russians scattered throughout its near
abroad. Alternatively, Russia and its neighbors could
collapse internally - a Balkan analogy but with nuclear
weapons. Central and Eastern European states are challenged
by existing and potential crisis which could have spill-over
effects for the entire Continent. The fragility of new
democracies and post -Communist economic transformations
combines with ongoing territorial and ethnic tensions,
refugee movements, the potential for the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and
environmental crisis to make Central and Eastern Europe
insecure
.
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Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and the
institutions which link them, are especially challenged to
promote security and stability in the new Europe. Yet the
West is internally confronted by the possibility that the US
could leave the Continent in a resurgence of its dominant
historical pattern of isolationism from Europe. A continued
disproportionate operational burden on the US role in
European security could accelerate an American withdrawal.
Such a move could revive the security dilemma that the US
and NATO helped eliminate between France and Germany and
possibly prompt Germany to obtain nuclear weapons, pursue
offensive-based national security arrangements, and
establish unilateral alliances with its neighbors to the
East. 2 Such a move would be viewed as provocative in both
Russia and the West. It is within this international
environment that NATO's institutional form must be adapted
if it is to have continued relevance. To date, such changes
have not occurred. At the core of this institutional
challenge is a need to use international relations theory to
clarify what NATO as an institution can, and can not do, to
enhance national security.
See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better," Adelphi Paper
171 (Autumn 1981); Kenneth N. Waltz, "The New World Order," Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 22:2 (1993) 187-195; John J. Mearsheimer, "Disorder Restored," in
Graham Allison and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Co
ld
War to New World Order (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Co., 1992) 213-237;
Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," Internationa,
Security 17:4 (Spring 1993).
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Realism and Institutionalism as Analytical Tnnls
Realists assert that institutions do not have a
positive impact on national security because they do not
cause peace. Power is the primary source of national
security and explains how and under what circumstances
states cooperate. 3 Realists remind scholars and
practitioners of national security that material power and
national interest remain primary concerns for states.
States are the key actors in an international system of
anarchy and their primary objective is survival and
advancing the means to that end. Realism assumes that, at
best, international institutions are an intervening variable
in security. 4 At their worst, institutions can cloud and
confuse the balance of power in the international system and
promote a false promise of security.
The realist view of institutions is essential to
testing an institutional perspective to national security in
Europe. For example, when institutionalist claims are made
Power (anything which aids in the control of man over man) can be measured in terms of
capacity to use force, the ability to use authority or influence to attain voluntary or involuntary
cooperation from another. Power includes both "hard" (military/capabilities) and "soft" (socio-
economic/the ability to use institutions to promote national interest) forms. For the formative
statement of contemporary realism in international relations see Hans J. Morganthau, Politics
Among Nations , 3rd ed., (New York: Knoph, 1978) 5-12. Also see Robert G. Gilpin, "The
Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Robert 0. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its
Critics (New York: Columbia University Press 1986) 304-305: David Baldwin, Paradoxes of
Power (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989); and Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Changing Nature of
American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
For a classic realist critique of institutions see George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy,
1900-
1950 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951) 95-103. This analysis of institutions
has been revived by John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International
Institutions," in
Michael E. Brown (et al), eds.. The Perils of A narchy: Contemporary Realism and
International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995) 332-376.
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supporting the enlargement of NATO into Central and Eastern
Europe based on the positive impact that NATO's
institutional structures had on managing relations between
Greece and Turkey, a realist counterf actual exposes this
claim as both untrue and a dangerous premise for NATO
enlargement. The pessimistic nature of realism helps
policymakers and scholars know what to avoid when using
institutions to promote security and what can go wrong if
they fail to do what is expected of them.
There is empirical justification for the realist view
of institutions given that three efforts to create formal
security architectures in Europe based on collective
security institutions (in which states organize military
power to manage crisis on the principle of all against one)
have been attempted and each failed to prevent war or end
conflict. The Concert of Europe, which formed the basis of
19th century European security, had some nascent
institutional functions. However, it was a system of great
power management that only worked well while there was a
general agreement among the five major actors and the
individuals representing them. Once interests diverged, the
institution could not adapt and the elite participants lost
their common goal of great power system management.
5 The
For analysis of the Concert of Europe as an institution see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes,"
in
Stephen D Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca. NY: Cornell University Press. 1981);
John Meuller. "A New Concert of Europe." Foreign Policy 77 (Winter 1988-1989); Charles
A.
and Clifford A. Kupchan. "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of
Europe,"
International Security 16:1 (Summer 1991) 114-161; Stanley Hoffmann, "Balance, Concert,
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League of Nations was a hierarchical security architecture
which sought to redefine national security as a collective
good through legal mechanisms mandating a commitment to
intervene on the principle of all against one when
institutional norms and principles were violated. However,
the League of Nations was neither collective nor secure and
was an institutional shell under which anarchy ruled in
spite of some minor successes. 6 From 1991 through 1994
Europe embarked on a concerted effort to build a new
amalgamated form of collective security based on
"interlocking institutions". While there was considerable
institutional activity during this time, over 200,000 people
were killed in the Balkan wars.
Realism is, nevertheless, limited as an analytical tool
if it assumes that an institutional analysis intrinsically
means a belief that collective security is attainable. In
fact, there are three institutional approaches with
relevance to understanding the sources of national security.
Anarchy, or None of the Above," in Gregory R. Treverton, ed., The Shane of the New Europe
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992); Patrick M. Morgan, "Multilateralism
and Security Prospects in Europe" in John G. Ruggie, ed.. Multilateralism Matters: The Theory
and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 327-364;
Richard Rosecrance, "Trading States in a New Concert of Europe," in Helga Haftendorn and
Christian Tuschhoff, eds., America and Europe in an Era of Change (Boulder, Co: Westview
Press, 1993) 127-146; and William H. Daugherty, "System Management and the Endurance of
the Concert of Europe," in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, Coping with Complexity in the
International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).
For analysis of the League of Nations see C.K. Webster and Sydney Herbert, The League of
Nations in Theory and Practice (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933); E.H. Carr, T_he
Twenty Years Crisis. 1919-1939 (London: Macmillan Press, 1940); and Inis L. Claude Jr.,
Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, 4th edition
(New York: Random House, 1984).
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The first is neoliberal which stresses national interest and
gains that states might make by cooperating within
institutions. Neoliberal institutionalism recognizes the
predominance of states and the importance of power but
maintains that some institutional arrangements can help
states better understand each other's aims and thereby
reduce uncertainty in the international environment. The
second school includes advocates of collective security who
would establish a hierarchical security architecture for
Europe attempting to make up for the failings of the Concert
of Europe and the League of Nations. A third is
constructivist and focuses on security communities and the
possibility that institutions can promote the evolution of a
community in which there is virtually no possibility of war
among a group of states
.
This project utilizes a neoliberal approach to
understanding international institutions and their
relationship to European security by testing the claim that
institutions, properly designed and adapted by their members
when necessary, can enhance national security in Europe.
While this school is the closest to realism among the three
institutional approaches to understanding European security,
there remain clear differences between the two. These two
traditions of international relations therefore provide a
rich analytical testing ground for adapting NATO's
institutional form as Europe moves into the 21st century.
As E.H. Carr writes:
16
...pure realism can offer nothinq but anaked struggle for power which mikes anykind of international societyimpossible
.. .The human will continue toseek and escape from the logical
consequences of realism in the vision of
an international order which, as soon asit crystallizes itself into concretepolitical form, becomes tainted with
self-interest and hypocracy and must
once more be attacked with theinstruments of realism.
There is no harder case for the role of institutions than
security. 8 Looking at institutions in terms of what they
should do rather than what they can do is not only
inapplicable to meeting challenges to European security - it
may be dangerous
.
Realism
Among realist scholars, Kenneth N. Waltz and John J.
Mearsheimer provide the most unyielding application of
realism to international security. To Waltz, the
international system is one of anarchy ". . .taken to mean not
just the absence of government, but also the presence of
disorder and chaos 9 The anarchical nature of international
Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 , 2nd ed., (London: Macniillan, 1969)
93.
A hard case for die success of institutions is one in which the interests in defection from an
institution are greater than those of cooperation, but cooperation occurs nevertheless. See Oran
Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables," in
James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., Governance Without Government: Order and
Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 160-194.
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, 1978) 1 14. To Waltz all states are similar actors within the international system and
domestic identity is not relevant to the primary objective of all states - survival. See Kenneth
Waltz, Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1959). For additional analysis of the role of anarchy in international relations see Hedley
Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia
17
relations forces states to pursue self-help and avoid
relying on the good nature of other states because "in an
unorganized realm each unit's incentive is to put itself in
a position to be able to take care of itself since no one
else can be counted on to do so." 10
In the absence of a balance of power, interdependence
and relative gains competition among states are causes of
instability and thus states pursue self-help by increasing
power for a minimum of survival or a maximum of hegemonic
dominance. As Waltz writes: "Interdependent states whose
relations remain unregulated must experience conflict and
will occasionally fall into violence ... If interdependence
grows at a pace that exceeds the development of central
control, then interdependence hastens the occasion for
war."
11 To Mearsheimer, states recoil from interdependence
which can infringe on sovereignty and even survival
.
Interdependence may lead to conflict because states will
struggle to escape the vulnerability that it creates. "The
greater the military advantage one state has over other
states, the more secure it is," Mearsheimer concludes.
12
Interdependence is likely to decrease as the number of great
powers diminishes and two is the lowest possible number.
13
University Press, 1977) 23-27 and Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little. The Logic of
Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press. 1993) l-
79.
Waltz Theory , 107.
Waltz Theory . 138.
Mearsheimer "The False Promise...", 338-339.
Waltz Theory . 145.
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Waltz concludes, for example, that a bipolar Europe is most
stable for: "Although we would prefer that East Europeans
freely choose their governors, we may nevertheless
understand that the Soviet Union's managing a traditionally
volatile part of the world has its good points... in Eastern
Europe and elsewhere, a division of managerial labor is more
readily arranged in bipolar than multipolar worlds." 14
To realists, balance of power systems are the most
stable and peaceful. Absent a balance of power, actual or
perceived shifts in relative power in one state can cause
fears in another thereby prompting security competition or
conflict. 15 If one state makes gains at the expense of
another, this can produce a security dilemma. As Robert
Jervis writes, "many of the means by which a state tries to
increase its security decreases the security of others." 16
Waltz suggests that when considering security cooperation
states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be
divided - not "will both of us gain?" but "who will gain
Waltz Theory . 208-209.
The theoretical debate over relative gains has evolved so that the general concern is not whether
they matter, but under what circumstances. Relative gains are likely to matter most when
security is at stake or when gains in capabilities can be easily transformed into military
capabilities. However, it is possible that when the number of actors increases, relative gains
concerns will be lowered because coalitions are more easily formed in response to a shift in
capabilities. For discussion of the degree to which relative gains matter in security see Charles
Lipson, "International Cooperation in Security and Economic Affairs," and Robert Powell,
"Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," in David Baldwin, Neorealism
and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993)
60-84 and 209-233.
Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," in Robert Art and Robert
Jervis,
International Politics: Anarchv. Force. Polit ical Economy, and Decision Making,
2nd ed,
(Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1984) 88.
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more?" 17 Similarly Robert Gilpin maintains that political
change is not the static distribution of power in the system
(bipolar or multipolar) but the dynamics of power
relationships over time. It is the differential or uneven
growth of power among states in a system that encourages
efforts by certain states to change the system in order to
enhance their own interests or to make more secure those
interests threatened by multipolar security competition.
Changes in relative power among the principal actors in the
system are precursors of international political change -
which can include systemic war. 18
Even the perception that any state is making relative
gains at the expense of another can prompt a state to
maximize its own national security and possibly lead to
instability or conflict. 19 As Mearsheimer writes: "Another
state may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be
certain of that judgment because intentions are impossible
to divine with 100 percent certainty."
20 Even states that
are currently allies may become competitors or enemies in
the future. 21
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18'
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Waltz Theory . 105.
Robert Gilpin, War & Chance in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1981) 93.
See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misnerception in International Politics (Princeton,
NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1976) and Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane,
"Achieving
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Baldwin 85-1 15.
Mearsheimer "The False Promise...", 337.
Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits ot Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest
Liberal Institutionalism," in Baldwin 128-129.
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Realism and NATO
Without the Soviet threat to unite the West in NATO,
contemporary realism predicts that the US will eventually
leave Europe and the Continent will enter a state of anarchy
- with a strong and united Germany exerting more influence
over European security. 22 For example, Mearsheimer writes
that
:
NATO provides a good example of
realist thinking about institutions.
NATO is an institution, and it certainly
played a role in preventing World War
III and in helping the West win the Cold
War. Nevertheless, NATO was basically a
manifestation of the bipolar
distribution of power in Europe during
the Cold War, and it was that balance of
power, not NATO per se, that provided
the key to maintaining security on the
continent. NATO was essentially a tool
for managing power in the face of a
Soviet threat. Now with the collapse of
the Soviet Union, realists argue that
NATO must either disappear or
reconstitute itself on the basis of the
new distribution of power in Europe.
Mearsheimer concedes that: "With the United States serving
as a night watchman, fears about relative gains among the
Western European states were mitigated, and furthermore,
those states were willing to allow their economies to become
tightly interdependent." 24 Yet realist analysis suggests,
as Waltz concludes, that after the Cold War: "NATO's days
See Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," in Sean M.
Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds.. The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993) 188.
Mearsheimer "The False Promise...", 340-341.
John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," The Atlantic 266:2 (August
1990).
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are not numbered, but its years are." 25 To realists, the
most pertinent question is: "How can an alliance endure in
the absence of a worthy opponent?" 26
Some realists acknowledge that, because of its
institutional qualities, a non- traditional alliance such as
NATO may survive for a time on bureaucratic inertia and
familiarity. However, NATO will eventually become a hollow
shell due to an inevitable decline in the American political
and military role in Europe. Realists do not necessarily
discount institutional shells for, once created, it is
easier to maintain an existing institutional arrangement
than to create a new one. As Richard K. Betts writes:
"Shells are far from useless - they can maintain the base
from which re-mobilization and coordination can be
accomplished in a shorter time than if they had to be
accomplished from scratch - but they do not provide the
animation or originality that revolutionary political
27
changes seem to mandate."
Though historically alliances dissolve in the absence
of a threat, institutionalized patterns of behavior can be
adapted to changed realities in the international system.
28
While the power foundations of an alliance may recede, its
25
. Kenneth N. Waltz. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," in Brown (et al). The
Perils of Anarchy 74.
26
.
Kenneth N. Waltz "The Emerging...", 73.
Richard K. Betts, "Systems of Peace as Causes of War? Collective Security, Anns Control, and
the New Europe," in Snyder and Jervis 272.
28
. See Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliheral Institutionalism,
and the
Future of NATO," Security Studies 3 (Autumn 1993) 3-43.
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institutional characteristics can give it life beyond its
original purpose. As Steven Walt has shown, an alliance can
have appeal not just because of actual capabilities a threat
may possess, but also the perceived danger or the
aggressiveness of a particular states' intentions. 29 Thus
while a threat may not be immediate, perception (based
largely on historical experience of interested states) can
give value to an alliance as an institution surviving in the
absence of a major threat. Fear of instability and the
unknown can be as much a unifying factor as a clear and
present danger. In this sense, cooperation may be an
important element of self-help. Thus Charles S. Glaser
notes that a policy is thought to provide a state with gains
when it increases what the state values, not when it
increases the instruments the state has available or
employs. 30 A state will primarily value security and if it
views institutions as helping to achieve that goal, then
participating in international institutions can be an
important part of self-help. 31
29
30
31
Steven M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," International Security
9:4 (Spring 1985) and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1987). Also see Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance
Politics," World Politics 36 (July 1984) 461-495 and Eric J. Labs, "Do Weak States
Bandwagon?" Security Studies 3 (Spring 1992) 383-416.
Charles S. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help," in Brown (et al) The
Perils of Anarchy 400-405.
This is an important element of the concept of "cooperative security" which stresses the
complexity and inter-related challenges of international security so that the security
of one state
is intrinsically linked to, and dependent on, the security of another state (or states).
This
interdependence of security challenges motivates states to increase their security
by utilizing
multilateral forums including formal institutions. See Ashton B. Carter,
William J. Perry, and
John D. Steinbruner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security (Washington D.C.:
The
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The strongest realist argument for maintaining NATO is
to expand the Alliance into Central and Eastern Europe.
Alliance-based NATO enlargement would help the West
consolidate the new status quo after the Cold War, fill a
security vacuum in the region, reassure Germany's neighbors
of its growing power in the heart of Europe, and increase
the West's deterrence capacity against an inevitable rise of
a new Russian challenge. In this realist view, the basic
premises of NATO - its alliance functions - will not be
sustainable unless those functions are expanded by
purposefully drawing new lines to the East reflecting the
balance of power. Even if Russia does not pose an immediate
threat, NATO enlargement would contain the zone of
instability in the post-Soviet region while at the same time
adding considerable assets to the power of the West,
particularly through the inclusion of Poland and its
sizeable armed forces.
Alliance enlargement as the solution to NATO's
uncertain role after the Cold War is not shared by all
realists. Some realists warn that enlargement is a relative
gain by the West at Russia's expense and that it
unnecessarily risks a provocative security dilemma and
confrontation between NATO and Russia while undermining pro-
Western politicians in Moscow. Moreover, it is an
overextension of American security commitments promoting a
Brookings Institutions, 1992) and Jamie E. Nolan, ed.. Global Engagement:
Cooperation and
Security^ the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. 1994).
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dangerous false promise of security when the trend in
European geopolitics is toward a decreasing US role and a
rising influence of a German dominated European Union.
Indeed, an alternative conclusion drawn from realist
propositions about power and balancing is not that NATO
should enlarge based on a potential Russian threat but,
rather, on furthering the American-led internal containment
of Germany by increasing US influence in the countries to
Germany 1 s East
.
Realism is limited in its overall explanatory power
because its conclusions are not based on detailed analysis
of institutions and their potential for enhancing national
security. To realists, all that mattered in NATO was the
Soviet threat - without that threat NATO is unlikely to
survive and its institutional attributes will have little
relevance. 32 Realism is successful in explaining NATO's
institutional form during the Cold War, but then loses its
primacy as it alone can not explain why NATO appears to be
transforming into a new institutional form with the
potential to play a major role increasing security in Europe
in the 21st century acting in conjunction with power
realities. However, while institutional approaches to the
study of NATO have provided good descriptions of its
institutional activity, institutionalism has yet to offer
See John Gerard Ruggie, "Realism, Institutions, and U.S. World Order Policy," International
Security (Summer 1995) and John Gerard Ruggie," America and the New World Order:
Multilateralism after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) 33-34.
25
rigorous proof that such activity actually increases
security. Because the risks of insecurity can be
extraordinarily high, the pessimism inherent in realism must
therefore be a core aspect of testing what NATO can, and cai
not, do for the future of European security. This is
especially true after the Cold War because as Jack Snyder
warns: "...institution building will do great damage if it
is attempted, but doesn't work... It will damage the West by
embroiling it deeply in the possibly insoluble problems of
the East . " 33
Inst i tut ional ism
International institutions are persistent and connected
sets of rules that prescribe behavior roles, constrain
activity, and shape expectations through international
regimes and organizations. Institutions are characterized
by the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which state expectations converge in a
given issue area. 34 The study of international institutions
can be divided into rational approaches which stress formal
regimes and organization, and reflectivist which emphasize
Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe," in Brown (et al) The Cold War and After,
139.
See Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1989) 3-5 and Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:
Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1983) 1-5.
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values, norms, and practices that vary across cultures and
can affect the nature of institutions. 35
This project assesses the relevance of NATO as a formal
organization enhancing security by drawing from a neoliberal
institutional perspective tested against realism.
Neoliberal institutionalism places a priority on explaining
the conditions under which states may use institutions to
their advantage and for mutual gain. The approach does not
explicitly reject realist propositions about institutions
and national security. Indeed, neoliberal institutionalists
do not claim that all institutions, in all circumstances,
have a major impact on outcomes. Most importantly,
neoliberal institutional analysis departs from the
hierarchical approaches of collective security or the
constructivist approaches of security community analysis.
As Robert 0. Keohane maintains: "Neoliberal
institutionalists accept a version of liberal principles
that eschews determinism and that emphasizes the pervasive
significance of international institutions without
denigrating the role of state power." 36 Similarly, Robert
Axelrod and Robert 0. Keohane assert that institutions and
their regimes: "...do not enforce rules in a hierarchical
sense, but they do change patterns of transaction costs and
See Keohane International Institutions . 166-179.
Keohane International Institutions . 1 1 . Also see Robert 0. Keohane, "Theory of World
Polities: Structural Realism and Beyond." In Robert 0. Keohane, ed.. Neorealism and its
Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) 195.
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provide information to participants, so that uncertainty is
reduced
.
1,37
Unlike realism, neoliberal institutionalism is
cautiously optimistic about the impact that international
institutions can have on outcomes promoting security and
lowering the prospects for war. Institutions are relevant
to security because they can make international cooperation
promoting security in an uncertain environment easier to
attain than in their absence. This is especially important
for, as Alexrod and Keohane suggest, the shadow of the
future and the uncertainty of anarchy in the international
system allow for an environment in which international
institutions both embody and affect state expectations. 38
As institutions gain permanence in the international system,
they can become important factors that states use to assess
their national security objectives and requirements.
Neoliberal institutionalists claim to have more explanatory
power than realism because the approach sees institutions as
fundamentally rooted in the realities of power and
interests. As Robert 0. Keohane and Lisa Martin write:
"Liberal institutionalists ... do not argue that NATO could
have maintained stability under any imaginable
conditions .. .What we argue is that institutions make a
Axelrod and Keohane, in Baldwin, 1 10.
Axelrod and Keohane, in Baldwin, 94.
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significant difference in conjunction with power
realities
.
1,39
Since the end of the Cold War scholars and policymakers
have increasingly asserted that institutions can apply to
security. For example, Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye
suggest that some types of security institutions aid the
exercise of influence, constrain bargaining strategies,
balance or replace other institutions, signal governments'
intentions by providing others with information and making
policies more predictable, specifying obligations, and
impacting both the interests and preferences of states. 40
Charles A. Kupchan maintains that institutions are relevant
to security because they: increase the level of information
available to all parties by enhancing transparency; raise
the costs of defection; and define what constitutes
defection, increase the likelihood of issue linkage, and
advance interstate socialization by promoting the concept of
an international community. 41 Regarding Europe, Robert 0.
Keohane asserts that: "If the theories of institutions have
any validity, the rich tapestry of institutions should both
constrain states, through the operation of rules, and
provide them with opportunities without positing the threats
39
.
Robert 0. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," international
Security 20: 1 (Summer 1995) 42.
40
.
Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds.. After the Cold War:
International Institutions and State Strategies in Eurone. 1989-1991 (Cambridge. MA: Harvard
University Press, 1994) 2-3.
41
.
Charles A. Kupchan, "The Case for Collective Security," in George W. Downs, ed.. Collective
Security after the Cold War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994) 50-51.
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to other states that are so characteristic of realistic
anarchy .
"
Institutionalism and NATO
Addressing NATO, John Gerard Ruggie notes that among
the options that the US had in establishing its post-World
War II security ties, the US adopted an explicitly
institutional approach via NATO. 43 Thus institutions,
adapted to reflect fluctuations in the international power
structure, have been an important element of NATO since its
founding. Steven Weber observes that as the alliance
developed over time, NATO facilitated communication through
a network of permanent and intermittently meeting bodies as
well as ad-hoc groups set up at the request of member
states. 4 Explaining NATO's post-Cold War adaptation John
Duf field asserts that "...NATO's institutional character has
probably contributed to the alliance's
persistence ... (NATO ' s) supranational bodies and the
individuals who head them have almost certainly helped the
alliance to adapt to changing external circumstances by
Robert 0. Keohane, "Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War." in
Baldwin 272.
Ruggie "Realism...", 4-5. These options included unilateral US security guarantees to one.
several, or an organization of European states; one or more US bilateral alliances with
European states; or a "dumbbell" model linking North American and European alliances. The
US, Ruggie maintains, chose the model which most closely approximated collective security
commitments.
Steve Weber, "Does NATO Have a Future?" in Beverly Crawford, ed.. The Future of
European Security (Berkeley, CA: Center for German and European Studies, University of
California at Berkeley. 1992) 369-370, 381. Also see Helga Haftendorn. NATO and the
Nuclear Revolution: A Crisis of Credibility. 1966-1967 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
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defining new tasks, identifying ways to achieve them,
forging compromises, and otherwise providing leadership." 45
A similar analysis has been forwarded by Robert McCalla who
explains NATO's persistence after the Cold War in neoliberal
institutional terms but without assessing whether or not
institutional activity is relevant to security. 46 In fact,
despite the growing institutional analysis of NATO and other
formal institutions with security functions, little detailed
consideration has been given to the basic challenge raised
by realism - do institutions affect the degree of national
security and, if so, how?
There is an increasing tendency among inst itut ionalist
theorists to assume that NATO had independent institutional
functions relevant to security beyond its traditional
alliance activity during the Cold War. For example, many
advocates of post -Cold War NATO enlargement assume that NATO
as an institution had an independent affect on
John Duffield, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Alliance Theory," in Ngaire
Woods, ed.. Explaining International relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996) 343-345. In a previous study, Duffield assessed NATO's role in helping to clarify
boundaries for state behavior in Cold War Europe, reinforcing the US commitment to European
security, and influencing military planning and capabilities. John S. Duffield, "Explaining the
Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes," Review of
International Studies 20:4 (October 1994) 369-388. In a more detailed analysis, Duffield has
shown that NATO's Cold War conventional force posture was affected independently by the
norms and rules of the institution, reinforced via rational incentives for compliance, which in
turn reinforced a process within states affecting the views and calculations of decision-makers.
See John Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995) 251-257.
Robert McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," International Organization 50:3
(Summer 1996). Also see Fred Chernoff, After Binolaritv: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of
Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of
Michigan Press, 1995).
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democratization in Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain.
Moreover, NATO's institutional characteristics are often
assumed to have had an independent impact constraining
Greece and Turkey from waging war against each other and
grounding Germany into the West. Some high-level NATO
oriented policymakers tend to view the institution as a
"club" of democracies expanding a zone of peace and
stability. 47 Wanting to accelerate NATO toward enlargement
in late 1994, a senior Clinton Administration official
opined that the (existing) Partnership for Peace "...is like
getting guest privileges at the club - you can play golf
once in a while. . .Now we want to send the bylaws and ask,
"do you want to pay the dues? 1 1,48
Such comments demonstrate allow Utopian wishes to
overcome practical understanding of just what NATO is and
whether it has adapted sufficiently to the post-Cold War
security environment to justify claims of institutional
relevance. Certainly NATO is not a club. It is a military
alliance that performs military functions in the heart of a
Continent that has witnessed the repeated horrors of
millions of dead through war and aggression in the 20th
century. Moreover, NATO is neither exclusively a collective
Analytically, Thomas Risse-Kappen has attempted to demonstrate that NATO's institutional
functions were explicitly reflective of the identity of its members and the fact that they were
primarily democracies. Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies: The
European Influence on U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
"US Wants to Expedite Entry of Eastern Nations into Alliance", The New York Times, 27
October 1994, A5.
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security architecture or a security community. Traces of
each are present but neither have been decisive in
establishing what institutional characteristics of NATO have
been relevant to security during its history or in the
contemporary context
.
At its founding, NATO was endowed with a positive view
of the world and given internal functions of consultation
should the actions of one member raise security concerns in
relation to another. Like the League of Nations and the UN,
NATO was endowed by its members with substantial
organizational attributes. However, NATO's institutional
architecture was created to facilitate a state-dominated
atmosphere with few, if any, independent characteristics.
Common practices and daily interaction in a multinational
setting, especially military planning and exercises, helped
increase the level of trust and transparency among the
member states. However, these institutional consequences of
NATO were secondary to maintaining collective defense and
alliance cohesion in times of Cold War tension and detente.
Thus, while NATO did provide for consultation, NATO was a
collective defense institution - not collective security.
49
In collective security states are organized for multilateral military responses to internal
challenges within a grouping of states and in collective defense, states organize their military
efforts against an external threat. For a classic assessment of the differences between collective
defense and collective security in relation to NATO, see Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Defense
versus Collective Security," in Arnold Wolfers, ed.. Alliance Policy in the Cold War
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959) 49-74. For a contemporary
analysis based on assumptions that NATO had collective security attributes see Charles A. and
Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security." International Security
20:1
(Summer 1995) 52-61.
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The primary difference being that NATO's institutional
attributes as developed during the Cold War were dependent
upon the international system and the demands of its member
states whereas, in collective security, the institution
should have shown clear indications that its form was an
independent variable affecting the degree of security.
Somewhat less obvious, but equally problematic, are
statements that NATO embodies a security community - or more
specifically, a pluralistic security community as described
by Karl Deutsch. A security community is a region in which
there is virtually no prospect for war among a group of
states. Deutsch described such a community as a group of
people which has become integrated within a territory based
on a sense of community and institutions and practices
strong enough and widespread enough to assure for durable
and dependable expectations of peaceful change among its
population. 50 Deutsch established the concept of
"pluralistic security communities" which retain the legal
independence of separated governments but comprise
relationships among a group of states which share
commonalities between the process of domestic security
Sense of community is defined as: " . . .a belief on die part of individuals in a group that they
have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can
be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'." Peaceful change is "the resolution of social
problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force."
Karl Deutsch (et al). Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1957) 5.
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establishment and that among states in the international
system
.
51
As NATO developed during the 1950s and 1960s many
integrationist scholars, including Deutch, looked at NATO as
a means toward a pluralistic security community based on its
apparently integrative trends. 52 However, by the mid-1960s
the dominance of NATO's alliance functions, which reflected
American dominance, combined with the French withdrawal from
NATO to lead integrat ionists away from NATO and toward the
European Community as a case study for regional integration
analysis. 53 The institutional processes in NATO that some
observers saw as promoting a nascent pluralistic security
community had much more to do with neoliberal institutional
activity intended to resolve problems associated with
collective action. 54 When these processes did have a
Deutsch 6.
In his analysis of security communities, Deutsch argued that NATO could contribute to the
evolution of a pluralistic security community by developing its economic and social potential to
make it "more than a military alliance. " Deutsch 203. For an analysis of trends toward
interdependence in NATO during the 1960s see Alastair Buchan, NATO in the 1960's: The
Implications of Interdependence (New York: Praeger, 1963).
Even the regional integration focus lost much of its appeal among integrationist scholars by the
1970s. See Ernst B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley:
Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, 1975). In his analysis of NATO, Steven Weber
revitalized debate about NATO as a pluralistic security community by asserting that NATO has
always been a peculiar mix of alliance and security community. Weber suggests that a security
community can be institutionalized as equivalence is favored over hierarchy with decisions
requiring unanimity and with formal organization existing primarily to enhance transparency and
to facilitate the transfer of information among states. Weber, in Crawford, 369-372.
For discussion of nascent security communities, see Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett,
"Security Communities," Paper prepared for delivery at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, September 1-3, 1994, 44-47. Adler and Barnett
maintain that a nascent security community exists when governments of two or more states begin
to consider how they might coordinate their security relations in order to increase their mutual
security.
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positive impact on security beyond NATO's alliance
functions, it was dependent upon strategic calculations
related to the needs of collective defense. The period
after the Cold War has shown that NATO has adapted its
institutional form so that it may contribute to the idea of
an emerging pluralistic security community. However, a more
clearly defined geographic basis for an expanding security
community is more likely to be found in the European
tt 55Union
.
Despite the absence of collective security or security
community and the constraints of its predominant
institutional form of allied collective defense, this
project shows that NATO has the potential to promote
security in the future if it is carefully adapted to meet
the evolved security needs of its member states. NATO can
reduce uncertainty in international security relations by
facilitating the flow of information among its members and
between members and non-members. Such information flows
also can also lower the transaction costs of identifying
challenges early and responding effectively to crisis.
See Emanuel Adler, European Union: A Pluralistic Security Community (Berkeley. CA:
University of California Press. 1 99 1 ). Adler challenges the premise that NATO can promote a
pluralist security community after the Cold War. To Adler an enlarged pluralistic security
community in Europe cannot be constituted in the absence of a deepening and enlargement of
European economic and political integration. Efforts by institutions to create or promote a
security community are likely to fail because a security community must evolve from below and
cannot be imposed from above. In this view, it is the grass roots, lower level, activity of the
OSCE, and not NATO, that should be the "institutional embryo" of a growing pluralistic
security community in post-Cold War Europe. Emanuel Adler, "Europe's New Security Order:
A Pluralistic Security Community," in Crawford 287-326.
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Through multinational military planning NATO can enhance
transparency among members and non-members so that the
danger that mispercept ion of state intentions might lead to
security competition or war can be lowered by contributing
to an institutional culture of trust, confidence-building,
and reassurance while helping to identify defectors from
international security cooperation. As a result, NATO can
enhance confidence on the part of states (and their leaders)
of relative safety within an uncertain international
environment. Moreover, NATO has not yet, but might
contribute to the socialization of states toward more
peaceful state domestic and foreign policies.
Whether the NATO member states will translate this
potential into reality via a major institutional adaptation
remains to be seen. To date, NATO's members have not
settled on a new form that will ensure the relevance of
these institutional functions to the security of its
members, and non-members, in the future. To examine the
challenge confronting NATO, it is necessary to measure its
variations in institutional form over time and assess what
elements, if any, are worth retaining.
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Measuring Variations in Institutional Form
There has been little analytical study of the impact
that variations in institutional form have on security. 56
However, formal institutions have specific characteristics
which are measurable over time and which can have a direct
impact on the relevance of institutions for enhancing
national security. To measure institutional form and the
affect of institutions on security this project assesses
four key elements of institutional design including: tasks;
organizational capabilities; norms, principles, rules, and
procedures; and capacity for change. It examines
variations in NATO's institutional form measured over time
and assesses whether changes in institutional form affected
the degree of national security in Europe.
Tasks
The primary indicators of institutional form are the
particular problems that an institution is designed to
address. In this sense, institutional form is dependent
upon the demands that states place on it based on the nature
56
Deborah D. Avant has shown how differences in national institutions can affect military doctrine
within states. See Deborah D. Avant, "The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine:
Hegemons in Peripheral Wars," International Studies Quarterly 37 (1993) 409-430. Similarly.
Peter J. Katzenstein has shown that variations in domestic norms and the institutional structures
within states can impact the means through which states seek to enhance their internal
security.
Katzenstein concludes that while norms are both contested and contingent, it is not
possible to
adequately explain state behavior without an examination of the normative context.
Peter J.
Katzenstein "Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and
Japan." in
Judith Goldstein and" Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions,
and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993) 265-295.
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of security challenges. At their inception, or as part of
an institutional transformation, institutions are a means to
a particular end and the nature of the goals and priorities
of the member states will affect institutional form. Once
tasks are defined, institutional effectiveness is measured
by the degree to which an institution aids states in meeting
particular goals. Once tasks are given to an institution,
then the form will depend upon the nature of those tasks.
In this sense, international institutions are both
constituted by, and constituted of, state actions. 57
Organizational Capabilities
The degree of institutional autonomy and formalism are
important measures of institutional form. 58 Autonomy is the
degree to which an institution has a capacity to act
independent of its member states and enforce compliance with
institutional objectives. Because of the dangers inherent
in security cooperation and the historical failures of
collective security, states are not likely to give
institutions a high degree of autonomy to affect national
See Alexander Wendt. "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,"
International Organization 41:3 (Summer 1987) 335-370; Alexander Wendt and Raymond
Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel,
eds.. Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989) 51-73; and Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What
States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46:2
(Spring 1992) 391-425.
Marc Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zurn, "The Study of International Regimes,"
Working Paper Prepared for the International Institute for Applied System Analysis WP-94-113
(November 1994) 10.
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security independent from state control. Therefore,
institutional enforcement mechanisms rest on the willingness
of states to utilize them. Absent a convergence of
interests based on a shared threat, security institutions
must depend on less reliable secondary compliance methods
such as long-term socialization. Autonomy is measured by
the degree to which institutional attributes have a
measurable impact on the tasks it is designed to undertake.
Formalism is measured by the physical organizational
structure of an institution and the means through which it
facilitates problem solving.
Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures
Institutional principles, norms, rules and procedures,
particularly those affecting membership, can also affect
institutional form. Principles are the fundamental beliefs
that the members of an institution hold. Norms are the
standards of behavior established in terms of rights and
obligations that states agree to assume when participating
in a formal institution. Rules specify the boundaries of
state behavior, and thus help to define and identify
defection, for members of an institution. Procedures
facilitate multilateral decision-making and help ease
tension or conflict among institutional members.
Principles, norms, rules, and procedures contribute to
institutional legitimacy, the capacity for action, and help
40
measure compliance in an institutional setting. 59
Membership in an institution can be classified as
restricted, conditionally open, or open. Restricted
institutions limit membership to a small group of states
that have some particular set of interests in common, or
those which have specified standards of domestic political
structures within states. Conditionally open institutions
are accessible in principle to states that are willing to
accept a set of prescribed commitments, which not all states
may be able or willing to make. Open institutions are
universal and accessible to all states with the exception of
those whose policies represent gross violations of specified
institutional norms. 60
Capacity for Change
International institutions are not static entities -
they can evolve, enlarge or contract, or be realigned and
redesigned if states see value in their maintenance.
Institutional change can result from internal
contradictions, a shift in the underlying structure of
power, and exogenous forces such as the transformation of
See Robert Axelrod. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science
Review 80:4 (December 1986) 1095-1 11 1; Friedreich V. Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and
Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 48-57; and Elinor Olstrom,
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes," in Volker Rittberger, ed..
Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 39. Keohane
assesses restricted institutions as promoting cartelization, conditionally open institutions as
fostering collaboration, and open institutions as limited to consultation and sharing of opinion.
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technology. States learn and adapt to changed
circumstances and if they find that an institution has
benefit for their national security, then a demand for
maintenance and transformation may occur. Rather than
fundamentally reconceptualizing the nature of an
institution, states are likely to pursue adaptation of
existing institutions when old challenges disappear and new
ones arise. This is especially true because it is less
costly to adapt an existing institution than it is to create
a new one from scratch. When national security is at stake,
adaptation is the most likely outcome of major institutional
efforts to meet new challenges. Such adaptation can occur
incrementally or in an ad-hoc manner. Adaptation is a
process controlled by member states with minimal
6 3hierarchical insights provided by the institution itself.
61
62
63
Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in Krasner
106-110.
For discussion of institutional adaptation patterns see Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge is
Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1990) 7-15.
It is important to distinguish between adaptation and learning. Institutional learning is a process
in which institutions themselves recognize, through a variety of means, that a new problem has
emerged in international relations requiring a fundamental rethinking of past institutional form
and change in state behavior. In this sense, institutions which learn become the causal factor
educating members as to the nature of the new challenge. Learning is rare and because states are
most concerned about security, state driven adaptation is the most likely, if not
desirable, means
of institutional change when national security is the policy problematique. See
Peter M. Haas
and Ernst B. Haas, "Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance."
Global
Governance 1 (1995) 255-285.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Subsequent chapters are organized around the central
thesis of this project - that variations in institutional
form can affect the degree of national security in Europe.
Each chapter begins with a short introduction and overview
relating the case study to the thesis. Each chapter
concludes with an analysis of the four measures of
institutional form including tasks; organizational
capabilities; principles, norms, rules, and procedures,-
and capacity for change and assesses their impact on the
degree of security. More general conclusions about
institutions, NATO, and the future of European security are
made in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER III
BUILDING AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM:
THE FORMATIVE PERIOD OF NATO
Introduction and Overview
This chapter shows that, in creating the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, the key actors incorporated a
sophisticated analysis of security challenges, alliances,
and institutions. The negotiators created an institutional
form that drew from both realist and inst itut ionalist
considerations about the sources of national security. The
Soviet threat was the primary factor which caused American
and West European diplomatic elites to consider responses to
enhance their security. However, a more complex
understanding of security emerged - one that viewed Western
Europe as threatened by instability and a lack of
confidence. In the negotiations over NATO's institutional
form, the parties rejected the arguments of the primary
realists involved in the negotiations. Instead, they
intentionally shaped NATO's institutional form to withstand
the challenges that realists warned of by making it more
than a traditional alliance. NATO was established on a
unique blend of realist and institutionalist assessments of
the sources of national security in Europe.
European Security After World War II
After World War II, European security was challenged by
a number of factors. To the East stood a massive Soviet
44
presence consolidating its gains through the creation of
puppet regimes throughout Eastern Europe. 64 Western Europe
was economically devastated and militarily weak so that it
could not balance the Soviet Union alone. Economic
disaster, fragile democracies, and dispirited populations
also made West European states susceptible to internal
Soviet-backed communist influence or destabilizing
nationalism. The US was dramatically reducing its troop
presence in Europe and those that remained had low combat
potential
.
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Toward the end of World War II, Britain considered such
potential postwar developments and sought to
institutionalize the integrated wartime military cooperation
in the combined US and British staffs. In September 1943,
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted in a speech
at Harvard University that: "...it would be a most foolish
and improvident act on the part of our two Governments, or
either of them, to break up this smooth- running and
immensely powerful machinery the moment the war is over... we
are bound to keep it working and in running order after the
The Soviet Union maintained approximately 30 divisions in Eastern Europe (including 9 tank
and 1 1 motorized infantry divisions). Western intelligence estimates concluded that in the
immediate postwar years, the Soviet Union had some 5 million men in the armed forces with
175 divisions in the western Soviet Union and another 125 divisions in strategic reserve.
Richard Kuglar, Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War (Santa
Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993) 30-36.
The US position in Western Europe was especially tenuous because the Americans were unable
to send more than a division anywhere without resorting to partial mobilization. As a result, the
entire defense of Western Europe relied on American air power and its nuclear component.
Robert Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1962) 29-30.
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war - probably for a good many years." 66 On 9 November 1944
the British Chiefs of Staff issued a classified report which
concluded that Britain's security interests lay in the
formation of a West European security group which could
cooperate with the British commonwealth and the US. Such a
security group would begin with an Anglo-French alliance and
then expand to include closer cooperation with Belgium,
Holland, Denmark, and perhaps Germany. At Potsdam in 1945,
the British Chiefs of Staff proposed that the US and Britain
have continued machinery for the mutual exchange of
information
.
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By early 1946 postwar allied security cooperation took
on a sense of urgency. On 2 2 February the top US government
Soviet expert in Moscow, George Kennan, warned that the West
faced a political force committed "fanatically to the belief
that with the US there can be no permanent modus vivendi ,
that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony
of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life
destroyed, the international authority of our state broken,
if Soviet power is to be secured."
68 On 5 March, Churchill
gave a speech at Fulton, Missouri, warning of an "iron
curtain" descending on Eastern Europe in the form of Soviet
Richard A. Best, Jr., "Cooperation with Like-Minded Peonies": British Influences on American
Security Policy. 1945-1949 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986)28.
See John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations. 1939-1980: The Special Relationship
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); Joseph Smith, ed., The Origins of NATO (Exeter, UK:
University of Exeter Press, 1990); and John Lewis Gaddis, The Lone Peace: Inquiries into the
History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
"The Long Telegram" (Kennan) 22 February 1946. FRUS, 1946, 4:706.
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domination. Churchill proposed a "fraternal association"
between Britain and the US. This required: "...not only
the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our
two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance
of the intimate relationship between our military advisers,
leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity
of weapons and manuals of instruction, and to the
interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges." 69
Churchill concluded that: "If there is to be a fraternal
association of the kind I described, with all the extra
strength and security which both our countries can derive
from it, let me make sure that great fact is known to the
world, and that it plays its part in steadying and
stabilizing the foundations of peace ... Prevention is better
than cure . " 70
American involvement in postwar European security had
become increasingly important for the Europeans because of
the immediate concern over Soviet intentions in the East,
the potential for a renewal of German nationalism, and the
inability of Britain to maintain its traditional stabilizing
influence on the Continental balance of power. In an effort
to address the German question, Britain and France signed
the Dunkirk Treaty on 4 March 1947 which committed them to
mutual assistance in the event of German aggression and to
Don Cook, Forcing the Alliance: NATO. 1945-1950 (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1989) 52-
53.
Cook 52-53.
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cooperate in their postwar reconstruction efforts. 71
However, the British dilemma had come to a head in Greece
where London could no longer afford to furnish military and
economic assistance to the western-oriented Greek monarchy
that was engaged in an intense civil war against Soviet
backed communist rebels. Britain hoped the Americans would
fill the void.
The US responded with the Truman Doctrine announced on
12 March 1947 in a presidential address to Congress. Truman
announced direct American aid to Greece and Turkey but based
the program on universal principles of freedom, democracy,
and peace. 72 In June the US Secretary of State George
Marshall announced an American program of economic
assistance for Western Europe to prevent a rise of
nationalism, promote democracy, and establish economic
containment of the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan
implicitly recognized the growing convergence between
interdependence, stability, and security. However, it was
designed to promote independence from, and not dependence
on, the US. 73 With the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan, the US entered into a gradual process of
See John Baylis, "Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO." Journal of Strategic
Studies 5 (June 1982) 236-247.
Message to a Joint Session of Congress, 12 March 1947. Public Papers of the Presidents , 1948,
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963) 178-179.
Marshall Plan aid was to be distributed to the recipient countries to promote self-help once they
had first designed their own reconstruction programs. For detailed analysis of the program and
its security implications see Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold
War. 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
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institutionalized regional commitments to promote security
in areas understood to be key to its national interest.
The Rio Treaty
In December 1947 Congress approved the Rio Treaty which
bound the US to a regional security guarantee in the
Americas. The accord stressed mutual aid and raised hope
that it might have broader implications for preserving peace
in Europe. While primarily an institutionalization of the
Monroe Doctrine - the Rio Treaty was an important signal to
the world that the US favored regional security institutions
as a basis for its postwar global involvement. This pact
was justified by Article 51 of the UN Charter which
guaranteed states the "inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence." 74
The Rio Treaty provided for mutual assistance in the
event of an aggressive action against any American state.
Internal procedures were created to promote the peaceful
settlement of regional disputes prior to referring them to
the UN. Such a regional pact would promote the same
principles institutionalized in the UN charter but, at the
same time, circumvent a Soviet veto over security issues in
Article 5 1 of the Charter of the United Nations states that: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council under the
present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security."
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areas of vital US national interest. The treaty condemned
war, and its signatories agreed to resort to the threat or
the use of force only in a manner consistent with that
provided for by the UN. Following passage of the treaty on
8 December 1947 by a vote of 72-1, the Chairman of the US
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Arthur Vandenberg,
stated that: "We are building upon mutual trust... This is a
true partnership which represents the greatest advance ever
made in the business of collective peace." 75
On 15 December The New York Times columnist James
Reston noted that some US officials hoped "to negotiate a
regional alliance within the United Nations for the defense
of those areas of Western and Southern Europe that are
considered by our strategic experts to be essential to our
own security." He concluded that "...it is gradually
becoming recognized in the Capital that economic security
and political security, like peace, are indivisible, and
that classic diplomatic statements of concern are no answer
to the problem of communist internal power.
"
7< Reston, who
had very close ties to senior US officials, was reflecting a
growing understanding that the threat to European security
"Americas' Treaty Ratified, 72-1; Vandenberg Cites Bar to Veto," The New York Times, 9
December 1947, Al,4. Vandenberg, from Michigan, was the Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and a senior member of the Republican leadership with broad bi-partisan
respect in the Senate.
James Reston, "Need for Firm U.S. Stand in Support of Italy is Seen," The New York Times,
15 December 1947, A3. Also see Timothy Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The
Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981)3'
41.
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more complicated than a direct Soviet invasion. West
European democracies struggling with economic disaster after
the war needed a sense of reassurance as to their relative
safety and stability to deter the political challenge that
communism, or nationalism, might pose.
The Brussels Pact
On 15 December 1947 British Foreign Secretary Ernest
Bevin met with US Secretary of State George Marshall in
London following the collapse of four-power dialogue over
the future of Germany. 77 Bevin told Marshall that Europe
and America must increase their commitment to each other.
He suggested that this need not necessarily come through a
formal alliance, but rather an "understanding backed by
power, money and resolute action ... sort of a spiritual
V 8federation of the West." Summarizing his view of the
Soviet challenge Bevin said:
I am convinced that the Soviet Union will not
deal with the West on any reasonable terms in the
foreseeable future and that the salvation of the
West depends upon the formation of some form of
union, formal or informal in character, in Western
Europe, backed by the United States and the
Dominions - such a mobilization of moral and
material force will inspire confidence and energy
within, and respect elsewhere.
The tour powers controlling their respective sectors in Germany were the US, Britain, France,
and the Soviet Union.
"The Charge in London (Gallman) to the Secretary of State," London, 22 December 1947.
FRUS, 1948, 3:2.
Quoted By Theodore C. Achilles, "The Omaha Milkman: The Role of the United States in the
Negotiations," in Andre de Staercke, ed., NATO's Anxious Birth (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1985) 30.
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Marshall generally supported Bevin's sentiments. However,
he was adamant that Bevin proceed under the same formula as
the Marshall Plan and that the Europeans should first
institutionalize a defense community in Western Europe.
Marshall advised Bevin that the Europeans should "come
together for their own protection, see what they could do,
and then turn to the United States, and see what we could do
to make up the difference between what the situation
required and what they were able to do by their own
efforts
.
"
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On 13 January 1948 Bevin informed Washington that, in
his view, Marshall Plan aid alone would not prevent further
Soviet encroachment on the West. "Political and indeed
spiritual forces must be mobilized in our defense", Bevin
suggested. This would be attained by seeking: "...to form
with the backing of the Americans and the Dominions a
Western democratic system comprising Scandinavia, the Low
Countries, France, Italy, Greece and possibly Portugal .. .As
soon as circumstances permit we should, of course, wish also
to include Spain and Germany without whom no Western system
can be complete." 81 The American response was positive but
not as specific as Bevin might have liked. In a 20 January
letter to Lord Inverchapel (the British Ambassador in
Charles E. Bohlen, Transformation of American Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 1969) 92-93.
"Summary of a Memorandum Representing Mr. Bevin's Views on the Formation of a Western
Union." FRUS, 1948, 3:5.
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Washington), Marshall wrote that: "As in the case of the
recovery program, we heartily welcome European initiative in
this respect and Mr. Bevin may be assured of our
wholehearted sympathy in this undertaking." 82 Contrary to
realist assumptions about maximizing gains, self-help and
power, the next day John Hickerson (Director of the State
Department's Office of European Affairs) told Inverchapel
that the US hoped to help create "a third force which was
not merely the extension of US influence but a real European
organization strong enough to say 'no' both to the Soviet
Union and to the United States, if our actions should seem
so to require . " 83
On 2 2 January Bevin informed parliament that he had
instructed British representatives in France and the Benelux
countries to begin negotiations on the creation of a Western
Union. The rationale for this departure from Britain's
traditional avoidance of Continental security commitments
was placed in the context of West European integration.
Bevin asserted that: "The nations of Western Europe have
much to unite them - common sacrifice in two wars, their
parliamentary democracy, and their striving for economic
"Secretary of State to the British Ambassador," 20 January 1948. FRUS, 1948, 3:8.
"Memorandum of Conversation, by Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)."
FRUS, 1948, 3:11. Hickerson had been advising Marshall that a regional security pact should
be negotiated with Europe based on the Rio Treaty. In a memo to Marshall he wrote that: In
my opinion a European Pact modelled on the treaty of Rio de Janeiro is the best answer to the
security problem for Western Europe. For such a pact to be really effective, the United States
would have to adhere. " "Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs
(Hickerson) to the Secretary of State." FRUS, 1948, 3:7.
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rights and conceptions of and love for democracy." 84
However, a Western Union alone would have been inadequate
for the security of Western Europe. As the Belgian Prime
Minister Paul-Henri Spaak asserted: "...any defense
arrangement which did not include the United States would be
without practical value." 85 The Western Union was a bold
initiative that risked prompting Soviet aggression taking
advantage of this institutional weakness. The Western Union
thus became an institution primarily designed to help its
members increase their security via a broader, transatlantic
institution involving an American security guarantee.
American reassurance was a primary concern for France.
Because any real defense of Western Europe would require
meeting the Soviet challenge as far East as possible,
Germany would have to be a part of Western defense plans
.
Such a forward defense strategy would require German
rearmament to be credible. Additionally, the success of the
Marshall Plan and European integration would likely hinge on
economic development in Western Germany. France promoted
forward defense and hoped to make substantial gains from
Marshall Plan aid and European integration. However, France
could not easily forget its adversarial history with Germany
and its recent Nazi occupation. Nevertheless, as Kennan
concluded, only a Western Union "...holds out any hope of
Parliamentary Dehates . House of Commons, 1947-1948, 5th series. 446, columns 383ff.
FB1S. 1948, 3:76-78.
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restoring the balance of power in Europe without permitting
Germany to become again the dominant power." 86 While Kennan
was correct in this assessment, he failed to understand that
a successful Western Union, which would ultimately rest on
Franco-German reconciliation, could not emerge in the
absence of direct American reassurance of its commitment to
West European security.
On 2 8 February Marshall related French fears about the
German question to the continued presence of American
troops
:
The French are secure against Germany as long
as (the) occupation continues.
. .In view of
Communist integration of a third of Germany and
the likelihood of continuing stringent economic
conditions, a united Germany bereft of Western
occupation force would be an easy prey to
Communist domination. As long as European
Communism threatens US vital interests and
national security we could ill afford to abandon
our military position in Germany ... The logical
conclusion is that three power occupation may be
of unforeseeable and indefinite duration, thus
offering protracted security guarantees and87
establishing a firm community of interests.
This desire to reassure France was shared in London where
Bevin wrote to Prime Minister Clement Atlee on 1 March:
Instead of being bottled up in Central
Europe, we feel the Germans have a great
contribution to make to the world's industrial and
social development. Our aim is to protect
ourselves against any further aggression by
Germany and at the same time to bring her back
into the community of nations as a united entity
on a democratic basis, with democracy as Western
civilization understands it. In this connection
of course, you must not forget the French. We all
talk too much about Germany. Our approach,
therefore, to a reorganization of economic, social
"Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State."
FRUS, 1948. 3:7.
"The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom," 28 February 1948. FRUS,
1948, 2:101.
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and defence weapons is a good neighbourly policyfirst with the French and now with Benelux In
view of the fact that France has been invaded so
many times and paid such a price, we must
therefore arrange our defences and our
responsibilities to give the French the assurance
of her security as far as we humanly can.
Marshall and Bevin had signaled a clear understanding of the
need to alleviate French fears by institutionalizing a
policy of reassurance in the form of a general US commitment
to European security.
After Soviet-backed communists took over Czechoslovakia
in late February and the pro-western Czech Foreign Minister
Masaryk was murdered on 10 March, Western states became
fearful of so called "5th column" Soviet invasions in which
covert activity might be used to rally communist forces in a
fragile democracy and turn that states' policy toward the
Soviet sphere of influence. Western concerns were
heightened by ongoing civil war in Greece, scheduled
elections in April showing the possibility of a communist
victory in Italy, and Soviet pressure on Finland and Norway
to enter into non-aggression pacts with Moscow. French
national security concerns were intensified by these
developments as it had recently undergone major work
stoppages and had a large communist presence in its National
Assembly
.
France had few options for increasing its national
security. France could not isolate Germany as it had in the
early 1920s for fear that such a policy could push Western
88
.
Quoted in Alexander Rendel, "Secret Explorations: the Anglo-American initiatives," in de
Staercke 12.
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Germany into the Soviet orbit. "Going it alone" was no
longer an option as the threat was much greater than the
resources France could marshall. Establishing bilateral
alliances in Eastern Europe was not possible so long as the
Soviet Union occupied the region and political accommodation
with Moscow was not an option. France was thus left with
little choice but to seek hard security guarantees from
Britain and the US. Even the French nationalist General
Charles de Gaulle said on 7 March that:
It is necessary that there be formed among
the free states of Europe an economic, diplomatic,
and strategic grouping, joining their productions,
their moneys, their exterior action, and their
means of defense... It is necessary that the effort
of old Europe and that of America be joined to put
our poor world back on its feet again. Their
support must extend at the same time to the domain
of defense and in a manner as precise and explicit
on the one hand as in the Marshall project in the
matter of credits and imports.
France especially wanted direct military assistance to
rebuild its national security capabilities. Paris
maintained a deep concern, based on the failure of the
League of Nations to provide for its security before World
War II, about reliance on institutions for national
security
.
Nevertheless, a Western European security institution
was created in Brussels by the United Kingdom, France and
the Benelux countries on 17 March 1948."° The Western
Lansing Warren, "De Gaulle, Asking for French Power, Seeks Our Arms Aid, The New York
Times , 8 March 1948, A 1,9.
Formally called "The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective
Self43efense." Department of State Bulletin 18:462 (9 May 1948) 600.
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Union, as it was informally called, sought to promote
integration and mutual assistance in a range of political,
economic, and military activities. The Western Union
established a Consultative Council to "promote the
attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples
and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other
related services of their countries (Article II)." The
members agreed to make "every effort in common to lead their
peoples towards a better understanding of the principles
which form the basis of their common civilization and to
promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves
or by other means (Article III)
.
11
Article IV of the Brussels Treaty stated that if any
member should be the object of attack in Europe, the others
will, "...in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so
attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in
their power." Article VII specifically mentioned Germany
but had further implications for the emerging Soviet
challenge. It mandated consultation in the event of
aggression at the request of any member "...in whatever area
this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be
adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by
Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any
situation constituting a danger to economic stability."
Additionally, the treaty established a principle of internal
conflict resolution by requiring member states to resolve
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internal conflicts according to the rules of the
International Court of Justice (Article VIII)
.
Worried about a potential isolationist backlash at
home, the Truman Administration was careful not to associate
publicly with the formation of the Western Union. However,
privately the Western Union was encouraged by Washington as
a prerequisite for discussing a transatlantic security
institution. By building a security institution from
scratch, the West European countries had made a substantial
step toward coordinating their long-term national security
objectives. Where collective security had failed in the
League of Nations, an emerging convergence of interests was
growing between the US and Western Europe that an alliance
built upon partnership and community would succeed thirty
years later.
Framing the Transatlantic Community
On the day that the Brussels Treaty was signed,
President Truman delivered a foreign policy speech to a
joint session of Congress. Truman suggested that national
security must be understood in a broad context. Western
Europe needed to integrate its economic resources to escape
its history of war and defend itself against the Soviet
Union. However, if Western Europe was going to unite
economically it must feel reassured of its security. Truman
said
:
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The free nations of Europe realize that
economic recovery, if it is to succeed, must be
afforded some measure of protection againstinternal and external aggression. The movement
toward economic cooperation has been followed by a
movement toward common self -protection in the face
of the growing menace to their freedom.
. .Thisdevelopment deserves our full support and I am
confident that the United States will, by
appropriate means, extend to the f ree nations the
support which the situation requires.
On 22 March American, Canadian, and British officials began
secretive discussions deep within the Pentagon over the
prospect of creating a formal transatlantic institution to
be based either on the Brussels Pact or the Rio Treaty. 92
The two main Soviet specialists in the US State
Department, Kennan and Charles Bohlen, opposed a formal
treaty on realist grounds - arguing that it was an
inappropriate security commitment for the US to make and
that it might foreclose on a political settlement with
Moscow. 93 While taken into account, Kennan' s and Bohlen'
s
views were dismissed in favor of an institutionalized
security commitment to Western Europe, enshrined in a formal
treaty, and built upon a common threat perception and shared
Address to a Joint Session of Congress, 17 March 1948. Puhlic Papers of the Presidents 184.
The talks were preliminary but resulted in a working paper presented by the US drafted
principally by John Hickerson. The central recommendations included having the President of
the United States invite thirteen other countries (U.K., France, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg,
Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Italy) to negotiate a
collective defense agreement for the North Atlantic. Pending conclusion of an agreement, the
President would issue a unilateral declaration that the US would consider an armed attack against
a siimatory of the Brussels Treaty as an armed attack against itself. "Final Draft," undated,
identified as "Pentagon Paper, 840.00/3-1748. FRUS, 1948, 3:72-75.
Kennan summarized his and Bohlen's views in a note to Marshall and Lovett on 29 April 1948.
"Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary and
Undersecretary of State (Robert Lovett), April 29, 1948." FRUS, 1948, 3:108-109.
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values. 94 They wanted it to reflect political, moral,
"spiritual" elements which united the North Atlantic
community of nations. As Escott Reid, a key figure in
Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had written in a
internal memorandum to the Prime Minister on 13 March:
. . .the purpose of the pact is to rally the
spiritual as well as the military and economic
resources of western Christendom against Soviet
totalitarianism; that it must therefore not be
merely a negative anti-Soviet military alliance
but must be the basis for a dynamic liberal
counter-offensive. The pact may succeed in giving
us a long period of peace if it results in
creating an overwhelming preponderance of force
against the Soviet Union, but the force to be
overwhelming must not only be military and
economic force; it must be the force that comes
from ability to rally to our side all non-
Communists in all countries, including our own,
who are now apathetic, fearful or doubtful. A
bold move is necessary to raise the hearts and
minds and spirits of all those in the world who
love freedom that confidence and faith which will
restore their vigor. The pact must set forth the
gospel - the good news of our faith - for which we
are willing to live and die. It must make as
clear as possible the methods which the peoples
and governments of the Free World intend to follow
to make good their faith in human rights and
fundamental freedoms, in the worth and dignity of
man and in the principles of parliamentary
democracy^ personal freedom and political
liberty
.
Reid's suggestion became formal Canadian policy. On 29
April Canadian Foreign Minister Louis St. Laurent stated
that it may be necessary for free countries of the West to
establish a security league whose purpose would be to
"create a dynamic counter-attraction of a free, prosperous,
Robert H. Ferrell, "The Formation of the Alliance: 1948-1949." in Lawrence S. Kaplan, ed.,
American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance (Kent. OH: The Kent State University Press,
1991) 24.
Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hone (Toronto, Ontario: McClelland and Stewart, 1977) 135-
136.
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and progressive society..." 96 On 27 May British Prime
Minister Clement Atlee denied that a "power pact" was sought
but rather "an association of free peoples, based on a
community of ideas, cooperating economically and defensively
to provide a firm material basis toward spiritual unity." 97
The Vandenberg Resolution
Gaining US Senate approval for a treaty establishing a
peacetime entangling alliance in Europe would require a
strong bi-partisan effort to overcome isolationist sentiment
in the US. Key State Department figures (primarily
Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett) consulted with Senate
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Arthur Vandenberg who
indicated his support for a treaty. 98 Passed by the Foreign
Relations Committee on 19 May and approved by the full
Senate on 11 June, the "Vandenberg Resolution" endorsed the
"progressive development of regional and other collective
arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in
accordance with the purposes, principles and provisions of
the (UN) Charter." 99
The Vandenberg Resolution showed that the institutional
form of the US security commitment would proceed according
P.J. Philip, "Canada Endorses Free Nation Unity," The New York Times . 30 April 1948. A5.
"Attlee Ties Peace to Brussels Pact," The New York Times , 28 May 1948, A 10.
"Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State," 1 1 April 1948. FRUS,
1948, 3:82-83 and 93-94.
The Vandenberg Resolution was formally titled "Resolution of the Foreign Relations Committee
Number 239V Congressional Record , 80 Congress., 2nd session, (11 June 1948) 4:7791.
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to clearly defined constitutional means and that it would
rest on the principle of popular legitimacy. Popular
support for the new institutional form would aid in the task
of promoting a positive view of the world based on shared
democratic principles. The resolution reaffirmed American
support for the UN but at the same time endorsed going
outside the UN to avoid a Soviet veto as in the Rio Treaty.
It also sought to assure that the new pact would remain
consistent with the general principles of international
relations that the US had initially hoped would prevail in
the UN.
The Vandenberg Resolution stressed that American
association with regional and other collective arrangements
must be "based on continuous and effective self-help and
mutual aid." Thus Vandenberg sought to assure that the
Europeans would be producers, and not solely consumers, of
security. This principle was included to strengthen
European integration as a front line of containment and to
help gain Senate support for a treaty based on burdensharing
principles. The Europeans were not pleased with this
provision as they continued to feel vulnerable without
assurances of direct military aid from the US. However,
they would have to agree to the burdensharing principle if
they wished to make the American commitment to European
security lasting.
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Uniting Power and Community
Formal negotiations began in Washington D.C. on 6 July
1948 between the US, Canada, and the Brussels Pact states to
shape the institutional form of a peacetime security pact.
During the talks, two differing perspectives emerged - one
realist and the other inst itutionalist
. The realist
viewpoint was generally represented by George Kennan who
intervened at the beginning and at the end of the
discussions. At the outset, Kennan proposed that the
institutional form should be based on a "dumbbell concept"
of alliance in which the Europeans would assume primary
military responsibility. 100 In this view, the US would
provide aid while reducing its direct presence on the
ground. Kennan also warned of a potential dilemma regarding
talk among the representatives of principles and community
on which the institutional form would rest. He asked what
would happen in a future situation "in which the countries
of Eastern Europe might come out from under the Iron Curtain
and "be able to come into the European family?" Kennan
advised that the "...US would not wish to do anything that
might hinder the ultimate unification of Europe." 101
Kennan' s realist interventions not withstanding, the
Americans most involved in the Washington negotiations were
10
°. The Dutch representative at the Washington talks, suggested an alternative "peach" shape with
the Brussels Pact serving as the "...hard kernel in the center and a North Atlantic Pact the
somewhat less hard mass around it. " "Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the Washington
Exploratory Talks on Security, 9 July 1948. FRUS, 1948, 3:171.
l0\ Cook 173.
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John Hickerson and Theodore C. Achilles of the State
Department European Desk who held strong views that any
transatlantic treaty be more than a traditional alliance.
Both were influenced by a book published in 1939 by the
American journalist Clarence K. Streit titled Union Now .
Streit called for the unification of the North Atlantic
democracies based on citizenship, defense, customs union,
currency, and postal /communications systems. 102 In his
memoirs, Achilles notes that he and Hickerson had both read
and been impressed by Union Now and that they "shared
enthusiasm for negotiating a military alliance and getting
it ratified, as a basis for further progress toward
unity." 1 3 Hickerson and Achilles entertained "a lot of
generalization about common interests, democratic values,
Atlantic civilization and the threat of Communism." 104 For
example, the British representative Sir Oliver Franks noted
that whatever their differences over the institutional form,
all of the countries at the meetings shared a common
conception of democracy: "...the conviction that the state
existed for the individual" - and that the Soviet challenge
Clarence K. Streit, Union Now: A Proposal for a Federal Union of the Free (New York:
Harper Brothers. 1949) 3-5. For analysis of Streit and the relationship of his work to the
conception of NATO see Kaplan The United States and NATO 51-52 and Elliot R. Goodman,
The Fate of the Atlantic Community (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975) 12-24. Later in his
career Streit made a comparison of NATO and the Articles of Confederation in the US formative
period. See Clarence K. Streit, Freedom & Union (February 1964) 4-5.
Achilles 13. Achilles notes that after the US Senate approved die NATO treaty in August 1949,
he said to Secretary of State Dean Acheson: "Dean, now that we've got this one wrapped up,
let's go after a full Atlantic federal union." Achilles quotes Acheson as responding that "I'd
rather start with Britain, Canada, and ourselves." Achilles 32-33.
Cook 173.
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was a "collective concern for all members of the North
Atlantic community." 105
Though principles and ideals were important in Paris,
France primarily came to Washington seeking urgent military
assistance to enhance its immediate national security
concerns.
106 The French wanted to ensure that if a third
world war broke out it would be fought East of the Rhine and
that American forces and military supplies would be
available from the start to defend French territory. 107 The
French were adamant to the point of intransigence about
direct military assistance programs coming in conjunction
with a formal institution. 108 As Lester Pearson (who headed
the Canadian delegation) reported to Ottawa: "...the
attitude of the French is causing increasing impatience and
"Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security." 6 July
1948. FRUS, 1948, 3: 153. Escott Reid saw values that united the western countries personally
represented among the individual negotiators in Washington. Fourteen of the fifteen (with the
exception of St. Laurent) were "by origin, upbringing and careers members of the group of
Protestant British and Protestant Irish origin which at that time dominated national political
activities in the United States, Britain and Canada... It was thus natural for them to become
advocates of a North Atlantic alliance of which these three countries would be the core. " Reid
67.
"The Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State." FRUS, 1948, 3:142.
Henderson 38.
The French insistence on material security guarantees was consistent with its proposals during
the creation of the League of Nations. In Versailles, France proposed creating a permanent
military staff prepared to intervene immediately in the case of aggression. France proposed that
the League Council should have standing troops at its disposal and be recruited specifically for
the League of Nations or composed of national forces put under League of Nations command.
These forces would have included a standing military staff to be organized by the League of
Nations which would train contingents and take responsibility for military planning in advance
of war. This plan received no serious consideration by the US or British governments and thus
the French accepted the institutional form of the League of Nations on terms which did
not
provide it with sufficient reassurance. See James Avery Joyce, Broken Star: The Story of the
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irritation here and is incomprehensible to everybody." 109
The Americans were more blunt in their assessment which was
summarized by Robert Lovett in a personal letter to the
American Ambassador (Jefferson Caffery) in Paris which
began: "Dear Jeff: The French are in our hair." 110
The French concerns were eased when their
representative Henri Bonnet, was given a lengthy opportunity
to air his position in an informal discussion at the home of
Robert Lovett. 111 This style of formal and informal
multilateral airing of grievances, compromise, and
consensus-building played a key role in the development of
the institutional form. The founders saw a clear benefit in
institutionalizing a process that would facilitate the
exchange of information among the member states and their
representatives. As Achilles observed:
The "NATO spirit" was born in the Working
Group. Derick Hoyer-Miller (of the British
delegation) started it. One day he made a
proposal which was obviously nonsense. Several of
us told him so in no uncertain terms, and a much
better formulation emerged from the discussion.
Derick said: "Those were my instructions. All
right. I'll tell the Foreign Office I made my
pitch and was shot down, and try to get them
changed." He did. From then on we all followed
the same system. If our instructions were sound
and agreement could be reached, fine. If not,
we'd work out something that we all, or most of
us, considered sound, and whoever had the
instructions undertook to get them changed. It,
always worked, though sometimes it took time.
Cook 185.
Cook 185.
See Henderson 52-54.
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While the end result might not necessarily be exactly what
one country wanted, short term interests were set aside for
long-term mutual gains.
The negotiators believed that such forms of
multilateral security cooperation might spill-over into
issue areas beyond collective defense. The Canadians, in
particular, wanted to institutionalize consultative forums
addressing non-military issues. Ottawa felt that a
peacetime alliance required a political foundation so that
it would have longevity, provide a positive alternative to
communism, deepen transatlantic political and economic
integration, and promote cultural cooperation. 113 Lester
Pearson was quite prescient in his concern that security
cooperation not be tied too closely to Soviet intentions.
He argued that this "might mean that if the danger were
removed, or appeared to be removed, this justification for a
collective system would disappear. . .Such a system was
justifiable on broader grounds and should have a positive
On 18 March, Escott Reid had proposed in an internal Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo that a
provision in the treaty include: agreement by the Atlantic Nations to organize their economic
activities to produce the greatest possible returns by the elimination of conflict in their economic
policies, the coordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges;
promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their people and greater economic and
social justice, and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their
countries; to work towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their,
common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges between themselves; and to use their
best efforts to secure those amendments to the international instruments setting up the
specialized agencies as are necessary to ensure that the agencies become the most effective
possible instruments for the speedy attainment of the objectives set forth in the charter. Reid
168.
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and not merely a negative purpose." 114 Pearson's comment
demonstrates that the actors who designed NATO's early
institutional form had a forward-looking conception of
power, threat, and alliances. They sought to preempt
realist predictions about alliance cohesion by creating an
institutional form with a broader purpose than collective
defense. Such an approach represented a sophisticated
assessment of the fact that detente could be as much a
challenge to alliance cohesion as war and that the Soviet
Union might use peace initiatives to divide the alliance.
Thus the new transatlantic security institution was given a
broader foundation as part of its institutional form so that
it could survive Cold War tension, detente, and even peace -
if the member states so desired.
Interestingly, Kennan endorsed this analysis,
emphasizing that: "...the community of interests of the
participating governments was wider than military, it was
traditional, historical, and would continue .. .Association
was necessary entirely aside from the troubles of the moment
and might well go far beyond the military sphere."
115
Nevertheless, the Washington working group was careful not
to endorse too broad a concept of a formal Atlantic
Community. The British in particular did not want to
intrude on the efforts being made toward European
"Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 7, 1948."
FRUS, 1948, 3:159.
"Minutes of the Third Meeting..." 159.
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integration via the Brussels Pact. France saw it as
irrelevant to their immediate quest for military assistance.
The US was also concerned that language promoting "cultural
cooperation" (for example) would hurt the treaty's chances
for approval in the Senate. 116
All of the parties except Britain supported the
creation of a high level council for political consultation
and cooperation within the institution. The British worried
that excessive consultative structures could delay a
response to a crisis rather than facilitate military action.
London did not force this position and the decision was made
to give the institution a formal structure. However, the
working group did not envisage NATO as a supra- sovereign
political authority. 117 States would remain the final
arbiter of how the institution would be utilized. At its
founding, NATO was not intended to be an "independent actor"
in international relations. Instead, it would be a standing
structure designed to aid the needs of its member states.
By fall 1948 the US supported inclusion of some non-military issues in the treaty to make it
more palatable to the Senate. However, in early 1949 the new US Secretary of State Dean
Acheson sought to dilute die Canadian initiative. Acheson felt that language stressing the
"general welfare" would not be accepted in the Senate and he believed that such language was
not practical without a mechanism for its implementation. The issue was settled permanendy
after a direct intervention by Louis St. Laurent (now the Canadian Prime Minister) to President
Truman who subsequently endorsed the Canadian proposal. Lawrence S. Kaplan The United
States and NATO: The Formative Years (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky,
1984) 117-118.
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The Rationale for a Treaty and a Realist Backl ash
On 9 September 1948 the Washington working group
completed a highly classified document for home government
review explaining the rationale for a North Atlantic
security pact. 118 The report referred to as the
"Washington Paper" concluded that the nature of the
problem facing transatlantic relations was "to consider how
the countries of Western Europe and those of the North
American continent can most effectively join together for
mutual aid against this common danger and achieve security."
The common danger was identified as the Soviet attempt to
use indirect or direct aggression. The Soviet Union was
termed an "implacable enemy of western civilization."
However, the Soviet threat was not to be the sole purpose of
the institution. The purpose would be to deter a Soviet
attack and to restore confidence among the people of Western
Europe. "United States and Canadian association in some
North Atlantic security arrangement would be a major
contribution to this", the report concluded. The presence
of American forces in Germany guaranteed US involvement in
any hostility in Central Europe. However, the report
stressed that: "If the arrangement is... to contribute to
the restoration of confidence among the peoples of Western
Europe, it would not be possible to base it on the presence
"Memorandum by the Participants in the Washington Security Talks July 6 to September 9,
Submitted to their Respective Governments lor Study and Comment." FRUS, 1948, 3:237
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of U.S. troops in Germany", the report asserted. A broader
American commitment to Europe was necessary to guarantee
successful reassurance.
The Washington Paper concluded that a formal treaty was
essential to meeting the dual objective of collective
defense and reassurance. To make a treaty more palatable at
home and to score propaganda points vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union, the report recommended that: "Soviet criticism could
be offset by fitting the arrangement squarely into the
framework of the United Nations and by providing not merely
for defense but also for the advancement of the common
interests of the parties and the strengthening of the
economic, social and cultural ties which bind them."
However, the report underscored that the political concept
of the treaty went beyond propaganda and that a North
Atlantic pact "should be more than an arrangement for
defense alone; it should serve both to preserve the common
civilization and to promote its development by increasing
the collaboration between the signatories and advancing the
conditions of stability and well-being upon which peace
depends .
"
The working group concluded that a pact would require
"adequate machinery for implementing its terms, in
particular for organized coordination and strengthening of
the defense capacities of the parties, beginning immediately
as it comes into force." The working group summarized
Canada's position noting that cooperation in fields other
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than security would contribute to general security. "The
Canadians," the Washington Paper stated, "felt that the
purpose of a treaty should not be merely negative and that
it should create the dynamic counter-attraction of a free,
prosperous and progressive society as opposed to the society
of the Communist world."
As the negotiators moved toward formal treaty language,
they were aided in their efforts by the Soviet leader Joseph
Stalin who had begun implementing a lengthy blockade of
Berlin to break Western resolve over Germany. The Dutch
representative suggested that the preamble to the treaty
simply read: "Dear Joe:". 1 However, in late September,
George Kennan re-entered the discussions and expressed
serious reservations about the alliance's institutional
characteristics and their potential impact on security. On
2 6 September, Kennan prepared a draft memorandum for
Marshall and Lovett which was remarkable for its realist
overtones . Kennan stated that
:
Instead of the development of a real federal
structure in Europe which would aim to embrace all
free European countries, which would be a
olitical force in its own right, and which would
ave behind it the logic of geography and
historical development, we will get an irrevocable
congealment of the division of Europe into two
military zones: a Soviet zone and a U.S. zone.
Instead of the ability to divest ourselves
gradually of the basic responsibility for the
security of Western Europe we will get a legal
perpetuation of that responsibility. In the long
run, such a legalistic structure must crack up on
the rocks of reality; for a divided Europe is not
permanently viable, and the political will of the
U.S. people is not sufficient to enable us to
Achilles 27.
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support Western Europe indefinitely as a military
appendage
.
1
In late November a formal memorandum from the Policy
Planning Staff (PPS 43) drafted by Kennan emerged. The mem<
warned that: "There is a danger that we will deceive
ourselves, and permit misconceptions to exist among our own
public and in Europe, concerning the significance of the
conclusion of such a pact at this time." 121
Kennan was especially concerned that a military
alliance could prevent a permanent settlement with the
Soviet Union. He continued to stress that the primary
Soviet challenge was political and that for Moscow,
"military force plays a major role only as a means of
intimidation." 122 Thus:
A North Atlantic Security Pact will affect
the political war only insofar as it operates to
stiffen the self-confidence of the western
Europeans in the face of Soviet pressures. Such a
stiffening is needed and desirable. But it goes
hand in hand with the danger of a general
preoccupation with military affairs, to the
detriment of economic recovery and of the
necessity for seeking a peaceful solution to
Europe's dif f iculties . . . We should have clearly in
mind that the need for military alliances and
rearmament on the part of the western Europeans is
primarily a subjective one, arising in their own
minds as a result of their failure to understand
correctly their own position. Their best and most
hopeful course of action, if they are to save
themselves from communist pressures, remains the
struggle for economi£ recovery and for internal
political stability.
Kennan concluded that a North Atlantic pact should not be
the main answer to the Soviet challenge in Europe. A
Gaddis 63.
"Memorandum by die Director of die Policy Planning Staff, 29 November 1948." FRUS,
1948, 3:283-289.
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transatlantic institution could not substitute for "the
other steps which are being taken and should be taken to
meet the Russian challenge, nor should they be given
priority over the latter." 124
Kennan wanted an integrated Western Europe to be the
main political and military component of containment in
Europe. However, the European unity that Kennan sought
could only be attained after these countries had been
sufficiently reassured of their security. Thus Kennan'
s
arguments were rejected on the basis that, with its nuclear
umbrella and troops in Germany, the US could
institutionalize a security guarantee and thereby provide
the reassurance Western Europe needed to build its resources
for self-help. As Bevin had suggested in a April 1948 memo,
the most important result of a treaty would be to provide
confidence which would make a Western Union more effective.
"If the new defense system is so framed that it relates to
any aggressor, it would give all the European states such
confidence that it might well be that the age-long trouble
between Germany and France might tend to disappear, " Bevin
, , , 125
concluded
.
PPS 43.
"Paraphrase of a Telegram from the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) of
April 9th Regarding Recent Talks on North Atlantic Security Arrangements." FRUS, 1948.
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Membership: Geostrategic or Principles?
Early in the Washington talks, the geographical scope
and membership was discussed. Options ranged from
concluding an agreement only among the core nations involved
to inviting other countries to join with "graded" or
"associate" status. 126 The group decided that all members
must be full members and share in the benefits, risks, and
costs that would come from collective defense. The working
group also worried that membership not be viewed as an
effort to encircle Russia - perhaps provoking a preventive
war. For example, the French representative asked: "Would
it be wise, for example, to enlarge the system in such a way
that could, however wrongly, be considered by Russia as
encirclement?" 127 At the outset the decision was made that,
where possible, membership would reflect shared values and
principles - but the primary factor would be geostrategic.
Norway, Denmark, and Sweden had hoped to create a
regional collective security institution based on shared
cultural identity, commonality of interests, and (at
Sweden's insistence) neutrality. This policy suited Sweden
which had not been occupied during World War II. However,
Norway and Denmark had suffered from direct Nazi occupation.
Additionally, Norway shared a border with the Soviet Union
which placed considerable pressure on Oslo either to take
Henderson 37, 50.
"Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security. July 7,
1948." FRUS, 1948, 3:167.
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measures to enhance its security or negotiate a compromise
with Moscow. Thus recent Norwegian and Danish historical
experiences made Sweden's insistence on neutrality
unappealing. The US wanted Iceland, Norway, and Denmark
(which was located at an important position at the entrance
to the Baltic Sea and possessed the territory of Greenland)
in the alliance because of their strategic importance as
stepping stones to Europe. Early in 1949 Norway came under
strong pressure from Moscow to sign a non-aggression pact
(as had been previously signed with Finland) . This
accelerated the collapse of the Scandinavian defense pact
discussions and caused Norway and Denmark to move toward the
Atlantic alliance. 1 8
The Republic of Ireland was invited to join the
discussions on membership. Dublin responded that it would
join the negotiations as representatives of a united
Republic of Ireland. While the Americans wanted the island
state in the treaty within the context of "stepping stones"
(as a base for antisubmarine warfare), Dublin's linkage of
the partition issue was unacceptable. The US neither wanted
to incorporate a problem of the nature of Ireland's
partition into the treaty nor offend its key ally - the
United Kingdom. According to Achilles, Washington's
See Henderson 83-89.
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response to Dublin was in effect: "It's been nice knowing
„ 12 9you . "
The US and Britain also wanted Portugal as an original
treaty member. The Azores and the position of the Iberian
peninsula as a gateway to the Mediterranean placed a strong
geostrategic priority on Portuguese membership. However,
the authoritarian dictatorship of Antonia Salazar stood in
direct contrast to the non-military foundations of the
institution in the final decision. Strategic necessity won
over principle in this first test of institutional
principles. Salazar labeled the proposed preamble of the
North Atlantic Treaty as "manifestly unfortunate."
Nevertheless, he added: "Be that as it may, we feel bound
by the obligations of the treaty and by its general aims -
not (in any way ) by a doctrinal affirmation pointing to the
uniformity of political regimes, of whose virtues in our
country we have learnt enough." 130
Canada raised fundamental concerns about Portuguese
membership. Lester Pearson told a British representative
early in the negotiations: "If a pact were to be worked out
which included declarations of belief in democracy, free
institutions, etc., such as were included in the Brussels
pact, it would be a little anomalous to have Portugal as an
Achilles 28.
Albano Nogueira, "The Pull of the Containment: Portugal Opts for a European Role." in de
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original signatory." 131 in the US, Senator Forrest Donnell
questioned whether Portugal was a democracy. 132 Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge asked Achilles in a classified meeting how
the US could square the "common heritage of freedom with the
Portuguese tradition." To this Achilles responded that
"although its government is not the same form of democracy
as we have it, it is authoritarian, but it is not
totalitarian ... If it is a dictatorship, it is because the
people freely voted for it." 133 Portugal's entry into NATO
required some careful diplomatic maneuvering in selling a
treaty based on shared principles. 134 It also set a
precedent that when considering rules for membership,
geostrategic needs would outweigh the stated principles of
the institution.
Italy, Greece, and Turkey presented an additional
problem for the negotiators. In April 1948 Italian voters
had overwhelmingly rejected communism despite direct Soviet
support for the Italian communists. 135 Nevertheless, there
was a general concern among the negotiators that if
Mediterranean states were admitted, they would diminish the
Reid 198.
Dean Acheson, The Struggle for a Free Europe (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1971) 61
.
Kaplan The United States and NATO . 110-112.
Because it shared the Iberian Peninsula with Spain, Salazar wanted Madrid invited to the treaty
negotiations. The US had sought ways to bring Spain into the pact given the strategic
importance of the peninsula. However, no European power was prepared to support Spanish
membership so long as its dictator (who had also sided with Hitler) Francisco Franco ruled.
Western countries also tried to influence the election through overt and covert methods. The
most important was a statement from Secretary of State George Marshall prior to the vote that
Italy's application for Marshall Plan aid would be considered on the basis of whether or not the
Communist Party was defeated in the elections.
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"North Atlantic" character of the pact. Having secured
Scandinavian participation, there was a legitimate concern
that extending the scope of the treaty could harm the
principle of mutual aid. Broadening the geographic scope of
the institution raised a fundamental question of collective
defense: Would Norway go to war to defend Mediterranean
states (or vice-verse)? Moreover, could a treaty covering
too large an area make effective decisions or lose its
cohesion in a crisis? The negotiators in Washington agreed
that Italy had an important role to play in Central Europe
and should be invited to join the final treaty
negotiations. 136 Greece and Turkey were not invited over
concern that they would dilute the "North Atlantic" element
of the pact and possibly force the consideration of inviting
Iran to join the treaty as well. There was, however, a
general understanding that the Truman Doctrine made Greece
and Turkey part of the area covered by the treaty. Greece
and Turkey would have been defended by the US whether or not
they were part of NATO.
The North Atlantic Treaty
In his first public comments as the new Secretary of
State, Dean Acheson said on 27 January 1949 that:
Initially France opposed Italian participation as it had been disarmed after World War II and
would not offer any tangible military contribution to western defense plans. However, their
position changed in relation to Algeria which France wanted in the area covered by the treaty
Thus giving the institution a Mediterranean element via Italy might help its position vis-a-vis
Algeria.
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We North Atlantic peoples share a commonfaith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person, in the principles
of democracy, personal freedom and political
liberty... We believe that these principles and
this common heritage can best be fortified and
preserved and the general welfare of the people of
the North Atlantic advanced by an arrangement for
cooperation in matters affecting their peace and
security and common interest.
Shortly thereafter, key elements of the security pact
between the US, Canada, and Western Europe were carefully
leaked to the press. On 18 March 1949 the treaty was made
public in advanced of signing ceremonies planned for early
April. Publishing the treaty prior to its signing was a
first in diplomatic history. The public presentation of the
accord prompted the Belgian Prime Minister to call it -
"diplomacy on the open market." 138 However, despite claims
of transparency in international security cooperation, the
accord was the result of over a year of highly secretive
negotiations. The NATO Treaty was neither open market
diplomacy nor, as Dean Acheson would call it, "an open
covenant openly arrived at." 139
The pact institutionalized a balance of power security
arrangement and reflected a growing sense of a transatlantic
community among those who crafted the institutional form.
As Acheson said in a radio address to the nation on 18
March -.
"Text of Acheson Remarks," The New York Times , 27 January 1949, A4.
"Spaak Hails Publication of Treaty's Text as Victory for Diplomacy on Open Market," The New
York Times , 19 March 1949, A3.
Acheson The Struggle , 49.
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It is important to keep in mind that the
really successful national and international
institutions are those that recognize and express
underlying realities. The North Atlantic
community of nations is such a reality. It isbased on the affinity and natural identity ofinterests of the North Atlantic powers. The North
Atlantic treaty which will formally unite them is
the product of at least 350 years of history and
perhaps more.
Similar sentiments had been repeatedly stressed in public
and classified statements throughout the negotiations over
the treaty; they were the primary focus of the speeches
given by the signators at the treaty signing ceremonies;
and they were formally institutionalized in the legal
language of the North Atlantic Treaty which was signed by
representatives of the participating states on 4 April
1411949 .
The preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty committed the
members to "faith in the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in
peace with all peoples and all governments." The
institution would be built by the members "to safeguard the
freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples,
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty
and the rule of law." The members agreed to "promote
"Text of Mr. Acheson's Broadcast on Atlantic Accord," The New York Times . 19 March 1949,
A4.
For formal interpretations of the treaty see "Minutes of the Ambassadors' Committee," 15
March 1949. FRUS, 1949, 4:222-223. Minutes of the Ambassadors' Committee, 15 March
1949; The Department of State White Paper on the North Atlantic Treaty: "The North Atlantic
Pact: Collective Defense and the Preservation of Peace, Security and Freedom in the North
Atlantic Community," U.S. Department of State Bulletin 20:507 (20 March 1949) 342-350;
and "Signing Ceremony of the North Atlantic Treaty: Statements by the Foreign Ministers and
President Truman," The Department of State Bulletin 20:51 1 (17 April 1949) 471-482.
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stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area",
through collective defence. 142
Article 1 of the Treaty required that the members not
use force in "any manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations." Article 2 incorporated the Canadian
design for general security stating that: "The Parties will
contribute toward the further development of peaceful and
friendly international relations by strengthening their free
institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of
the principles upon which these institutions are founded,
and by promoting conditions of stability and well-
being... They will seek to eliminate conflict in their
international economic policies and will encourage economic
collaboration between any or all of them. " Burdensharing
was identified as a priority institutional goal through
Article 3 which states that: "The Parties, separately and
jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and
mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack." Should any
member feel threatened by any state (including another
member) , Article 4 facilitates consultation within the
institutional structure of the Alliance and Article 5
provides the security guarantee (under the right to
individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of
Text of the North Atlantic Treaty. Signed in Washington D.C., April 4, 1949. In Claude 49
494.
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the UN Charter) that an "armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all ..."
The treaty provided for formal organization to aid
multinational security cooperation and consensus through a
North Atlantic Council (Article 9) which would "set up such
subsidiary bodies as may be necessary." Also, the treaty
allowed for enlargement in a manner that furthers its
principles and contributes to the security of the North
Atlantic area (Article 10) . The treaty affirms that member
states are the key actors by insuring that the treaty "shall
be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in
accordance with their respective constitutional processes"
(Article 11)
.
Analysis
NATO's formative period reflects the competing themes
of realism and institutional ism - both of which were
incorporated into its original institutional form. The
primary factor leading to the NATO alliance was the Soviet
challenge in Eastern Europe. In that sense, realist
assessments of NATO's formation are correct: NATO was an
alliance created in response to a threat. As Charles Bohlei
wrote in his memoirs: "...our participation in the North
Atlantic Treaty arrangement was entirely due to Soviet
policy and power... Had the Soviet Union not chosen to
prevent the unification of Germany in 1947 and 1948, there
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would have been no North Atlantic Treaty." 143 However, to
explain primary causality is insufficient to understanding
why the states chose the particular institutional form that
emerged in April 1949. A variety of factors beyond the
Soviet threat coalesced to shape the form that the NATO
alliance would take in its early years.
First, the national representatives who negotiated the
NATO treaty placed a high value on using the alliance to
enhance the principles that they believed united their
countries - peaceful international relations and democracy.
The negotiators recognized that if a peacetime alliance was
to withstand ebbs and flows of the Cold War, it would have
to reflect a broader purpose than collective defense.
Second, the negotiators had a concept of national security
challenges that went beyond the Soviet threat. They saw
states challenged by fragile economies, weak political
systems, and the potential for internal Soviet influence or
traditional nationalism spreading from within and
threatening regional stability. Third, the US insisted on a
specific institutional form that would prioritize
burdensharing . Washington was wary to make certain that the
European members would be more than security consumers -
they had to contribute as well. Fourth, during the
negotiations, a pattern of consultation and information
exchange developed in which short-term compromises were made
Bohlen 1 14.
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in the interest of long-term security interests. This so-
called "NATO spirit" of consultation and consensus was not
only viewed as beneficial to the negotiations - it was
institutionalized in the North Atlantic Council and its
subsidiary organs
.
Realist critiques of this institutional form were
present during the negotiations. Later, realists would
discount non-military tasks given to NATO as window dressing
designed to sell a peacetime entangling alliance with Europe
to the US Senate. Indeed, the 9 September 1948 Washington
Paper recommended that if the treaty were placed within a UN
context it could have positive propaganda results. US
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in particular, saw value in
a limited acceptance of the Canadian proposals regarding a
broader community as having value in attaining Senate
approval of a treaty. In 1949, Acheson spoke of NATO in
colorful language stressing its foundations in western
civilization. However, in 1966 he wrote that:
The plain fact, of course, is that NATO is a
military alliance. Its purpose was and is to
deter and, if necessary, to meet the use of
Russian military power or the fear of its use in
Europe. This purpose is pretty old-fashioned.
Perhaps to avoid this stigma, Canadian draftsmen
had Article 2 inserted into the treaty.
Reflecting on NATO's founding, Henry Kissinger writes that:
America would do anything for the Atlantic Alliance except
call it an alliance ... It would practice a historic policy of
Dean Acheson, "Canada, 'Stern Daughter of the Voice of God'," in Livingston Merchant, ed.,
Neighbors Taken For Granted: Canada and the United States (New York: Praeger, 1966) 141
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coalition so long as its actions could be justified by the
doctrine of collective security." 145
These realist analysis stand in contrast to that of the
widely recognized founder of contemporary realism, Hans J.
Morganthau. In his Politics Among Nations . Morganthau wrote
that: "In its comprehensive objectives and the techniques
used to accomplish them, NATO indeed moves beyond the
traditional alliance toward a novel type of functional
organization." 146 Realist criticism of NATO's non-alliance
functions implies that statesmen such as Bevin, St. Laurent,
Pearson, Lovett, Marshall, Acheson, and Truman advocated
institutional principles to intentionally misinform public
opinion. However, similar sentiments were pervasive in the
classified discussion during the treaty negotiations and the
records show that the participants placed a high value on
the principles on which the institution would be founded.
Realism was not rejected in creating the institutional form.
Realism was transformed into an understanding that a
particular institutional form would shield this peacetime
alliance because it was founded upon a broader concept of
security challenges than the Soviet threat alone.
145
146'
Kissinger. Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Sinister, 1994)460.
Morganthau 530.
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Tasks
There were four tasks that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization was intended to perform at its founding. The
first, and primary function, was to promote collective
defense by signalling to the Soviet Union the collective
will of the member states to come to each other's aid in the
event of an attack. The second was to promote reassurance
among the West European countries so that they could pursue
their own self-help objectives free from internal
instability. The third was to strengthen and expand an
international community based on democratic principles,
individual liberty and the rule of law in the context of a
peaceful international society. The fourth was to build
institutional structures to aid the completion of these
goals
.
Organizational Capabilities
The organizational capabilities present at NATO's
founding were minimal. The institutional form was premised
on state-dominance and avoidance of hierarchy. NATO was
never conceived of as having institutional autonomy in
peacetime. Even in the event of an attack on a member,
Article 5 only committed states to respond: "individually
and in concert with the other Parties, such actions as it
deems necessary...." It would be incumbent upon the member
states to implement the security guarantee and the response
would not necessarily be automatic. In its earliest days,
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NATO had no standing organization and relied on the
underdeveloped Western Union for military planning. A North
Atlantic Council was created to lower the transaction costs
of international cooperation and it was tasked to establish
a Defense Committee responsible for making recommendations
on meeting the needs of collective defense. Early NATO
meetings initially consisted only of the foreign ministers
of the member states meeting on an ad-hoc basis with no
standing procedures or structures to facilitate or implement
institutional objectives.
Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures
Principles and norms were defined in the treaty
negotiations and were enshrined in the preamble and the
treaty language. Specific rules and procedures were narrow
and left for further development. Yet it was also clear
that collective defense needs outweighed principle in the
decision to include Portugal as a founding member.
Procedurally, Article 4 promoted formal consultation in the
event that a member felt threatened from any source. The
Treaty also established procedures for national adherence to
constitutional procedures of each member. The institution
was restricted in its membership rules. Becoming a new
member would require a contribution to the principles of the
treaty and to the security of the North Atlantic area.
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Capacity for Change
The founders of NATO intended that the institution have
the capacity for change. The decision to endow this
traditional alliance with institutional characteristics was
in part to aid the process of adaptation. For example, the
North Atlantic Council was empowered to set up subsidiary
bodies as might be necessary; the institution could enlarge
under restricted circumstances; the treaty was open to
review by the members after a ten year period; and after
twenty years in force, any party could leave one year after
a notice of denunciation had been given. The decision on
how to advance variations in institutional form was reserved
for the member states.
Conclusion: Getting from Here to Where?
During the intensive information exchange in the treaty
negotiations, a sophisticated understanding of the complex
security challenge was attained which affected the
institutional form of NATO. By institutionalizing a US
security commitment, Europe attained a period of reassurance
in which military assistance could flow to them and in which
Marshall Plan aid could stabilize their economies. The
information exchange created a better understanding of
national security concerns and the participants learned to
work together, and make concessions when necessary, toward
common objectives in a multilateral framework. However, at
its founding, NATO held considerable potential as a false
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promise of security for, in fact, little actually changed
immediately following the signing of the North Atlantic
Treaty. It is for that reason that the song selection
played at the treaty signing ceremonies was ironic - "It
Ain't Necessarily So" and "A Whole Lot of Nothin' " from the
musical Porgy & Bess. 147
147
.
Dean Acheson, Present at the Cr^rinn- Mv Years in the State Department (New York:
W.W.
Norton & Co., 1969) 284.
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CHAPTER IV
NATO DURING THE COLD WAR: THE PRIMACY OF ALLIANCE
Introduction and Overview
Chapter Four surveys variations in NATO's institutional
form during the Cold War. It assesses the extent to which
NATO performed its tasks of promoting collective defense,
burdensharing, restricted enlargement, and creating
institutional structures to facilitate these goals. As an
independent actor, NATO performed poorly in all four areas
despite considerable institutional adaptation. This chapter
confirms the realist proposition that, as it evolved during
the Cold War, NATO was primarily a US-led alliance and its
formal institutions were, at best, intervening variables
aiding collective defense.
NATO and Collective Defense
At its founding, NATO was an institutional shell
promoting reassurance for Western Europe via a general US
security guarantee. In September 1949, the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) was identified as the principal authority of
the Alliance. The NAC would meet at the request of any of
its members and periodically as the situation required.
Soon a pattern emerged of the NAC meeting in formal
ministerial session biannually and in weekly meetings at the
ambassadorial level at NATO Headquarters established outside
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Paris, France. The NAC established a Defense Committee
consisting of Defense Ministers responsible for defense
planning. A Military Committee was created to meet at the
Chief s-of -Staff level to advise the NAC on military issues.
A Defense Financial and Economic Committee and a Military
Production and Supply board soon followed.
Missing from this security institution was a military
capability. As US Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted,
NATO was conceived as a "pre- integration organization, aimed
to produce general plans for uncoordinated and separate
action in the hope that in the event of trouble a plan and
forces to meet it would exist and would be adopted by a sort
of spontaneous combustion." 149 NATO had no integrated
forces, no defense plan, and no real means to mobilize
against a Soviet attack. However, dramatic global events
rapidly prompted a major adaptation of NATO's institutional
form. The Soviet attainment of nuclear weapons, the victory
of communists on mainland China, and the war in Korea
globalized the Cold War and had a major impact on NATO as it
was transformed into a highly formal standing military
alliance
.
Relocated to Brussels, Belgium in 1967. Each NATO ambassador would have a Deputy Chief
of Mission, or secondary representative, to do the primary senior level preparatory work for the
ambassadors. National delegations were given offices near the NAC and the Private Office of
the Secretary General to facilitate communication between representatives. National delegations
varied in size proportionate to the country and their relative influence within NATO.
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years at the S tate Department (New York: W.W.
Norton & Co., 1969).
See Walter LaFeber, "NATO and the Korean War: A Context," in Lawrence S. Kaplan, ed.,
American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991)
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In Europe, the divide between East and West had become
startlingly unbalanced in the early 1950s with 12 NATO
divisions and under 1000 combat aircraft to defend against
an estimated 210 Soviet divisions accompanied by over 6000
aircraft. President Truman thus asked Congress for $15
billion dollars of military assistance for Western Europe.
This included a planned increase of US troops stationed in
Europe from 145,000 to 346,000 by 1952. NATO was given a
formal military command structure to be headed by the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) . The first SACEUR
was the popular American general Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Eisenhower inherited a military command with no
military structure. 151 NATO planning was based on limited
chiefs of staff cooperation that had begun in the Western
Union and on regional national commands. In 1952 the NATO
ministers met in Lisbon and agreed to establish a US-
dominated military structure and to a force structure
including 25-30 divisions stationed in Central Europe -
primarily in western Germany. Development of such an
ambitious force goal would require multilateral consultation
to avoid duplication in defense planning. As Eisenhower
commented on early NATO planning: "...devising an
organization that satisfies the nationalist aspirations of
33-51 and Walter LaFeber, America. Russia, and the Cold War. 1945-1971 (New York: John
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1972) 95-145.
US defense plans had assumed an evacuation strategy in the event of an attack while holding a
line at the Pyrenees. "Text of Strategic Plan. " FRUS, 1949,4:353-356.
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twelve different countries or the personal ambitions of
affected individuals is a very laborious and irksome
business." 152 The NATO members thus created an international
political and military bureaucracy to aid the process of
multilateral defense planning. NATO was given a political
organization to be headed by a Secretary General in charge
of an international secretariat staffed by representatives
from the member states. The Secretary General was to speak
for and prepare matters for the NAC, and implement NAC
decisions with the help of the international secretariat. 153
Political Consultation
Absent an international government, consultation became
the primary decision-making procedure in NATO. The "habit
of consultation", as President Eisenhower described it in
1958, did not come easily. 154 The demand for increased
consultation among NATO members arose from the need to
prevent conflicts occurring outside of the NATO area
involving its members from decreasing alliance cohesion. 15 "
Gregory Pedlow, "The Politics of NATO Command," in Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang
Krieger, eds., U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years. 1945-1970 (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1993) 18.
See Robert S. Jordan, The NATO International Staff/Secretariat. 1952-1957 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1967) and Robert S. Jordan, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in
Multilateral Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).
"Text of Letter from President Eisenhower to General de Gaulle," October 20, 1958. In Senator
Henry M. Jackson, ed.. The Atlantic Alliance: Jackson Subcommittee Hearings and Findings
(New York: Praeger, 1967) 285-286.
Several events accelerated this demand for consultation. In 1954 the fall of Dien Bien Phu and
the departure of France from Indochina strained relations between Paris and Washington as the
US was quick to fill the strategic void left by the French. Both French and British relations with
the US were strained during the Suez crisis of 1956. Additionally, the inability to coordinate a
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In 1956 the "Committee on Non-Military Cooperation" was
established by the NAC to be headed by the foreign ministers
from Italy, Norway, and Canada - commonly referred to as the
"Three Wise Men". 156 They completed a report which concluded
that
:
Consultation within an alliance means more
than letting the NATO Council know about national
decisions that have already been taken; or trying
to enlist support for those decisions ... It means
the discussion of problems collectively, in the
early stages of policy formation, and before
national positions become fixed. At best, this
will result in collective decisions on matters of
common interest affecting the Alliance. At the
least it will ensure that no action is taken by
one member without a knowledge of the views of the
157
others
.
In accepting the report, the NAC empowered the Secretary
General to take a lead role in settling crisis among the
allies by using his good offices. If the parties consented,
the Secretary General could initiate or facilitate
procedures of inquiry, mediation, conciliation or
arbitration. In addition to the increased scope of activity
for the Secretary General, NATO further enhanced its
organizational structures and consultation was increased at
all levels of the organization. 158
unified political response to the Soviet repression of Hungarian reform movements in 1956 made
NATO appear ineffective and irrelevant in a time of crisis. The process of de-Stalinization in
the Soviet Union and the potential for an East-West detente also placed pressure on NATO to
consult on an effective response or risk losing relevance as external events out-paced its ability
to adapt.
The committee included Gaetano Martino, Halvard Lange, and Lester Pearson respectively.
Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO. NATO Information
Service, December 1956.
Harlan Cleveland, who served as US Ambassador to NATO in the mid-1960s has noted that
consultation in NATO took a variety of forms including: imparting information unilaterally;
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Despite this expanded institutional activity, many
problems emerged in the institutionalized consultative
procedures. 155 First, the sharing of information, even among
the strongest of allies, on sensitive issues of national
security policy is something that states are hesitant to
undertake. Second, members tend to utilize consultative
mechanisms solely to enhance their interests - not
necessarily those of the institution. Third, excessive
consultative mechanisms can prove time consuming therefore a
state is likely to circumvent the institution if a situation
requires quick decisions. Fourth, national bureaucracies
can frustrate, delay, or even block collective action due to
their own decision-making procedures. Fifth, the flow of
information can highlight differences among allies and
exchanging information bilaterally or multilaterally; notifying others of national decisions
already taken, but without expecting any reaction on their part; notifying others of decisions
already taken, in such a way as to build consent for them; consulting in advance on national
actions that affect the interests of others; consulting internationally to ascertain in advance the
possible reaction to a national decision not yet made (that is, as an input to the national decision
itself): consulting in advance on a matter lending itself to separate parallel national actions by
others; or consulting for the purpose of arriving at a decision by which its nature must be taken
or carried into action collectively. Harlan Cleveland, The Transatlantic Bargain (New York:
Harper & Row, 1970) 19. As another study by a former NATO official, Roger Hill, has
shown, the institutional network gave rise to a heavy flow of activity, including information
exchange, advice-giving, decision-making, communications to capitals, formal meetings,
informal gatherings, distribution of documents, translations visits back and forth, report writing,
and collective drafting. The headquarters machine, bureaucracies in capitals, and other parts of
the network continuously process the tide of inflowing requests, initiatives, draft documents,
and memoranda. Roger Hill, Political Consultation in NATO (Toronto: Canadian Institute of
International Affairs, 1978) 74.
The following overview of NATO's political and military processes is based on information
available from NATO including NATO: Facts About the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts and Figures , and the NATO Handbook published by
the NATO Press Service in Brussels. That information is supplemented by personal discussions
with NATO and member state officials and via direct observation of NATO activity.
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possibly contribute to a public crisis of cohesion and lower
the deterrent value of the alliance.
Most importantly, NATO's formal political structures
were not designed to have an independent affect on state
behavior. The decision-making heads of state met rarely and
then only to endorse previously debated and approved
documents. Foreign, defense, and military staff leaders
would generally meet twice a year. Lower level NATO
committees, chaired by representatives of the International
Secretariat (to ensure continuity of committee mandates and
provide a neutral voice) was where the everyday
institutional activity occurred. 160 Committees were often
instructed by the NAC or other organs to conduct particular
tasks such as short and long-term studies (eg. of Soviet
threat assessments or Warsaw Pact capabilities) . If, in
committee work, an impasse would arise which could not be
resolved via consensus, the dispute would be referred to the
NAC or to the member states for instructions. After
completion of their work, committees might forward their
recommendations to the NAC for action. This advise would
then be reviewed by member state governments and a final
decision taken by national ambassadors in the NAC acting on
instructions from their home governments. NATO's committee
activity did contribute to collective defense by aiding the
As one study has shown by the end of the Cold War. formal and ad-hoe NATO struetures
totaled over 400. Pan Smith. Pressure: How America Runs NATO (London: Bloomsbury
Publishing Ltd., 1989) 10.
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flow of information and expertise - but not by making
independent decisions.
Despite these obstacles, the NATO members saw benefit
from institutional consultation. Larger states gained from
consultation by attaining a better knowledge in advance of
other members' national security perspectives so as to avoid
confrontation when gaining support for a policy.
Alternatively, bargaining or coercive strategies could be
more readily developed by the larger states in the attempt
to bring others toward a particular position. Smaller
members also gained as the institutional structures
facilitated efforts to organize coalitions to influence the
larger states with more leverage than when acting alone.
Additionally, because each member of the NAC had a veto over
formal NATO activity, maintaining alliance cohesion often
required considerable time and effort when bargaining with a
state for its support in the NAC - thus a small state could
exact concessions from a larger member via the consultative
process
.
In this environment, the most effective form of
consultation that developed in NATO was informal. "Hallway
negotiations" among national representatives were often the
best way to get an understanding of the reasoning behind
another member's formal positions or toward building
consensus on a particular initiative. However, the very
nature of such negotiations - private and confidential -
makes it difficult to demonstrate specific linkage to an
increase in national security. 1 " 1 One indication that states
saw benefit in this form of consultation was the emergence
in the early 1960s of a lunch among the NAC ambassadors
where no subject was barred. The lunch occurs prior to the
weekly NAC ambassadors meeting so that the participants have
a better sense of what to expect in the NAC. The meetings
were institutionalized but remained informal and off-the-
record. Each member state hosts the lunch on an
alphabetical rotation giving Iceland or Luxembourg as much
opportunity to shape the agenda as France or the US . The
Secretary General was invited to participate as an equal
voice among the member states at the table. Participants
give personal views of international events occurring in or
out of NATO. The ambassadors are free to challenge or
debate their own national instructions - possibly leading to
a request for a change of instruction if it would facilitate
consensus.
162 Nevertheless, consensus among NATO ambassadors
did not guarantee that anything substantive would result in
the NAC. In their formal activity, representatives still
had to act according to their national instructions.
The same can be said of semi-official discussions between member states held in the Private
Office of the Secretary General. Such meetings are conducted primarily absent staff and
are
in strict confidentiality.
Jordan 127, 184.
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Defense Planning
NATO's military organization was based on integrated
regional command headquarters under the command of SACEUR
based at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
(SHAPE) who, by tradition, was always a senior American
general. 1" The standing NATO commands were assigned
personnel by member states and organized as an integrated
military staff. Three kinds of forces were made available
for military planning in NATO: forces assigned to NATO and
which are either under the operational control or command of
SACEUR or which would come under SACEUR' s operational
control or command during periods of emergency; those
nations which have agreed to assign forces to the
operational command or operational control of a NATO
commander at some future date; and forces under national
command such as land, sea, and air forces not specifically
assigned to or earmarked for a NATO command but which might
be placed under the operational command, control, or
cooperation with a NATO command under certain circumstances.
Effective collective defense required that national military
planning take into consideration the interests of the
Alliance. NATO was thus tasked to lower the transaction
costs of collective defense planning by overcoming
Also by tradition the NATO Secretary General is a European. Since 1966, SHAPE has been
located outside of Mons, Belgium.
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disparities between collective defense needs and national
military planning.
This process was completed through a defense planning
cycle conducted by NATO. 164 The process was initiated with
"Ministerial Guidance" as approved by Defense Ministers.
Once guidance was given to the NATO staff, military planners
developed force goals to be met by the member states. Then
a follow up was carried out to review national actions
during the current year and adapt lessons learned into the
next cycle of defense planning. Transparency was enhanced
via an annual exchange of information on national military
planning. Additionally, NATO conducted command post and
live action exercises to better refine the planning process
and expose national militaries to the technical requirements
of collective defense. This annual defense review would
then be incorporated into a common NATO Force Plan which
came to provide the basis for NATO defense planning over a
five year period.
If collective defense planning were to succeed in an
efficient manner, NATO would have to promote the national
adoption of common standards to assure interoperability of
forces and equipment and to promote efficiency in
multinational military planning and effectiveness in
164
. This cycle was initially conducted as an annual review begun in 1 95 1 , which evolved
into a
triennial review in the 1960s and a two year review by the 1980s.
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multilateral military operations. 165 NATO made numerous
attempts to promote standardization including independently
aiding in the development of common military equipment via
the NATO Basic Military Requirement (NBMR) procedure
beginning in the late 1950s. However, the NBMR could not
overcome national perspectives on defense requirements and
was abandoned in 1966. 166 Subsequent efforts, including
statements endorsing standardization in formal NATO
communiques, proved equally ineffective. By the 1980s NATO
efforts were limited to promoting "interoperability" of
equipment. Member states would endorse standardization
but in practice they supported it to the extent that their
own national model was to be the standard for common NATO
purchases. 168 The inability of NATO to affect the collective
defense requirement of standardization demonstrated the
weakness of NATO's institutional functions and the primacy
of its member states. As one observer concludes of NATO's
standardization efforts: "The biggest impediment stemmed
Standardization goals in NATO included equipment, components and parts for systems,
maintenance and training systems in a way that assures the most economical and effective use of
the research, development, production and logistical resources of member states. "Allied
Interdependence: Trade and Cooperation in Military Equipment," Transatlantic Policy Panel
Report , CSIS Special Report 16, (May 1977) 7.
Robert R. James, Standardization and Common Production of Weapons in NATO (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967) 1-11.
Interoperability is the degree of compatibility between national military equipment. Though not
based on one standard, the goal was that national planning would promote systems that could be
integrated into a NATO command on an effective basis.
For example, in the cases where NATO did attain some standardization of equipment (the M-44
torpedo, the F-104F fighter, and several missile systems), it was on the American model
-
attained only after hard leverage was exerted by the US and its related defense industries. See
General E. Vandervater Jr., Coordinated Weapons Production in NATO: A Study of Alliance
Process (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1967).
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from the need for unanimity at each individual decision
level; centralized control proved to be impossible because
the (members) jealously guarded their independence." 169
The identification of areas for infrastructure
development - fixed military installations for the
deployment and operation of integrated armed forces in the
event of war - was another major task for NATO defense
planning. 170 Infrastructure facilities could also provide
early warning and enhance information available to decision-
makers. 171 NATO was granted authority to identify
infrastructure needs and for aiding the flow of budgetary
resources for infrastructure activities. The NATO member
states would then jointly contribute to a common NATO
infrastructure fund. Impetus remained with host countries
(those which would host infrastructure) and user nations
(those who would contribute forces to the program) . NATO
civilian and military committees played an important
advisory role in the process, but initiative and
James R. Carlton, "NATO Standardization: An Organizational Analysis", in Lawrence S.
Kaplan and Robert W. Clawson, eds., NATO After Thirty Years (Wilmington, DL: Scholarly
Resources Inc., 1981) 21 1.
NATO infrastructure needs included sites such as airfields, signals and telecommunications
installations, military headquarters, fuel pipelines and storage, radar warning and navigational
aid stations, port installations, and missile installations.
For example, the NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) was established as a
linked system of standing sites ranging from Norway to Turkey equipped with radar and
communications systems designed to alert NATO military authorities of an incoming air attack.
This early warning capacity was adapted further in the 1980s with the acquisition of a NATO
commanded fleet of E-3A Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) which serve as
mobile information gathering systems and control centers. At NATO headquarters crisis
management was aided by the NATO Situation Center which was linked to the major NATO
commands and infrastructure warning systems as well as to the member state capitals with the
highest available quality equipment.
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implementation remained with the member states. Pressure
for infrastructure expansion grew from smaller states who
saw it as a means of enhancing their security and as having
spill -over economic benefits. However, once implemented and
running NATO could not justify or originate program
expansion as it had no independent control over funding.
The primary criteria for national contributions to the
common infrastructure program was state-based and did not
result in substantial financial resources. 17 " Moreover, NATO
did not administrate the distribution of infrastructure
funds. The members would enter into mutual financial
commitments and pay each other the requested amounts on
request as needed. NATO's primary administrative role was
to keep account of such transactions. The responsibility
for actual administration lay in the Infrastructure Payments
and Progress Committee composed of member state delegations
operating under national instructions.
Toward Integration or Disintegration?
While NATO had the appearance of accelerating
institutional integration based on its increased
consultative and defense planning characteristics by the
The criteria for establishing national contributions was decided by NATO authorities and
included: 1) the contributing capacity of the member countries; 2) the advantage accruing to
the use country; and 3) the economic benefit for the host country. Though it was central to
NATO military planning, the infrastructure program on average totalled less than .3 percent o:
total combined NATO national defense spending. See James A. Huston, One For All: NATC
Strategy and Logistics through the Formative Period. 1949-1969 (Newark, NJ: University of
Delaware Press, 1984) 157-183.
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1960s, the trend in the institution was actually toward
disintegration. 173 The successful Soviet launch of the
Sputnik rocket in 1957 meant that Moscow now had the
capacity to reach US territory with intercontinental
ballistic missiles. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, in
which the Soviet Union deployed intermediate range missiles
90 miles off the US coast, had given the world a glimpse of
a superpower standoff bordering on intercontinental nuclear
war. Ongoing crisis in Berlin leading to the construction
of the Berlin Wall heightened tensions between the US and
the Soviet Union in Europe. This new strategic environment
tested the credibility of NATO's collective defense function
and contributed to France's withdrawal from the integrated
military command in 1966.
Initially, the ultimate deterrent value behind NATO was
the principle of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which
threatened massive retaliation with US nuclear forces in the
event of a Soviet attack. By the late 1950s MAD was
undermined by a fundamental challenge to the principle of
collective defense - would the US risk its own territory for
that of its NATO allies once the Soviet Union could threaten
American soil? So long as the US maintained control over
nuclear decisions in the Alliance, reassurance had
decreasing value for some European members. With growing
See Francis A. Beer, Integration and Disintegration in NATO : Processes of Alliance Cohesion
and Prospects for Atlantic Community (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press.
1969).
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nuclear parity emerging between the US and the Soviet Union,
the concept of MAD actually increased the potential for a
lower level conventional attack in Europe should the Soviet
Union wish to test US resolve to defend Western Europe. As
Roger Hilsman, a senior State Department official, wrote in
1959: "In the face of this new strategic situation,
Europeans have begun to translate E=MC2 into local terms." 174
To reassure the European allies, and prevent a
conventional war in Europe from escalating into a major
global nuclear exchange, the US backed a plan (conceived by
SACEUR General Laris Norstad) for a Multi-Lateral Force
(MLF) which would have made NATO a fourth nuclear power.
The US would not put all of its nuclear forces under a NATO
command but would grant NATO a role in the decision to use
nuclear weapons. The primary hope of the MLF was to
reassure France (in particular) about the quality of the
security guarantee it received in NATO and thereby convince
Paris not to develop an independent nuclear force. However,
to President de Gaulle, the MLF was an insincere effort to
enhance European reassurance that strengthened NATO
integration and which increased the US role in Europe and
thereby constrained independent French action.
Roger Hilsman, "On NATO Strategy," in Wolfers 152. For further discussion of nuclear issues
see Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers.
1957); Pierre M. Gallois, "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe," Orbis 8:2 (Summer
1963) 226-249; Hedley Bull, "Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance: A Critique of United States
Doctrine," Policy Memorandum No. 29 (Princeton, NJ: Center of International Studies, 1964);
Kugler 141-190; Weher Multilateralism in NATO 48-80; and Duffield Power Rules , 151-232.
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De Gaulle's concerns were heightened when, after first
promoting the MLF, the Kennedy Administration decided that
crisis decision-making required maximum US control over
nuclear forces and that multiple decision-making centers
could cloud the capacity to respond quickly. As an
alternative, the US advanced a policy of "flexible response"
in which NATO would respond step-by- step to a crisis by
continually assessing the degree to which escalation might
be necessary. Reassurance to the European members of NATO
was offered via the creation of a ministerial level
(ministers of defense) Defense Planning Committee (DPC) with
primary responsibility for military affairs (replacing the
Defense Committee) and a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) to
increase smaller NATO members' involvement in the
development of nuclear policy.
None of these institutional efforts satisfied General
de Gaulle who increasingly worried about the US commitment
to its security. For several years, the US used NATO
planning structures to sooth French worries, but strategic
concerns and national pride were driving France away from
NATO. To the extent that France was participating in NATO,
it was as an obstacle to NATO planning. In 1966, France
informed its allies that it would withdraw from the NATO
integrated military command and that all NATO installations
should be removed from French territory. De Gaulle was
careful to distinguish between NATO as an organization and
the "Western Alliance" of which France still considered
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itself a part of. Moreover, France did not completely
withdraw from NATO's political structures thereby confirming
the proposition that states found value in non-military
participation in NATO institutions. By continuing its
political role, France could continue to raise concerns
about, and even block, NATO policy. 175
Little changed with the French withdrawal - the
structure of the international system remained intact and
NATO cohesion was actually enhanced as the remaining allies
were able to proceed with decisions that had been held up by
France. France also maintained its role in areas where it
felt that NATO increased its security - such as in the NADGE
early warning system of which France continued to pay about
12 percent of the costs. Realizing that little had actually
changed with the withdraw of France, the US was not
especially critical . The US remained committed to West
European security and the primary means to reassuring
security in Europe remained forward defense in Germany.
That policy was revised to account for nuclear planning via
flexible response, but it was unaffected by the absence of
France. Paris and Bonn negotiated a new status of forces
accord allowing France to maintain its forces in West
De Gaulle's actions were not universally welcomed in France. For example, in the national
assembly, former Premier Rene Pleven launched a strong attack on the unilateral nature ot the
decision and the tact that France appeared to be weakening NATO without any concessions Iroi
- or weakening of - the Warsaw Pact. Mr. L. Radoux (Rapporteur), France and NATO (Paris:
Western European Union, 1967) 65-78.
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Germany outside of the NATO command structure and thus the
balance of power remained unchanged.
The dramatic external and internal changes which
created crisis in NATO in the 1960s produced a reassessment
of NATO's institutional tasks. The Harmel Report of 1967,
as accepted by the NAC, broadened NATO's scope to include
coordinating a multilateral detente strategy toward the
Soviet Union. 176 The report concluded that:
Military security and a policy of detente are
not contradictory but complimentary. Collective
defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics.
It is the necessary condition for effective
policies directed towards a greater relaxation of
tensions. The way to peace and stability rests in
particular on the use of the Alliance
constructively in the interests of detente.
The report recommended that NATO coordinate a multilateral
approach to bridging gaps between East and West; commit the
major powers to full consultation with NATO allies on German
reunification; overcome the division of Germany and foster
European security; and coordinate and consult on arms
control and mutual and balanced force reductions between
East and West. 178 Despite this continued adaptation, NATO
Named after the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel who proposed, and led, the study.
"The Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)." December 1967. NATO Office of
Information and Press.
Future Tasks. The proposal for Mutual and Balanced Forced Reductions (MBFR) signaled
acceptance of a Warsaw Pact offer for negotiations the year before. NATO's formal activities
were expanded via the creation of a Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS).
The committee was chartered to improve: "...the exchange of views and experience among the
allied countries... with the deliberate objective of stimulating actions on problems of the human
environment by member governments. Mandate of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society 17 November 1969, NATO Press Service. For full discussion of the role of the CCMS
see Edwina Campbell, Consultation and Consensus in NATO: Implementing the Canadian
Article (New York: University Press of America, 1985).
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increasingly appeared to be an alliance that had outlived
its usefulness and was struggling to find new missions.
In a comprehensive overview of NATO's consultative
functions written in 1969, Robert Hunter noted that NATO's
institutions have "...been unable, perhaps inevitably, to
affect seriously the complicated process of diplomatic
bargaining that have been the life-blood of the Alliance and
the relations conducted among fifteen nations within that
context." 179 Indeed, a short list of major challenges to
international security during the Cold War shows that NATO
had little if any direct role. During the Suez, Cuban, and
Vietnam crises, the views of European allies were largely
ignored by the US. Major decisions related to Berlin and
Germany were taken by the US, Britain, and France, outside
of the consultative framework of NATO. The US and its
allies were in disarray by the mid-1970s over disputes
related to the Middle East. In the 1980s, Britain ignored
its allies concerns over its war in the Falkland Islands and
the US launched air attacks on Libya over the objections of
all of its allies except Britain. 180 By the 1980s, the
Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear
missiles targeted at Western Europe, the Soviet invasion of
Robert Hunter. Security in Europe (London: Eleks Books, 1969) 54. For a similar analysis,
see Morton A. Kaplan, "NATO in the International System of the 1970s," Orbis 8: 1 (Spring
1969) 28.
See Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO Out-ot-Area Problems
since 1949 (Baltimore, MP: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990); Beer; and Chernoff
for detailed discussion of NATO's role, or lack of role, in these and other Cold War crises.
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Afghanistan, and the violent repression of the Solidarity
reform movement in Poland renewed the American commitment to
a global Cold War strategy with NATO its centerpiece.
However, the same kinds of problems that the institution
failed to ameliorate before returned to divide NATO in this
new phase of Cold War tension. In particular, differences
between the US and Western Europe over the perceived danger
of the Soviet threat prompted increased resentment in the
Washington DC over the failure of Europe to share in the
burdens of collective defense. 181 US Senator Ted Stevens
symbolized a growing frustration in the US commenting that:
"If they (the Europeans) feel so secure in their
relationship with the Russians, then I think it is time for
18 2
us to re-examine the number of troops we have in Europe."
181
182
For example, the Afghan invasion signaled what the Americans viewed as a threat to US and
European access to Persian Gulf oil. The US hoped to get European commitments to offset any
reallocation of American resources from the Continent to the Gulf theater of operations while
establishing a US-led Rapid Deployment Force for the region. However, the Europeans did not
share this assessment and indeed rejected American opposition to a planned sale of gas pipeline
materials to the Soviet Union.
Simon Lunn, Burdenshariinz in NATO (London: Royal Institution of International Affairs,
1983) 49. Editorials published in major US newspapers in late 1981 took an even harder line
questioning the US commitment to West European security. As an editorial in The Chicago
Tribune opined: "The heirs of Talleyrand, Bismarck and Disraeli (and of Petain,
Hitler and
Chamberlain) tell us that we don't know how to deal intelligently with the Soviet colossus. We
are hamhanded, they say, unsubtle, and simpleminded...But look at the record.
These paragons
of diplomacy managed twice in this century to get Europe in such an unholy
mess that the U.S.
was called upon to rescue it at a vast cost in wealth and blood." Quoted in Simon
Sertaty.
"Atlantic Fantasies," in Robert W. Tucker and Linda Wrigley, eds., The Atlant.c
Alliance and
its Critics (New York: Praeger, 1983) 122.
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Burdensharing in NATO
NATO institutions did not perform well in the task of
promoting burdensharing
.
In fact, the primacy of alliance
contributed to a political economy of West European security
dependence on the US and NATO. This contradiction
constrained Europe's capacity to act on its own and became a
constant irritant for many American members of Congress who
felt that the Europeans were "free-riding" on the US which
spent disproportionate amounts of its Gross National Product
(GNP) securing Western Europe. 183 The lack of burdensharing
in NATO became ingrained in the political economy of West
European integration. Empirical evidence for
disproportionate cost sharing in NATO is demonstrated by
comparing relative defense expenditures as a percentage of
GNP among major Alliance members: 184
Free-riding is a public choice dilemma for collective action. During the Cold War, the
collective defense became a public good - a benefit which, once provided, is utilized by all
recipients whether they contribute to the costs of service provision or not. If one nation has a
greater demand for a public good than others, it will place a higher valuation on its provision.
Ultimately, that state provides a disproportionate level of the collective good as the smaller
members of an alliance tend to supply only suboptimal amounts. Moreover, a small country
which views defense costs as a burden could withdraw from (or not contribute to) the military
obligations of an alliance knowing that the larger power and its remaining allies would still
come to its defense if attacked. See Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic
Theory of Alliances," The Review of Economics and Statistics 47:3 (August 1966) 266-279 and
Mancur Olson (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). For a mathematical application of the
Olson and Zechauser study see Gavin Kennedy, Burden Sharing in NATO (New York: Holmes
and Meier, 1979) 18-21.
The figures on European and American defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP are
compiled from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London:
Brassey's, 1960-1993). These dates reflect various stages of shifts in the Cold War including
the impact of the Korean War (1953), limited detente (1958), Vietnam and the French
withdrawal from NATO (1965 and 1970), 1970s detente (1980), the new Cold War and die
Reagan years (1985) and the impact of Soviet reform under Mikhail Gorbachev (1991). There is
dispute over the best way to measure burdensharing including the military plans that are set out
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Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of Gross National Product
among Major NATO Members During the Cold War
Country 1953 1958 1965 1970 1980 1985 1991
United States 14.7 11.1 8.0 7.8 5.5 6.5 5.1
Federal Republie of
Germany
4.9 3.8 4.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 1.9
France 11.0 8.0 5.6 4.0 3.9 4.0 2.8
United Kingdom 11.3 7.8 6.0 4.9 5.1 5.2 4.2
As the major power in the Alliance, the US maintained a
larger percentage of the defense burden in NATO
.
185 Other
major NATO powers did maintain a relatively high level of
peacetime defense spending. 186 However, over time, European
contributions averaged just above or below 3.0 percent.
by NATO members, the ability of a country to contribute to those plans, and a variety of
economic factors including relative growth in defense spending over time. The relevant figures
prompting political disputes over NATO burdensharing were drawn from comparisons of the
percentage of GNP allocated to national defense. See James R. Golden, The Dynamics of
Change in NATO: A Burden-Sharing Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1983) 24-54 and Simon
Duke, The Burdensharing Debate: A Reassessment (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993) 124-
5
l50
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Adjusting for non-NATO national defense outlays is difficult as the US and its allies had
numerous military commitments and related costs. This is especially true for the US which saw
its defense spending rise considerably during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Nevertheless,
Leonard Sullivan Jr. and Jack A. LeCuyer show that the US, with 48 percent of the aggregated
NATO Gross Domestic Product (GDP), provided 66 percent of NATO defense costs when
Vietnam is excluded . Sullivan and LeCuyer maintain that for equity to have been attained the
US would have spent $1.1 trillion less between 1961 and 1988 on defense. Leonard Sullivan Jr.
and Jack A. LeCuyer, Comprehensive Security and Western Prosperity (Washington D.C.: The
Atlantic Council of the United States, 1988) 48. Also see Melvin Krauss, ed., How NATO
Weakens the West (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986) 32-33 and David P. Calleo, "Inflation
and American Power," Foreign Affairs 59:4 (Spring 1981) 781-812.
6
The different levels of percentage of GNP allocated for defense among the major NATO members
can be explained by a number of factors. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany
maintained a large standing army as the front-line state in Europe. However, the internal and
external constraints on West Germany assuming any role outside its own territory kept West
German defense expenditures low. France maintained a relatively high share of the defense
burden because of its perception that the American commitment to France's security could not
always be counted on. Nevertheless, France's defense expenditure actually tell after its
withdrawal from the NATO integrated military command - suggesting that France's selt-help
goals were also motivated by soft security gains.
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American gains in political influence in NATO were
somewhat offset by opportunity costs in soft security -
where Europe made gains under the US security guarantee.
Differences among the main NATO countries in terms of
government expenditures for social security programs as a
percentage of GNP were very disparate during the Cold War. 1
Government Expenditures on Social Security Programs
as a Percentage of GNP Among Selected NATO Countries
Country 1957 1960 1963 1966 1971 1977
Canada 6.5 8.7 9.4 9.0 14.8 14.6
United States 5.0 6.29 6.8 7.7 11.1 13.7
Federal Republie of Germany 16.6 16.2 16.9 18.4 18.8 26.5
United Kingdom 10.0 11.0 11.1 12.3 13.5 17.1
United States 14.3 13.7 15.4 16.6 N/A 26.5
European government investment into human and industrial
resources through welfare states was part of a strategic
effort to provide an alternative economic model to Soviet
communism. Yet as the European welfare states grew, so did
domestic bureaucracies resistant to reallocating resources
that might have reassured the US that European promises to
share the costs of European security were sincere. Even if
there had been a desire to contribute more to the costs of
collective defense, the political economy of NATO and
European integration made this an unlikely policy option in
7
David Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) 96.
These figures include old age, survivors and incapacitated, public health insurance, workmen s
compensation, unemployment insurance, family allowances, public employee programs, and
public assistance. Also see David P. Calleo. Bevond American Hegemony (New York: Basic
Books Inc 1987); Krauss 28 and 138; and Catherine M. Kelleher, "Enduring Interests
and
Negotiable Bargains," in Stanley R. Sloan, ed., NATO in the 1990s (Washington DC:
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989) 93-95.
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Europe. Forced to choose between continued free-riding on
the US versus raising taxes, reducing popular welfare-state
spending, or increasing budget deficits, European
politicians were left with an easy decision - though often
publicly berating NATO and the US, they continued to support
the Alliance.
The European Pillar of NATO
One day after signing the NATO Treaty the Brussels Pact
countries submitted a formal request to the US for military
and financial aid. 189 This request fueled congressional
concern that the US was expected to underwrite the economic
and military recovery of Western Europe. 190 Therefore, at
the outset, pressure was placed on the US to establish its
forward defense plans in Europe on a basis of burdensharing
- initially focusing on German rearmament. As President
Truman wrote in his memoirs:
See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1982); Leon N. Lindberg and Charles S. Maier, eds., The Politics of Inflation and Economic
Stagnation (Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1985) 213; Christopher Pierson,
Bevond the Welfare State? (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991 );
and Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act," in Robert O. Keohane and
Stanley Hoffmann, eds.. The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional
Change (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991) 73.
"Requests from the Brussels Treaty Powers to the U.S. Government for Military Assistance", 5
April 1949. FRUS, 1949,4:285-287.
George Kennan worked against large scale military aid to Europe arguing that the militarization
of NATO would hinder efforts toward a political settlement with the Soviet Union. Senator
Vandenburg felt that it was inappropriate to over-emphasize the military aspects of NATO as tin
Senate was about to debate its ratification. A compromise was reached to postpone
congressional debate on military assistance until after the Treaty was approved. See Lawrence
S. Kaplan, A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951
(Washington D.C: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1980).
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Without Germany, the defense of Europe was a
rearguard action on the shores of the Atlantic
Ocean. With Germany there could be a defense indepth, powerful enough to offer effective
resistance to aggression from the East... Any map
will show it, and a little arithmetic will prove
what the addition of German manpower means to the
strength of the joint defense of Europe.
Moreover, as Lawrence S. Kaplan asserts: "Not only was it
illogical to omit the German component to NATO, it was also
unfair.
. .Why should Americans - and Europeans - labor to
defend a West that includes Germany without the Germans
participating in the common defense?" 192
France insisted that German rearmament be done through
an all European army which would grant Paris authority over
German military activity. To that end, French Premier Rene
Pleven proposed creating a European Defense Community (EDC)
which would also accelerate European economic integration
via the creation of a supranational integrated planning
structure. The EDC would be based on a Special European
Force with its own European Minister of Defence and with an
independent command staff under the authority of existing
NATO command structures. 153 The US endorsed the EDC as a
means of strengthening the European contribution to
collective defense while maintaining the primacy of NATO and
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1956) 253.
Kaplan NATO and the United States , 45.
Germany would have contributed manpower but would not have its own General Staff, defense
ministry, or armaments industry. See Michael M. Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and
Atlantic Security (Baltimore, MP: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). Unlike NATO, the
EDC would decide independently the direction and control of arms industries. See Edward
Fursdon, The European Defence Community: A History (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1980).
117
attaining both through the inclusion of West Germany in
NATO.
The EDC Treaty was signed on 27 May 1953. 194 Though a
number of parliaments soon approved the EDC, France - who
had originated the concept - caused it to fail. Because of
historical sensitivity toward military integration with
Germany, concern that French colonial distractions in
Indochina would allow Germany to increase its power in
Europe, and intense differences of domestic opinion between
pro-NATO forces and nationalist Gaullists, the French
National Assembly defeated the EDC on procedural grounds on
30 August 1954. For its part, Washington had not helped
promote a favorable climate in France for the EDC, NATO, or
the US. For example, US Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles had warned that failure of the EDC might prompt an
"agonizing reappraisal" of the American commitment to
Europe
.
As an alternative to the EDC, Britain proposed an
institutional solution - backed by power - as a means of
managing Germany and promoting reassurance for its
neighbors. In September 1954 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
proposed revitalizing the Brussels Pact to create a Western
European Union (WEU) to include Germany and Italy. Because
The signators of the EDC included France, Belgium the German Federal Republic, Italy,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The US and Britain provided support via protocols (signed
the same day) on mutual security guarantees between EDC and NATO members. Britain did t
sign the EDC as it could not accept the supranational element of the accord.
FRUS, 1952-1954, 5:711-712.
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the security guarantees of the WEU would apply to the same
states as the NATO guarantee, the WEU became the means of
bringing West Germany into NATO. This institutional option
avoided militarizing the WEU and was thus more a political
event than an effort to create a functional European pillar
of NATO. 196 Nevertheless, the WEU settled the question of
forward defense, included Britain, reassured France, and
promoted the principle of a European pillar of NATO and
operational burdensharing therefore satisfying the US for a
time. This institutional evolution facilitated an
acceptable compromise among disparate national security
concerns in which the major participants believed that their
security had increased. 197
The Modified Brussels Treaty specified that: "Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the
military staffs of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate military
authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters." Protocol Modifying and
Completing the Brussels Treaty: Paris, France (October 23, 1954). For discussion of the WEU
see Alfred Calien, The Western European Union and NATO: Building a European Defence
Identity within the Context of Atlantic Solidarity (London: Brassey's UK, 1989).
After its creation, the WEU could claim only one major achievement - aiding in the settlement
of the Saar lands in 1955 which further eased historical tensions between France and Germany.
See Calien 4-5. The European members did apply some elements of economic integration to
security, primarily through the creation of the EUROGROUP in 1968. This was an inner-
NATO caucus of European ministers of defense. The EUROGROUP received a degree of
institutionalization (though without French participation) with high level staffing from European
defense ministries responsible for coordinating European activity in communication
(EUROCOM), logistics (EUROLOG), and defense procurement (EURONAD) designed to
enhance Europe's commitment to NATO. In the European Community, France participated in
the Independent European Programme Group (1EPG) which included all of the EC member
states (except Ireland) and Turkey and Norway. The Single European Act of 1984 gave the
1EPG a goal of creating a European defense industry. See Trevor Taylor, European Defence
Cooperation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984) 17-27 and Jeffrey Harrop, The Political
Economy of Integration in the European Community (Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing,
1989) 10.
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Institutional Bargaining and Economic Burdensharing
The failure to establish a functional European pillar
to NATO continued to cause concern in Washington and in the
US Congress. Such distress was reflected in a growing
dispute over balance-of
-payments deficits between the US and
Europe. 198 The issue took the political form of American
pressure on Germany to provide "offset" payments for
maintaining US forces there. Germany agreed to a program of
arms purchases from the US and some direct payments for
American troop activities. 159 However, in Europe there was
an increasing sense of already shouldering the greatest
burden given that war would most likely take place in the
European theater. Additionally, the German public was
increasingly frustrated with the presence of foreign troops
stationed on their land. 200 Off-set payments not
withstanding, the primacy of NATO's alliance functions
brought about by the structure of the international system
impeded the ability of the institution to meet one of its
primary tasks
.
In 1966, US Senator Mike Mansfield began a series of
Senate Resolutions stressing that NATO would not be
Caused by the costs of maintaining troops and variations in currency exchange rate losses. See
Gregory Treverton, The Dollar Drain and American Forces in Germany: Managing the Political
Economics of Alliance (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1978).
This included a $2.2 billion program over two years based on military procurements, loans, and
German coverage of some property costs of the US in Germany. Golden 54-59.
Intangible forms of burdens for Europeans included the US force presence in Germany (in
particular), the physical presence of nuclear weapons in Europe, and general dislike for US Cold
War strategy. Duke 211-213.
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fundamentally harmed by substantial reductions in US troop
levels in Europe. Senator Mansfield hoped to use
legislation to return NATO to its origins with a strong
European self-help component organized within the
transatlantic context. The original Mansfield Resolution
(1967) declared that:
The condition of our European allies, both
economically and military, has appreciably
improved since large contingents of forces were
deployed. The commitment by all Members of the
North Atlantic Treaty is based upon the full
cooperation of all Treaty partners in contributing
materials and men on a fair and equitable basis,
but such contributions have not been forthcoming
from all of the Members; relations between the
two parts of Europe are now characterized by an
increasing two-way flow of trade, people and their
peaceful exchange; and the present policy of
maintaining large contingents of US forces and
their dependents on the US continent also
contributes further to the fiscal and monetary
problems of the US
.
Seeking to reassure the NATO allies, President-Elect Richard
Nixon wrote to NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio in early
1969 that: "There will be no diminution of America's
commitment to the defense of Western Europe or to the
Organization you so ably serve..." 202 The Nixon
Administration persuaded its allies to agree that any
reductions in NATO troop levels be done in the context of
mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) to be negotiated
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and not through unilateral
declarations. The claim that support for Mansfield- style
"United States Troops in Europe: Hearings Before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign
Relations and Amis Services Committees on the Subject of United States Troops in Europe".
United States Senate Ninetieth Congress, First Session on S. Res 49 and S. Res 83. 26
April
3 May 1967.
Joan Hoff-Wilson, "'Nixingerism,' NATO, and Detente," in Kaplan American Historians, 9
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legislation could harm arms reduction efforts (and thus
hinder military cost-reductions) took some steam out of
Mansfield's legislative efforts. 203 Nevertheless, Mansfield
had struck a chord in Congress which was increasingly
frustrated with maintaining 315,000 uniformed troops,
235,000 dependents and 14,000 civilian employees stationed
in Europe which all contributed to a dollar gap in foreign
exchange amounting to a $1.5 billion annual deficit. 204
In 1977 NATO members agreed to an institutional
strategy to promote burdensharing as measured by percentage
of GNP
.
As part of US President Jimmy Carter's proposal for
a Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP) to modernize conventional
and nuclear capabilities and promote standardization of
equipment among the Allies, the DPC agreed on 18 May to fund
the project from 1979-1984 with a required three percent
annual increase in NATO related defense expenditure in real
Mansfield continued his efforts with an amendment to the Selective Service Act of 1971
requiring that US force levels in Europe be reduced by 50 percent - to about 150,000 troops by
the end of the year. The White House enlisted former SACEURs, former Secretary of State(s)
George Ball and Dean Acheson, and former President Lyndon Johnson to lobby against the
amendment which was defeated by a vote of 61-36. In 1973, the Senate approved a similar
Mansfield Amendment by a vote of 49-46. Caught by surprise, the Nixon Administration
defeated a bill put forward by Senator Alan Cranston (which contained virtually the same
language as the Mansfield Amendment) thus assuring Mansfield's procedural defeat. Senators
Sam Nunn and Henry Jackson continued the Mansfield tradition through an amendment to the
Defense Department Authorization Act of 1974. This amendment stated that a failure of the
European members to offset fully the costs of troops in Europe would result in automatic
reductions in troop levels. Had the amendment passed, it would have required the President to
reduce US forces in Europe on a percentage equal to the amount of the balance of payments
deficit the European members of NATO failed to offset. For detailed discussion of Mansfield's
efforts see Phil Williams, The Senate and US Troops in Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1985) 169-204.
Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO: The Second Generation," in Kaplan and Clawson 7.
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terms by each member state. 205 A senior Carter
Administration official told a closed meeting with US
Senators that, the three percent solution was based on
"...our perception that we needed some kind of an agreed
program whereby we could get the Allies to come along with
us in the rearmament we saw as necessary in NATO." 206 This
was in spite of the fact that European defense expenditures
had actually been rising on average of about three percent
during the 1970s as part of national force modernization
programs - while US spending had been in decline. 207
In calling for a three percent solution to promote
burdensharing, the NATO members had created a supranational
institutional guideline to which member states were expected
to adhere. However, there was no mechanism for guaranteeing
compliance. 208 For example, in Washington the program
sparked bureaucratic debate with the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) insisting that only defense outlays for
NATO should be counted and thus there may not be a need for
an overall increase in national defense spending. Meanwhile
the National Security Council and the Department of Defense
205
. Defence Planning Committee Communique, 18 May 1977. NATO Office of Information and
Press. The DPC recommendations became formal NATO policy at a Washington D.C. Heads of
State NATO Summit in May 1978.
206
.
Quoted in Lunn 17-18. The official, Robert Komer (Special Assistant for NATOAffairs to the
Secretary of Defense) noted that in reality the US had already included increases into its own
planning for the time period covered by the LTDP and that the only countries who would have
to increase their percent of GNP toward defense would be European members of NATO.
2
0. Duke 73.
208
. The DPC Communique qualified the plan by adding that: "This annual increase should be in the
region of 3 per cent, recognizing that for some individual countries economic circumstances will
affect what can be achieved.
"
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asserted (successfully) that the NATO plan should apply to
the entire defense budget. 209 The internal American debate
over how to measure national commitments to this
burdensharing plan suggested to the Europeans that creative
legerdemain might allow members to circumvent the
institutional directive. The result was a divisive program
based on redundant military planning. Even if successful,
the results would have maintained the "unfairness" aspect of
burdensharing - only measured at a higher proportionate
level of GNP . Thus as NATO moved toward the end of the Cold
War it had failed to achieve the institutional task of
burdensharing. The objective of a reassured and
economically strong Western Europe was attained in the form
of West European economic integration, but it was built upon
a political economy of security dependence on the US.
NATO Enlargement
Article 10 of the NATO treaty states that: "The
Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other
European state in a position to further the principles of
this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North
Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."
210 The relevant
principles are "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage
and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles
Foreign Policy Research Institute, The Three Percent Solution and the Future of NATO
(Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1981) 29-30.
North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4 April 1949.
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of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law." 211
NATO expanded three times during the Cold War - to include
Greece and Turkey (1952), West Germany (1955), and Spain
(1982)
.
Each enlargement was done for strategic gain.
Principles were secondary and in some cases ignored
entirely
.
Greece and Turkey
Though Greece and Turkey were the core states of the
Truman Doctrine, they were not original NATO members. 212 The
changed strategic environment in the early 1950s facilitated
their entrance into NATO. Greece could serve as a
containment point on the Balkan peninsula and Turkey would
cut off Soviet naval access to the Mediterranean Sea.
Turkey would provide NATO planning with one of the largest
standing armies in Europe - up to 25 divisions which could
tie down and distract the Soviet Union should it attack
Central Europe. Enlargement would also shore up NATO's
southern command and open the way for US bases in Turkey.
213
North Atlantic Treaty, Preamble.
A number of strategic and political objections were raised against Greece and Turkey having a
formal relationship with NATO. Central to these arguments were concerns over extending
NATO's defense into the Middle East and up to the Caucasian border of the Soviet Union.
Neither country could really be considered "Atlantic" and as Greeks were Orthodox Christians
and Turks Islamic, neither were representative of the western understanding of tire "Atlantic
Community". Ferenc A. Vali. The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 1972) 83. Additionally, Britain was more interested in establishing a non-
NATO alliance in the Mediterranean that would look toward the Middle East.
S. Victor Papacosma, "Greece and NATO," in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and
Raimondo Luraghi, eds., NATO and the Mediterranean (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly
Resources, 1985) 192.
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In September 1950 Greece and Turkey were invited to
coordinate with NATO defense planning. On 22 October 1951
Greece and Turkey signed protocols on their accession to the
North Atlantic Treaty - which was formalized on 18 February
1952 .
After joining NATO, Greece made initial steps to
promote democratic civilian control of its military by
sending officers to the NATO Defense College in Rome.
However, in 1967 Greek colonels staged a coup. The junta
took control using a NATO counterinsurgency plan (called
Prometheus ) intended for use in response to serious internal
subversion. 214 NATO faced what one observer termed a "crisis
of conscience" regarding one of its members. 215 However,
NATO did nothing to discourage the Greek military. 216
American, British, and NATO officials met regularly with the
coup leaders. 217 Reflecting the realist policies of US
Several of the coup leaders had served with the Greek Central Intelligence Agency (KYP) which
had close ties to the American CIA. The coup leader Papadopoulos had served as liaison
between the two services. Theodore Couloumbis, The United States. Greece, and Turkey: The
Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger, 1983) 51.
D. George Kousloulas. "The Origins of the Greek Military Coup, April 1967," Orbis 8:1
(Spring 1969) 332.
The Scandinavian NATO members did raise the issue of the Greek regime for discussion in the
NAC. However, their efforts were deflected by more powerful members. NATO Secretary
General Brosio also opposed discussion of the Greek regime - an act which the Scandinavian
members believed went beyond the authority of his office.
Though the US embargoed heavy weapons sales to Greece, Washington continued to be the
highest supplier of weapons to Greece. In fact, there were more US military supplies transferred
to Greece in 1967-1970 than there had been in the three years before the coup. In 1972
Washington negotiated an "open-ended" home-port agreement for the stationing of US Naval
forces in Greece (rescinded in 1974 after the junta fell). Both France and Germany also traded
with, and sold military equipment to Greece. Benjamin Cameron Sharp, NATO and the
Mediterranean. 1949-1979: Deterioration on the Southern Flank (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, 1981)
102-103.
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Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (after 1969) , these
officials believed that it was necessary to live with the
Greek coup out of strategic necessity - even if it meant
working with a military that was using NATO plans to subvert
democracy. 218 The coup leader, George Papadopoulos
,
responded with decidedly pro-NATO policies. 219 However, NATO
paid a price for this sacrifice of principles for, after the
military government fell in 1974, the new civilian
government quickly withdrew from the NATO integrated
military command. 220 Short sighted realist policy had
actually decreased the security of NATO member states by
damaging collective defense. 2 " 1 Greece eventually decided
that it could better constrain its historical enemy in
Turkey with a voice in NATO affairs. However, Athens was
not able to negotiate re-admission to the NATO integrated
military command until 1980. 222
Turkey experienced a series of military coups,
restrictions on the press, violent public protests, and
martial law. By 1987 Turkey had parliamentary elections
218
219
220
22l'
222
Robert Jordan and Werner Feld, Europe in the Balance: the Changing Context of European
International Politics (London: Faber and Faber, 1986) 216.
For example, in 1967 he withdrew a Greek brigade from Cyprus rather than allow tensions there
to exacerbate - much to Washington and NATO's pleasure.
Couloumbis 101-102.
See Laurence Stern. The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of
American Diplomacy (New York: Times Books, 1977). Stern notes similarities between
Kissinger's willingness to overlook principles in Greece with the approach taken by Metternich
during the Greek uprising against the Ottoman Empire in 1821.
Greece's re-entry was delayed due to obstacles raised by Turkey over command and control
issues and territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea. See Thanos Veremis, "Greece and NATO:
Continuity and Change," in John Chipman, ed., NATO's Southe rn Allies: Internal and External
Challenges (New York: Routledge, 1988) 269-270.
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showing momentum toward democracy. This movement continued
in 1995 when parliamentary elections brought a peaceful
change of government. Democracy appeared to function
marginally in Turkey - but not due to NATO
. In fact, in the
1995 elections the victorious Islamicist Welfare Party
campaigned on a platform that included withdrawing from NATO
and establishing an "Islamic NATO." As a former US
Ambassador to Turkey asked: "How do you deal with a NATO
ally led by a man who is fundamentally anti-NATO,
fundamentally anti-Semitic and fundamentally pro- Islamist
,
even when he's largely behaving himself?" 223
NATO's record of managing relations between Greece and
Turkey is equally weak. In 1964 Greece and Turkey were
nearly drawn into a civil war on Cyprus which held sizeable
Greek and Turkish populations. NATO Secretary General Dirk
Stikker attempted to mediate on behalf of NATO." 24 There was
also inconsequential debate in the NAC about the possibility
of deploying a NATO peacekeeping force. 225 However, war was
only deterred by the US acting unilaterally with power
politics. On 5 June 1964 US President Lyndon Johnson
223
. Steven Erlanger, "Turkish Prime Minister's Islamic Tour Worries U.S.," The New York Times.
10 August 1996. A2.
224
.
Jordan 136. In 1956 NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay suggested that NATO serve as a
forum for mediation of Greek-Turkish disputes over what was then the British mandate of
Cyprus. In 1957 Secretary General Paul Henri-Spaak proposed that the NAC sponsor a
conference on Cyprus. Spaak advocated a federal arrangement for Cyprus composed of Greek
and Turkish assemblies which would work with a British governor over a period of seven years.
In the first case, a lack of consensus in the NAC prohibited NATO from acting and in the later
the parties were unwilling to place good faith in NATO as a mechanism for resolving their
disputes.
225
.
Sharp 85-86. UN peacekeepers were eventually deployed to the region.
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dispatched a personal letter to Turkish Prime Minster Ismet
Inonu asserting that: "I hope you will understand that your
NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they
have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet
Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet
intervention without the full consent and understanding of
its NATO allies." 226 While Johnson appealed to the
principles of peaceful settlement of disputes in his letter
- it was the implied threat that the US might not come to
Turkey's defense in the event of a Soviet attack that
prompted a change in Turkish policy and not NATO. The
Turkish Prime Minister replied that the tone and substance
of the US letter raised "great sorrow and concern" for
Turkey. 227 NATO did reassure Turkey somewhat as the NAC
instructed Secretary General Stikker to observe Greek-
Turkish disputes and report to the Council . Given disparate
views between Athens (which preferred the UN) and Ankara
(which preferred NATO) of NATO's role, it was necessary for
Stikker to distinguish between facilitating information
flows and mediation. Thus Stikker was limited to stating
The Johnson letter was published in the Middle East Journal (Summer 1966) 386-389.
The Turkish response stated that: "Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes
upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim
of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the
scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the
situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was
provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist this member
should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance
would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. " Published in the Middle East Journal (Summer
1966) 389-393.
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that: "I am a watch-dog trying to diminish tensions between
Greece and Turkey." 228
In 1974, civil war in Cyprus again drew the two NATO
allies to the brink of conflict. While negotiating with
Greece in Geneva, Turkey quietly built up 40,000 troops on
Cyprus and then in a quick action took over 40 percent of
the island in August. The US Senate responded by imposing
an arms embargo on Turkey (lasting from 1974-1978)
. This
restriction on Turkish freedom to act angered Ankara which
temporarily closed over two dozen US military installations
on Turkish territory. 229 Turkish foreign policy toward
Cyprus had been constrained by balance of power on the
island and by the US - NATO had no independent role to play
beyond reinforcing the American pressure on Greece and
Turkey in at least ten special sessions of the NAC
.
However, Turkey built up considerable resentment for the US
and, by association, NATO for the constraints it felt had
been unjustly placed on its foreign policy.
By 1996 Greece and Turkey were still close to war (in
this case over small rock islands in the Aegean Sea)
.
23 °
Jordan 136. In 1967 renewed strains over Cyprus nearly brought Greece and Turkey to war
once again. NATO Secretary Brosio was given a mandate by the NAC to use his office to lower
tensions. Although the US approved of Brosio's mission in the NAC, President Johnson
appointed his own special representative (Cyrus R. Vance) to mediate between the countries.
Though the two worked in a complimentary manner, it was the influence of the US and not
NATO which brought the two countries away from the brink of war.
James Brown, Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey (London: Brassey's, UK, 1991) 9.
For the roots of this particular crisis see S. Victor Papacosma, "More than Rocks: Greek-
Turkish Discord in Historical Perspective," Association for the Study of Nationalities: Analysis
of Current Events 7:9 (May 1996) 3-6.
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NATO did provide a forum in the NAC where they were "read
the riot act" for setting a poor example while NATO was
implementing peacekeeping plans in nearby Bosnia-
Herzegovina.' 1 However, when NATO Secretary General Javier
Solana offered his good offices for mediation, Athens
rejected his participation as it would imply there was even
something to negotiate over - in Greece's view the rocks
were non-negotiable and protected by international law. 232
Once more, the tensions between Greece and Turkey were
resolved by US diplomatic pressure - this time by President
Bill Clinton and his top foreign policy representatives.
Ongoing differences between Greece and Turkey have been
time consuming for NATO - taking up considerable amounts of
staff energy and often distracting NATO from more important
security issues. NATO did play a constraining role and, at
times, served as a channel for information between the two
thereby lowering the risk that each member's military
maneuvers (for example) might be misinterpreted as plans for
an attack. However, constant tension over Cyprus and the
Aegean Sea ruined any chance at institutional socialization.
From the mid-1970s through 1990 there were no significant
joint military exercises between the two allies which might
have contributed to a culture of cooperation between the
two. Most of the exercises that Greece and Turkey have
Interview with senior NATO official, Brussels, February 1996.
Interview with senior NATO official, Brussels, February 1996.
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undertaken in the Aegean Sea since 1974 have not been with,
but rather against, each other. 233
Germany
The inclusion of West Germany in NATO was part of
strategic defense plans requiring West German rearmament and
forward defense. To attain these goals, NATO leaders looked
to institutions to allay its neighbors' fear of this postwar
German gain. As the US representative in western Germany
John J. McCloy, asserted in a classified memo in 1950 the
challenge was: "...to foster the right kind of Germany and
have that Germany accepted by other Western powers, and
indeed the whole democratic world, as an equal partner." 234
Even in France the issue was not "whether" western defense
plans should include West Germany, but rather "how" . West
German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer believed that West
Germany's future lay in identifying with Western
institutions. Although the West German public largely
opposed rearmament, Adenauer felt that West Germany's
strategic position could be used to bargain for formal West
German statehood. 235 For West Germany, statehood meant
voluntary restraint insured by NATO - but guaranteed by US
(and British and French) ground troops.
Brown 5.
"The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State," April
25, 1950. FRUS, 1950, 4:634.
John A. Reed, Germany and NATO (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press,
1987) 37, 43.
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Meeting in Paris with its soon-to-be Allies in October
1954 West Germany agreed as a condition of statehood not to
manufacture atomic, chemical, biological weapons, guided
missiles, magnetic and influence mines, warships, or long-
range bombers, except at the request of NATO. 236 West
Germany also promised not to use its new military forces
(which became the 500,000 man Bundeswehr ) to force German
unification. Upon entering NATO, West Germany agreed:
"
. . .never to have recourse to force to achieve the
reunification of Germany or the modification of the present
boundaries of the German Federal Republic, and to resolve by
peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the
Federal Republic and other states." 237 The US, Britain, and
France added that any event which would "threaten the
integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance" from within,
would result in the "offending government as having
forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military
assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty" and
will act with a view to "taking other measures which may be
2 38
appropriate .
"
The entrance of the Federal Republic of Germany into
NATO was a compromise among diverse national interests. As
Richard Kugler writes: "...each participant was required to
236
. Modified Brussels Treaty, Protocol Number III: Paris, France (23 October 1954).
Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany: Paris, France (23 October
1954).
238
.
Declaration by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and
France. Paris, 23 October 1954.
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undertake important, enduring obligations of the sort that
sovereign nations do not normally accept ... (The Paris
Agreements) made these obligations acceptable by offering
each participant offsetting strategic gains that exceeded
the costs of these commitments." 239 Moreover, as Joseph
Joffe concludes, the resolution of the German question
created a situation in which "...collective gain could
overwhelm the zero- sum logic of rivalry and relative
gain." 240 This transparency and reassurance in turn provided
an opportunity for complementary institutional activity -
especially economic integration - to bind Germany to the
West as a stable and peaceful democracy.
West German public opinion occasionally ran counter to
NATO interests and periodic popular movements supporting
German neutrality as a means of gaining unification arose
during the Cold War. In the 1980s considerable West German
public opposition grew on West Germany over NATO nuclear
deployment strategy during the INF crisis. Nonetheless,
West Germany remained firmly embedded in NATO. The end of
the Cold War has shown the continued validity of this "dual-
containment" function of NATO. When proposing "2 plus 4"
negotiations on German unification to Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev in February 1990, US Secretary of State
James Baker asked: "Would you prefer to see a united
Kugler 66.
Joseph Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens ot Alliance
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987) 184.
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Germany outside of NATO and with no U.S. forces, perhaps
with its own nuclear weapons? ... Or would you prefer a
unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that
NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from
its present position?" 241 By 1991 Germany was unified as a
member of NATO - with Soviet approval. 242
Spain
Although NATO was comfortable with dictatorships in
Portugal and Greece, the Spanish ruler General Francisco
Franco's support for Hitler during World War II prevented
Spain from entering NATO. Nevertheless, the US viewed
Franco as a useful ally based on in his virulent anti-
communism and Spain's strategic location at the entrance to
the Mediterranean Sea. In 1953 the US began providing Spain
with economic assistance in return for basing rights on
Spanish territory. 243 Spain gained economic assistance and
aid in military modernization from the bilateral
relationship but ceded considerable sovereignty through a
secret accord granting US access to Spanish territory in the
Quoted in Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of
the End of the Cold War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1993) 185-186.
See Stephen F. Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1992); Gregory F. Treverton, America. Germany, and the Future of Europe (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1992); Peter H. Merkl, German Unification in the European
Context (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1993) 312-313; and Philip Zelikow and
Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
See Esther Barbe, Espana v la Otan: La nrohlematica euronea en materia de seeuridad
(Barcelona: Editorial Laia, 1981) 51-90.
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event of war without previous consultation with the Spanish
government
.
244
After Franco's death in 1974, Spain began a period of
gradual democratic reform - with only one major setback - a
failed coup attempt by armed forces associated with the
Franco regime in 1981. Under Franco the primary function of
the Spanish military was to prevent domestic unrest with no
independent civilian oversight of this responsibility. In
its planning and operations, the Spanish military was thus
oriented toward domestic rather than external activity. To
maintain loyalty to this arrangement, Franco established an
officer-heavy patronage system. When democratization and
military reform arrived in the late 1970s, the military thus
became a formidable source of resistance. 4 The 1981 coup
attempt demonstrated that weak civil -military relations
posed a serious challenge to democratization in Spain.
Spain's path to NATO was guided by a desire among post-
Franco Spanish political elites to use European institutions
to aid democracy and decrease the likelihood of another
coup. Once Spain joined NATO, the Socialist Government of
Felipe Gonzales resolved to hold a referendum on Spanish
membership. While the political leadership backed
Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, "On Spain. NATO and Democracy," in Douglas Stuart, ed., Politics
and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance (Baltimore, Ml): The Johns
Hopkins University Press) 99.
Angel Vinas, "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges," in John Chipman,
ed . NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External challenges (London: Routledge, 1988)
153-154.
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membership, the public was hostile to the US (and, by
association, NATO) for its past support of Franco. 246 Two
key strategies combined to win public support for Spain's
membership in NATO. First, foreign leaders and domestic
politicians informally linked Spain's membership in NATO
with membership in the European Community - a more popular
proposition. 247 Second, the Gonzalez government made
concessions to public opinion on the status of Spain's
membership in NATO. Spain would remain in NATO without
joining the integrated military command, there would be no
deployment of nuclear weapons in Spain, and efforts would be
made to reduce the role of the US military on Spanish
territory. With these concessions to public opinion, the 12
March 1986 referrendum affirmed Spain's conditional
membership in NATO by a vote of 52 percent in favor and 40
percent opposed. NATO and democracy had been directly
linked through the Spanish referendum. However, other
variables besides NATO were at work - including the US
desire for formal inclusion of the entire Iberian peninsula
into NATO defense planning and Spain's desire to join the
European Community.
See Javier Perez Royo, "Repercussions on the Democratic Process of Spain's Entry into
NATO," in Frederico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., Spain's Entry into NATO:
Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives (Boulder, CO: Lynne-Rienner Publishers, 1988)
?f)-28 and Javier Ruperez. Espana en la Otan: Relato Parcial (Barcelona: Plaza and Janes, 1986)
141-187.
Sanchez-Gijon (in Stuart) 112. Spain signed a Treaty of Accession to the Treaty of Rome
admitting it to the EC in June 1985 and became a full member of the EC in January 1986.
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Though Spain did not join the integrated military
command, NATO military goals were incorporated into Spain's
national security planing. The Spanish military began
preparing and organizing for external activity rather than
civil -control functions. 248 The Spanish government
instituted a comprehensive reform of its civil -military
relations including a pardon of those who had been punished
for support of democracy in the military and full civilian
control over the Ministry of Defense." 49 Since the end of
the Cold War, the trend in Spain has been toward increased
support for NATO - with Spain sending considerable
peacekeeping forces, first under a UN mandate and then under
NATO command, to keep peace in the Balkans. In November
1996, the Spanish Parliament voted to join the NATO
integrated military command.
Analysis
This chapter shows why realists are pessimistic about
NATO's capacity to function in the absence of a unifying
Soviet threat. During the Cold War, NATO developed
considerable institutional attributes. However, the
248
.
The Spanish military was assigned five key tasks within NATO planning: assuring security on
the Iberian peninsula; contributing to the strengthening of the defense of the western
Mediterranean flank; participating in keeping the Atlantic routes open and assuring the aero-
naval passage between the US and Spain in the event of conflict; to monitor and control the tw
approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar; and to integrate the Spanish air-warning
network into th
NATO-wide early warning systems. Vinas, in Chipman, 183.
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Gregory F. Treverton, "Spain, the United States, and NATO: Strategic Facts and Political
Realities," in Gil and Tulchin 129-132.
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structure of the international system and the relative
balance of power between the US-led West and the Soviet-
dominated East was what kept war from breaking out in Europe
- either between East and West or, at a lower level, between
Greece and Turkey. NATO did enhance collective defense
through institutional mechanisms but key areas such as
consultation and defense planning were dependent upon other
primary factors - mainly the distribution of power. This
does not imply that NATO was irrelevant - only that as an
institution NATO was a dependent variable during the Cold
War
.
Tasks
The primacy of collective defense led to an expansion
of institutional tasks to include intensive consultation and
defense planning. The Secretary General was empowered to
facilitate consensus and resolve disputes among allies.
Military representatives were responsible for coordinated
planning of the contributions made by member states to
collective defense. In Germany, NATO was given a formal
task of internal containment . The changed strategic
environment accompanying advancements in nuclear weapons
technology highlighted the importance of institutional
efforts to strengthen the credibility of collective defense
during the 1960s. Also in the 1960s, NATO was given an
increased political role as part of a general detente with
the Soviet Union. Formally, burdensharing remained a task
of the institution as did enlargement consistent with
institutional principles. However, only in the case of
Spain did NATO have an independent role affecting national
security
.
Organizational Capabilities
The organizational capabilities of NATO were expanded
to include political and military headquarters involving
representatives from member states and including a
secretariat and staff serving the institution.
Nevertheless, in its efforts to meet its tasks, NATO had no
independent peacetime authority despite the growth of its
organizational attributes. Thus, NATO's institutional
characteristics had little measurable independent impact
affecting the national security of its member states.
NATO's dominant organizational capabilities were highly
formal with low autonomy.
Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures
The principles upon which NATO was founded were
secondary to geostrategic concerns during the Cold War.
Consultation and defense planning became institutional norms
and were given formal rules as the primary decision-making
procedures for NATO. However, it is not clear that they had
any measurable impact beyond enhancing collective defense.
Consultation and military planning were dependent on the
extent to which states chose to share information with their
140
allies. The primary area where consultation may have been
effective was in the informal and highly secretive
discussions held by national representatives at NATO
.
However, without a full historical disclosure, a direct
relationship between informal consultation and increased
security can only be inferred. Military planning did
enhance the capacity for action in the event of a
conventional war and states that were not contributing fully
to collective defense were more easily identified through
the information sharing process in NATO. However, there was
no independent enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance
with common objectives. Membership remained restricted and
enlargement was based on geostrategic objectives. In the
most serious threat to security within the alliance, NATO's
institutional attributes had no impact on relations between
Greece and Turkey. Strong institutional rules were placed
on Germany with the objective of socializing it into a
peaceful democratic state and limiting its capacity for
independent action. However, these rules were enforced by
NATO only to the extent that it symbolized the presence of
foreign occupation forces on German territory. Only in the
case of Spain can a clear linkage be shown between NATO
enlargement and institutional principles.
Capacity for Change
The expansion of NATO's institutional tasks
demonstrated a capacity for change. However, institutional
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adaptation was responsive and did not shape events. For
example, one major change - empowering the Secretary General
to resolve disputes among allies had no measurable impact on
Greek-Turkish tensions. Additionally, in the changed
strategic nuclear environment the ability of the MLF or
flexible response failed to assure France that NATO had
adapted sufficiently to have continued relevance to its
national security. In the case of burdensharing, change was
largely cosmetic after the failure of the EDC . In fact, the
primacy of NATO's alliance functions contributed to a West
European political economy of security dependence on the US
which constrains the ability of NATO to adapt to the absence
of a threat after the Cold War. Change in NATO was
responsive, slow, and dependent on the structure of the
international system.
Conclusion: The Constraints of Alliance
Realists have good reason to be skeptical of NATO's
ability to adapt to the absence of a threat after the Cold
War. Even in areas where NATO is generally thought to have
been highly successful during the Cold War, it did not
always function well - if at all. As NATO developed, the
variations in institutional form were dependent upon
external events and the interests of the member states.
That is not to say that NATO was irrelevant to national
security. NATO facilitated the essential elements of
stability in Europe for over forty years - it helped keep
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the Americans involved in Europe, reassured Germany's
neighbors that it would not easily become a military threat
to their security, and deterred the Soviet Union from
encroaching into the West. However, this conclusion does
suggest that for NATO to have relevance for the post-Cold
War European security environment it would have to be
substantially transformed as an institution.
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CHAPTER V
NATO AFTER THE COLD WAR:
NEW CHALLENGES AND INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION
Introduction and Overview
Chapter Five demonstrates the high value that the member
states of NATO placed on institutional adaptation to enhance
post-Cold War European security. It shows that, contrary to
some realist predictions, NATO did not dissolve but actually
became central to the concept of "interlocking institutions"
designed to enhance security in Central and Eastern Europe.
However, despite considerable institutional activity
involving NATO, the EU, WEU, the CSCE and the UN, the
promise of institutions failed to deliver peace in the
Balkans. NATO did produce two effective institutional
programs promoting stability in Central and Eastern Europe
via the Partnership for Peace and the Bosnia Peace
Implementation Force. However, in the Balkans, NATO only
functioned when its traditional alliance mechanisms were
activated via US leadership. This chapter therefore shows
that its members have considerable work to do if NATO is to
have lasting relevance in the absence of a threat.
Winning the Peace?
By the late 1980s economic and political crisis forced
the Soviet Union to withdraw from the Cold War stalemate in
Europe. This process began in December 1987 when the US and
the Soviet Union eliminated an entire class of nuclear
weapons in Europe through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty (INF)
.
A year later Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev announced a reduction of 500,000 personnel from
the Soviet military to include a withdrawal of the most
threatening Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. In November
1990 the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) was
concluded by all NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. 250
Conventional reductions were followed by agreements between
the US and the Soviet Union to reduce strategic nuclear
weapons through START I and START II. 251 In the long-term, a
revitalized Russia could challenge European security with
its large inventory of nuclear and conventional weapons and
the capacity to promote instability in its neighboring
states. However, there would be considerable warning time
of a direct Russian threat to Central Europe as it would
require large scale violations of the verifiable CFE treaty.
The immediate danger from post-Cold War Russia was not
expansion - but implosion, disintegration, and the potential
for nuclear proliferation.
Absent the Soviet threat, democracy appeared to be
spreading after the dramatic post -Communist revolutions of
CFE limits the deployment of military equipment between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact
to 40,000 battle tanks, 40,000 artillery, 60,000 armored combat vehicles, 13,600 combat
aircraft, and 40,000 attack helicopters to be implemented by each participating country with
intrusive verification procedures. CFE troop levels would lower (between 1989 and 1997)
NATO collective force levels from 3,410,600 persons to 2,158,000; East European levels
(Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary) from 820,200 persons to 452,000,
and former Soviet Republic levels from 4,260,000 to 2,124,000 persons. This included an
estimated size of the Russian armed forces of around 1,500.000 personnel by 1997.
Together the two treaties would eliminate nearly two-thirds of existing strategic nuclear forces.
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1989. Yet democracy did not necessarily mean stability. As
Czech President Vaclev Havel told NATO Secretary General
Manfred Worner in early 1992: "We have a country that is
run by dissidents, but none of whom have studied tax law." 252
What is most telling about Havel's comments is the person to
whom they were made. As NATO Secretary General Worner
observed in 1993, NATO's members and many countries from
Central and Eastern Europe looked to the institution to:
maintain the transatlantic relationship; manage
international conflict by serving as a forum for
multilateral diplomacy toward the East backed by substantial
military resources,- alleviate traditional conflicts within
Western Europe and contain a united Germany; provide
predictability and reassurance in European-American
relations in a time of increasing economic competition; and
lower the costs of national security by pooling defense
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resources in cooperation with like-minded states.
Additionally, because NATO command and control arrangements,
logistics, communications, and some forces were used with
considerable success in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, some of
its members hoped that NATO could facilitate the
multinational use of force outside the NATO area. With its
standing structures and years of consultative patterns and
Interview with a senior NATO official, Brussels, March 1992.
Manfred Worner, "European Security: Political Will Plus Military Might," in Manfred
Worner, et al. What is European Security after the Cold War? (Brussels: The Philip Morris
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1993) 12.
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mutual trust among its members, NATO members preferred it to
the G-7, Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe for addressing their national security concerns.
Contrary to realist predictions, rather than dissolve
as most alliances have in the absence of a threat, NATO
moved to the core of an emerging European security
architecture. Yet, for a time, it also became the core of
false promises of security in Central and Eastern Europe.
While NATO countries would use the institution to make
overtures toward "winning the peace" - little security was
provided on the Balkan peninsula between 1991 and 1995.
Events in the former Yugoslavia out-paced the ability of
institutions to adapt to new security challenges and the
willingness of states to make them work. In fact, some
institutions such as the EU and UN often caused more
problems than provided solutions in post -Cold War Europe.
Nevertheless, there were some important successes as a
secure environment was established with NATO in the Balkans
in 1995-1996.
Early Adaptation of NATO: Promoting Stabili ty in the East
Meeting in London in July 1990, the NATO heads of state
stressed the continued task of collective defense while
acknowledging that challenges to that mission had been
radically transformed to include promoting stability among
its former adversaries:
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We recognize that, in the new Europe thesecurity of every state is inseparably linked tothe security of its neighbors. NATO must becomean institution where Europeans, Canadians andAmericans work together not only for the commondefence, but to build new partnerships with allthe nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community
must reach out to the countries of the East which
were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extendto them the hand of friendship. 4
NATO invited East European leaders, including Soviet
President Gorbachev, to address the NAC and to establish
regular diplomatic liaison with the Alliance. "This will
make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and
deliberations in this historic period of change", the NATO
leaders proclaimed. 255
In November 1991 NATO adopted a new strategic concept
after 16 months of work and 12 different drafts by its
Strategy Review Group (SRG)
. The process was completed with
the understanding that the new strategic concept would
represent the collective diplomacy of the NATO members. 256
NATO agreed that the primary challenge to the security of
its members was uncertainty and instability in the former
Warsaw Pact
:
...the adverse consequences of instabilities
that may arise from the serious economic, social,
and political difficulties, including ethnic
rivalries and territorial disputes, which are
faced by many countries in Central and Eastern
Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as
they remain limited, should not directly threaten
the security and territorial integrity of members
London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 1990. NATO Office of
Information and Press.
London Declaration.
Reflecting the political nature of the drafting process, France joined the SRG. However, Fiance
only participated when it became clear that major strategic decisions affecting the future of
European security were being made in its absence.
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of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to
crises mimical to European stability and even to
armed conflicts, which could involve outside
powers or spill over into NATO countries, having adirect effect on the security of the Alliance.
NATO outlined four "fundamental tasks" for the Alliance
after the Cold War-.
1. To provide one of the indispensable
foundations for a stable security environment
in Europe, based on the growth of democratic
institutions and commitment to the peaceful
resolutions of disputes, in which no country
would be able to intimidate or coerce any
European nation or to impose hegemony through
the threat or use of force.
2. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the
North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic
forum for Allied consultations on any issues
that affect their vital interests, including
possible developments posing risks for
members' security, and for appropriate
coordination of their efforts in fields of
common concern.
3 . To deter and defend against any threat of
aggression against the territory of any NATO
member state
.
4 . To preserve the^trategic balance of power
within Europe.
During the drafting there were divisions within the SRG
.
25
Some members opposed the stress on preserving the strategic
balance of power in Europe given that the Warsaw Pact was in
rapid dissolution. Additionally, some Alliance officials
and member states were deeply divided on whether NATO's
The Alliance's Strategic Concept. Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7-8 November 1991 . NATO Office of
Information and Press. The Communique also specified potential challenges arising from the
Mediterranean region and nuclear proliferation.
The Alliance's Strategic Concept.
Discussion with J. Michael Legge, Chairman of the SRG and NATO Assistant Secretary
General, at the Belgian Royal Defense College, Brussels, 23 January 1992.
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successful adaptation would require amending its mission to
include action outside of its territorial area. Indeed
among senior NATO officials, there was considerable
enthusiasm for giving NATO an out-of-area role - some
arguing that NATO's future depended on it. 260 France, in
particular, opposed any "out-of-area" language in the
document - insisting that NATO should be maintained in
reserve as a hedge against a Soviet threat while not taking
on new missions. 261 Thus, NATO's most dramatic military
adaptation was to establish an Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
within the new strategic concept. However, its function was
to respond to Article 5 challenges within the NATO area.
A key area of agreement was a general understanding
that NATO should be placed within a new framework of
interlocking institutions. The intent was to use
international institutions to aid post -Communist democratic
and economic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe and
to establish a mechanism for early warning, preventive
diplomacy, and conflict management as an amalgamated form of
collective security. Though European security institutions
would remain controlled by states, their members sought to
enhance the capacity of institutions for meeting the
evolving challenges of post-Cold War European security. The
primary impetus in this outreach to Central and Eastern
Interviews with senior NATO officials conducted by the author from 1991-1993.
See "Transatlantic Relations and the Management of Disorder," Report to the Netherlands
Atlantic Commission (The Hague: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1993) 27.
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Europe came from NATO which continued to represent the
collective diplomacy of its member states.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)
Early NATO initiatives to the East focused on
strengthening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) as a "Pan European" institution ranging from
Vancouver to Vladivostock
.
2h2 Established through the
Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the CSCE promoted international
norms of the rule of law, non-aggression, and the peaceful
settlement of disputes. 263 For NATO, building a working
partnership with the CSCE was a pragmatic means of reaching
out to the nascent democracies to the East without expanding
formal security guarantees. As a senior NATO official
commented: "...at the London Summit in July of 1990, the
decision was that we would establish a friendly
relationship, that we would cooperate, and as this has
See Sean Kay, "NATO and the CSCE: A Partnership for the Future," in Paradigms 7:2 (Winter
1993) 59-77 and Sean Kay, "NATO and the CSCE: A New Russian Challenge," in S. Victor
PapaCOSma and Mary Ann Heiss, NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does It Have a Future?
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 1 13-133.
The original members of the CSCE included 35 states from Europe and North America -
expanded to 53 by 1992. During the Cold War, the US and its NATO allies emphasized CSCE
norms to expose contradictions in the Soviet system and as part of the general policy of detente.
However, (hey were reluctant to grant the CSCE operational authority as this would have
allowed the Soviet Union a veto over mailers of direct concern to the Alliance since CSCE
decisions were taken with unanimity. The Soviet Union liked the CSCE stress on the inviability
of existing borders - which codified the division of Germany and their incorporation ot the
Baltic countries in the USSR. Leaders of the post-Communist revolutions in Central and
Eastern Europe valued the CSCE as a forum to raise security concerns and credited the
institution with exposing their populations lo Western norms and values.
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evolved, this has taken more and more concrete forms - but
membership is not one of these." 264
The CSCE heads of state met in Paris in October 1990
and approved the Charter of Paris emphasizing that: "Our
common efforts to consolidate respect for human rights,
democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen democracy and
the rule of law, to strengthen peace and to promote unity in
Europe require a new quality of political dialogue and
cooperation and thus development of the structures of the
CSCE." 265 The CSCE leaders established a Secretariat in
Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, and an
Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. Furthermore, the
members created a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
for political consultation, to take appropriate decisions,
and to prepare biennial CSCE summits. A Committee of Senior
Officials was established to endow the CSCE with a standing
body and a permanent structure.
The trends in NATO toward engagement with former Warsaw
Pact countries were accelerated at the Copenhagen meeting of
Comments of a senior NATO official visiting Riga, Latvia, April 1992. At the London NATO
meeting, the members proposed that the CSCE endorse, inter alia: CSCE commitments to
respect and uphold the rule of law; CSCE guidelines for enhancing economic cooperation,
based on the development of free and competitive market economies; and CSCE cooperation on
environmental protection. NATO also encouraged the CSCE to adopt a structure for regular
consultations among member governments to meet at the heads of state or ministerial level at
least once a year; a schedule of CSCE review conferences once over two years; a small CSCE
Secretariat to coordinate meetings and conferences and serve as a data and information center: a
CSCE mechanism to monitor elections in all the CSCE countries; a CSCE Center for the
Prevention of Conflict; and a CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
CSCE Charter for a New Europe. Available from the CSCE (OSCE) Secretariat in Prague, 1 he
Czech Republic.
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the NAC on 6-7 June 1991 where the foreign ministers
declared that NATO's security was linked to that of Central
and Eastern Europe and provided further encouragement for
the CSCE. However, wanting to insure that the primary
decisions affecting security in Europe were taken in the
institution where it had the most influence, the US insisted
that the Copenhagen Communique state that: "...NATO is the
essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the
forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and
defense commitments of its members under the Washington
Treaty." 266 Further measures to strengthen the CSCE mandate
were taken by its foreign ministers in Berlin on 20 June
1991. At that meeting, agreement on an emergency mechanism
for consultation and cooperation on violent conflict in
Europe was reached. 267 In December 1991 the NATO foreign
ministers agreed to exchange information and documents and
expressed a desire to make the collective experience of NATO
available to the CSCE. NATO offered to contribute to
seminars sponsored by the CSCE Conflict Prevention Center on
defence conversion and the role of armed forces in
democratic societies. The ministers also invited military
North Atlantic Council Communique, Copenhagen 6-7 June 1991. NATO Office of Information
and Press.
Such situations were defined as a violation of one of the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act or
as the result of major disruptions endangering peace, security, or stability. A state with a
particular security concern resulting from the actions of another state could request explanation
for that state's behavior and be entitled to receive a response within forty-eight hours from the
requested date. The foreign ministers agreed to allow twelve or more members to call an
emergency meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials in the absence of the violating state
should the time limit be breached.
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officials from all CSCE states to attend special courses at
the NATO Defense College in Rome and the NATO School in
Oberammergau
.
NATO's parliamentary organization, the North
Atlantic Assembly (NAA)
,
sponsored special CSCE
interparliamentary conferences on European security and
provided staff support for CSCE parliamentary meetings. 268
Increased institutional activity originating from NATO
enhanced stability in the East by reassuring new democrats
that they had the moral support of the West during a time of
uncertainty and rapid change. They also gained practical
benefit from interacting with Western officials within this
institutional context. For example, in the NATO military
schools, the participants were exposed to principles of
civilian control of the armed forces - a key aspect of
stable democratization. In the North Atlantic Assembly,
Central and East European parliamentarians gained practical
experience in parliamentary procedures which they could then
use to educate colleagues in their capitals. High level
exchanges of military officials coming from Central and
Eastern Europe to NATO headquarters - and NATO officials
traveling to the new democracies of Central and Eastern
Europe - helped raise the awareness of the challenges these
countries faced and began to build a sense of trust and
The North Atlantic Assembly is independent of NATO. Complimentary to NATO, the NAA
began an extensive program of outreach to Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU by granting
of associate membership and funding for their participation in seminars addressing areas such as
democratization, civil-military reform, and broader issues of European security.
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transparency. By increasing their understanding of the
challenges facing Central and Eastern Europe, NATO members
could also more efficiently plan programs for multilateral
or bilateral assistance. All of these actions were designed
with the intention of enhancing the principles and norms of
the CSCE.
However, as the Balkan crisis escalated in 1991-1992
Europe needed action beyond social activity if its
institutions were to have any direct capacity to deal with
violent conflict. The immediate problem was a CSCE
decision-making procedure requiring that all decisions be
unanimous. This procedural arrangement in the CSCE made it
a useless institution for conflict resolution as an
aggressor could use CSCE procedures to block any effective
action against it. Gathering at Prague in January 1992 the
CSCE foreign ministers amended the consensus rule so that in
situations where there are clear, gross, and uncorrected
violations of CSCE commitments, a majority of member states
could act in the absence of the state concerned. Consensus
would remain an institutional norm of the CSCE. However,
this new approach - called "consensus-minus-one" - could
allow the CSCE to take political action against a member
2 6 9
state that was in violation of its principles. Thus
The ministers also agreed to strengthen the Conflict Prevention Center by reinforcing and
increasing its role in fact-finding missions, the monitoring of disputes, and implementation and
verification of amis control agreements. The CSCE thus sent an observer mission to Nagorno-
Karabakh. Other such missions undertaken since 1992 include fact-finding, rapporteur and
monitoring in Kosovo, Sandjak, Vojvodina, Skopje, Georgia, Estonia, Moldova, and Chechnya.
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Europe had taken a small step toward rationalizing the
institutional capacity to promote security.
Meeting in Helsinki in July 1992, CSCE foreign
ministers called for the continued strengthening of orderly
procedures for conflict prevention and crisis management by
seeking the support of other international institutions and
organizations, the strengthening of the chairman- in-off ice
,
the establishment of a high commissioner for national
minorities, and the creation of a Forum for Security
Cooperation (FSC) to meet regularly in Vienna. The
ministers also established procedures for crisis prevention
and management to include : early warning mechanisms
(focusing on human rights and the development of democratic
institutions)
;
political management (drawing attention to
non-violent measures available for lowering tensions);
specific instruments (such as fact finding missions) ; and
formal peacekeeping operations. 270 Further steps to build
CSCE institutions were made by the CSCE foreign ministers
meeting in Stockholm in December 1992 where they established
a commission of Conciliation and Court of Arbitration to
examine and rule on disputes. The ministers also created an
Office of CSCE Secretary General. However, despite these
institutional advancements which were encouraged by NATO,
the CSCE did not have the joint planning, training, and
"Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change." Available from the CSCE Secretariat
in Prague.
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infrastructure that would be needed to assume responsibility
for peacekeeping even if a consensus could be attained among
the 50-plus members.
The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
Hoping to promote a more direct relationship between
NATO and the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, NATO
created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at the
Rome Summit in November 1991. An American initiative, the
NACC was a new "institutional relationship of consultation
and cooperation on political and security issues" open to
all of the former (and newly independent) members of the
Warsaw Pact. 271 The NACC states consult on issues including
national defense planning; principles and key aspects of
strategy; force and command structures; military
exercises; democratic concepts of civil -military relations;
civil/military coordination of air traffic management; and
the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes.
272
As one senior NATO official suggested, the objective of
the NACC was to promote extended security based on
assessments of self-interest by the NATO members:
Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation. November 1991. NATO Office of Information
and Press.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information
and Press, 1995) 44-45. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the NACC grew to include
38 members. The NACC also serves as a technological forum for sharing information on
scientific and environmental issues and to facilitate in the dissemination of information about
NATO among the NACC countries.
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What we are after is our own security. In
the kind of situation in which we live now, the
security of any state in Europe is linked to the
security of all other states. If there is chaos
throughout Europe, if there are local conflicts,
if there is ethnic strife, our own security in the
long run will suffer. So this is one of those
circumstances where it (security) is not a zero
sum game. Increased security for one does not
mean less security for another. Increased
security for us means increased security for the
rest of Europe. It is in that spirit that the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council was set up.
NATO officials stressed that the NACC was a consultative
forum and not a decision-making body. Rather, the NACC
would permit formal and informal exchanges of views and
promote a long-term understanding of national and
multilateral security concerns. Nevertheless, the NACC
alone was insufficient to meet the security demands of
Central and Eastern Europe. The NACC had a limited budget
(1.5 million dollars in 1993), no secretariat, no formal
doctrine, and no security guarantee.
The most important function of the NACC was to provide
a multilateral forum for discussion and sharing of
information on peacekeeping. The NACC partners created an
Ad Hoc Committee on Peacekeeping, which released an
extensive report on NATO /NACC peacekeeping planning in June
1993. 274 The group sponsored a number of high level seminars
focusing on the peacekeeping experiences of individual
Comments of a senior NATO official visiting Riga. Latvia, April 1992.
The report stressed that peacekeeping can be carried out only under the authority of the
UN
Security Council, or of the CSCE; on a case-by-case basis; with the UN or CSCE defining
peacekeeping operations, including command relationships; and that peacekeeping requires a
clear political objective and a precise mandate. Report of the NACC Ad Hoc Committee on
Peacekeeping, June 1993. NATO Office of Information and Press.
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participants and on cooperation with other relevant
institutions. They also received detailed studies from
NATO's military authorities addressing technical issues of
peacekeeping. 275 In sharing military experience in the NACC,
military- to-military contacts between NATO and the former
Warsaw Pact nations grew considerably to the extent that
military relations out-paced political cooperation. Due to
French opposition, there was no (ministers of) defense
component to the NACC. Thus, one of the most important
aspects of democratization, that of civilian control over
the military, was missing from the NACC experience. 276
Because it is a multilateral forum with no decision-
making structures, a participating state could create major
obstacles within the working agenda of the NACC thereby
limiting its potential . This became clear after a NACC
meeting in Istanbul, Turkey on 10 June 1994. The Russian
delegation haggled over the final communique (forcing the
NACC to drop any language related to NATO enlargement) and
CFE deployment levels for five hours causing an embarrassing
This included detailed presentations addressing assets and capabilities required for the conduct of
peacekeeping operations; the possibility and utility of developing a database of available
resources; and the requirement for forces, procedures, and equipment to facilitate cooperation
in peacekeeping operations. NATO also developed a paper for the NACC covering theoretical
and generic planning issues relating to command and control standards and procedures, standard
operating procedures, and rules of engagement for peacekeeping operations. The NACC also
created its own Ad Hoc Technical Sub-Group to facilitate the development of technical issues
affecting peacekeeping missions
S. Nelson Drew, NATO from Berlin to Bosnia: Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition
(Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1995) 25-26. Absent France, the remaining
NATO countries created a Group of Defense Ministers which is a non-decision-making body
that channels requests for assistance from Central and East European countries to NATO
member nations most willing or capable to deal with a particular problem.
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delay in the release of the NACC Final Communique. A senior
NATO diplomat described Russia's behavior in the NACC as a
"pretty bloody affair... an absolutely Soviet exercise, a
disastrous performance by the Russians and it does not augur
well." 277 Another NATO official openly pondered whether
there could ever be another working NACC meeting if this was
the way the Russians would behave in the future. 278 After
the Istanbul meeting, the NACC stopped issuing a formal
communique and instead opted for a chairman's summary - thus
weakening the importance of the NACC for some non-NATO
participants who had seen it as a way to move closer to
formal NATO activities leading toward membership.
The Partnership for Peace (PFP)
By 1993 several Central and Eastern European states
felt that only full membership in NATO would resolve their
(real or perceived) security dilemmas; promote stability to
attract economic investment and membership in the EU; and
provide reassurance for democratic and market reformers
.
This view was promoted by three senior American analysts at
the RAND Corporation who circulated a draft paper in the
summer of 1993 calling for NATO to reassess its mission to
focus on internal and external restructuring - including a
gradual enlargement of NATO membership to include Hungary,
277
. Reuters. 10 June 1994.
278
Interview with a senior NATO official. Brussels, Belgium, June 1994.
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Poland, the Czech Republic and possibly Slovakia. Failure
to do so would make NATO: "...like the aging knight replete
in splendid armor, impressive to admire until someone one
day lifts the visor to discover it is a hollow shell. NATO
will go out of area or out of business." 279 Arguing that the
challenge in Europe was between forces of integration and
forces of disintegration, the authors felt that the Alliance
could encourage the former by shifting its focus to Article
4 of the NATO treaty to include issues such as peacekeeping,
search and rescue, and humanitarian/disaster relief.
There was a sense of urgency for the US to address the
question of NATO enlargement. Germany had begun quietly but
assertively pushing to expand NATO to stabilize its Eastern
border and provide economic stability and reassurance for
the growing free-markets in the region. Germany suggested
Associate Membership in NATO for some Central and East
European countries. Defense Minister Volker Ruehe (in
particular) argued that Associate Membership could speed
full entry into NATO for the Visegrad countries. In theory,
if NATO did not engage the East, Germany might act
unilaterally to provide security guarantees to its Eastern
neighbors - something that both Russia and the West would
view as provocative.
The RAND analysts were Ron Asmus, Richard Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee. See Frederick
Kemp, "NATO: n„ r »f Ar^ nr n,.f nf Rainess " The Wall Street Journal. 11 August 1993. A
formal version of the RAND paper appeared in Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kuglar, and F.
Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO", Foreign Affairs 4 (September/October 1993)
28-
40.
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Senior officials in the US State Department and
National Security Council agreed that NATO enlargement could
be used as a tool to encourage and promote political and
economic reform to the East. However, the pace and scope of
enlargement was hotly debated with serious inter-agency
differences emerging. 280 Supporters advocated a policy of
gradual enlargement to show Europe that the US was committed
to its security, that Germany was not driving the Alliance
East, and that NATO was relevant after the Cold War.
Enlargement would also satisfy a number of American ethnic
groups of Central and East European origin lobbying for
their home country's inclusion in NATO. This domestic
appeal might give members of Congress, who were becoming
increasingly skeptical of funding a US role in Europe, with
new justification for supporting NATO. Thus a prolonged
debate over NATO enlargement would shift discussion from
whether NATO was needed after the Cold War, to whether or
not it should expand. A major initiative toward NATO would
also help President Clinton establish his foreign policy
credentials
.
National Security Advisor W. Anthony Lake and key State
Department figures (including Ambassador to Germany Richard
Holbrooke and the US negotiator at the Helsinki CSCE
conference John Kornblum) were convinced of the
institutional value of using enlargement to encourage
Interview with a former senior Administration official, Washington D.C., March 1996.
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reform. A gradual approach to NATO enlargement fit well
into the new US policy of "enlargement and engagement"
formulated by Lake and his National Security Council staff.
This approach stressed the importance of international
institutions where the US could best direct policy - such as
NATO. The goal was to expand the number of democratic
nations in the world while engaging troubled areas through
partnership where possible and with power if necessary. 281
Nevertheless, as support within the Clinton Administration
for NATO enlargement grew, senior officials in the
Department of Defense, and especially in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, expressed concerns about taking on substantial new
military commitments while downsizing US capabilities. Such
concerns combined with caution signals from Russian experts
in the Department of State to produce an inter-agency
2 8 2
compromise - the Partnership for Peace.
On 6 October NATO Secretary General Worner met with
President Clinton and his top foreign policy advisors in
See United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO (Washington, D.C.: Department of
Defense. Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995).
Within NATO there was shared sentiment that some sort of compromise was necessary to go
beyond the NACC but stop short of membership as there was no consensus in NATO for
enlargement. As a senior NATO official told The Washington Post on 31 August: "Right now,
the prevailing wisdom is that bringing in Poland or any other state would be risky and self-
defeating for the Alliance as a whole." William Drozdiak, "NATO Balks at Opening Pact to E.
Europe/ The Washington Post , 1 September 1993, A25. The name Partnership for Peace grew
out of discussion in SHAPE about giving the NACC a "Partnership for Peacekeeping" function.
While the PFP was the result of considerable inter-agency review, the primary impetus was the
European and NATO policy office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. If any one
individual can be most closely identified with the initiative it was Dr. Joseph Kruzel, who
headed that office as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO, and his
accompanying staff.
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Washington DC and received a briefing on the US plans for
partnership with Central and Eastern Europe. The stated
intention was to use perspective toward NATO membership to
maintain momentum for reform in Central and Eastern Europe
while buying the Alliance time. NATO partnerships would be
open to all NACC/CSCE countries and they would gain all of
the institutional benefits of NATO - except a security
guarantee. Practical security cooperation could be attained
through training and exercises in preparation for joint
peacekeeping operations. 83
At a meeting of NATO defense ministers on 20-21 October
in Travemunde, Germany an informal agreement was reached
that new members would only be admitted in the long term and
the PFP was endorsed as an alternative. Reflecting concerns
in the Alliance that premature discussion of NATO
enlargement would isolate Russia and perhaps hinder reform
in Moscow, NATO Secretary General Worner affirmed that the:
"Western Alliance would consider the legitimate concerns of
Russia" and that "we do not want to isolate Moscow."
284
These comments reflected an informal response to a letter
sent by Russian President Boris Yeltsin on 15 September to
NATO Headquarters and to the major NATO countries outlining
strong Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. Yeltsin
indicated that enlargement would violate the 2-plus-4
Interview with a senior NATO Official, October 1993.
Comments to the Press by NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner, 21 October 1993. NATO
Office of Information and Press.
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arrangement for German unification. As an alternative,
Yeltsin proposed a NATO-Russian security guarantee for
Eastern Europe
.
In a speech to the Atlantic Council of the United
States on 3 December 1993 US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
identified five key benefits of the PFP
:
First, it does not redivide
Europe ... Partnership for Peace gives all nations
the same chance to take part, but makes the
results dependent on the effort of each partner.
Second, Partnership for Peace sets up the right
incentives. In the old Cold War world, NATO was
an alliance created in response to an external
threat. In the new, post-Cold War world NATO can
be an alliance based on shared values of democracy
and the free market . Partnership for Peace
rewards those who move in that direction. Third,
Partnership for Peace requires that partners make
a real contribution. It doesn't just ask what
NATO can do for its new partners, it asks what the
new partners can do for NATO. . .Fourth, it keeps
NATO at the center of European security concerns
and thereby keeps American involvement at the
center of Europe. Finally, it puts the question
of NATO membership for the partners where it
belongs, at the^end of the process, rather than at
the beginning.
The PFP would, according to Aspin, allow those partners
which take full advantage of the program to "pick up NATO's
standard operating procedures, habits of cooperation, and
28 6
routines of consultation."
Personally briefed on the PFP by US Secretary of State
Warren Christopher, Russian President Boris Yeltsin
described the plan as "brilliant". Central and East
Les Aspin, "Partnership for Peace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense
Les Aspin to the Atlantic Council of the United States," J.W. Marriott Hotel, Washington D.C
3 December 1993.
Aspin "Partnership for Peace..." For official discussion of the objectives behind the PFP see
Joe Kruzel, "Partnership for Peace and the Transformation of North Atlantic
Security," in
Papacosma and Heiss 339-346.
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European countries were not as thrilled but a promise to
keep open the door to NATO via the PFP was intended to
provided reassurance that they might ultimately attain
Article 5 membership in the Alliance. Despite promises from
US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian
Affairs Stephen Oxman on 26 October that "we do not want to
be perceived or in any way treat others as second-class
citizens", some critics felt that PFP did exactly this.
Polish officials were especially animated in their rhetoric
- disturbed by what they perceived as a "Yalta II" in the
PFP. US Senator Richard Lugar called PFP a "band-aid
offered in place of corrective surgery." 287
The PFP was approved by the NATO heads of state meeting
in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994 who stated that: "We
expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to
democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary
process, taking into account political and security
developments in the whole of Europe." 288 The NATO leaders
invited NACC and other CSCE countries that are able and
willing to join the PFP which: "...will play an important
role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of
Senator Richard G. Lugar, "NATO's 'Near Abroad': New Membership, New Missions:
Speech to The Atlantic Council of the United States on 9 December 1993. " Lugar criticized the
PFP as a bureaucratic half-step that had a "Russia-first" orientation that would give Moscow a
defacto veto over NATO's future and encourage neo-imperial tendencies in Moscow.
Partnership for Peace Invitation. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in
the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels on 10-1
1
January 1994. NATO Office of Information and Press.
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NATO." The NATO countries would establish 16-plus-l
consultations with permanent offices at NATO Headquarters
and at a SHAPE Planning Cell in Mons. 290 16-plus-l refers to
the multilateral relationship of the 16 NATO members with
each individual Partner country. 291 Consultation would
include the right to call a 16-plus-l PFP meeting "...if
that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial
integrity, political independence, or security." 292 The
heads of state added that : "At a pace and scope determined
by the capacity and desire of the individual participating
states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency
in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of
defense ministries, joint planning, joint military
exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO
forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and
humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed." 293
NATO did not have a strong history of effective
institutional efforts in the new missions that it was
advancing vis-a-vis the PFP. However, given the demand from
some Central and Eastern European countries for direct
cooperation with NATO, the Alliance was in a strong position
to use its leverage to link cooperation and consultation
Partnership for Peace Invitation.
The actual Planning Cell is located near the Allied Command Europe Headquarters outside the
SHAPE compound.
The actual Planning Cell is located near the Allied Command Europe Headquarters outside the
SHAPE compound.
Partnership for Peace Invitation.
Partnership for Peace Invitation.
289
290'
291
292
293*
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with certain behavior from the states that joined the PFP
.
Therefore at the Brussels meeting, NATO approved a uniform
document for each country to sign when joining the program.
Participation was contingent upon adherence by the partner
to the "...protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms
and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and
peace through democracy (which) are shared values
fundamental to the Partnership." 294 The PFP required NATO
partners to cooperate with the Alliance in pursuing the
following objectives:
1 Facilitation of transparency in national
defense planning and budgeting processes
.
2 . Ensuring 9tdemocratic control of defense
forces
.
3 . Maintenance of the capability and readiness to
contribute, subject to constitutional
considerations, to operations under the
authority of the UN and/or the responsibility
of the CSCE.
4. The development of cooperative military
relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint
planning, training, and exercises in order to
strengthen their ability to undertake missions
in the fields of peacekeeping, search and
rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as
may subsequently be agreed.
5. The development, over the longer term, of
forces that are better able to operate with
those of the members of the North Atlantic
Alliance
.
Partnership for Peace Framework Document.
This point was left vague by NATO as it was unclear to whose satisfaction democratic control of
armed forces had to be maintained.
Partnership for Peace Framework Document.
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Each partner would submit an Individual Partnership Program
(IPP) identifying ways to work with the Alliance and what
assets it might contribute to joint planning for
peacekeeping and other forms of 16-plus-l (or multilateral)
activity. Partner countries were required to list the steps
that have been, or will be undertaken to promote
transparency in the national defense planning and budgeting
processes, and to ensure democratic control of the armed
forces. Operationally, the program required an indication
of long-range plans, force development goals, and other
planning factors that could affect a Partner's future
involvement in the Partnership (such as changes in the
structure of the armed forces or the setting up of special
peacekeeping units) . Partners were required to fund their
own PFP activities and share the full burdens of mounting
exercises in which they take part.
Describing the PFP, a senior advisor to Polish
President Lech Walesa commented to the press that: "We've
gone from Chamberlain's umbrella to Clinton's saxophone."
29
Nevertheless, the PFP grew to include 27 partnerships - none
of which were hampered by the size constraints of the NACC
or CSCE.
298 Those countries who chose to integrate closely
with NATO planning were invited to join the PFP Planning and
United Press International. 12 January 1994.
This activity involved hundreds of PFP or "in the spirit of PFP" related NATO programs. PFP
has included major peacekeeping exercises - largely modeled after hypothetical Balkan scenarios
- held in Poland, the Netherlands, the North Sea, the Baltic, the US, the Czech Republic, and
Hungary (for example).
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Review Process (PARP) where they can (every two years)
exchange data on their defense plans and budgets, and
identify areas in which they agree to work toward improving
interoperability between their military forces and those of
NATO in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, and
humanitarian operations (to include areas as specific as
communications procedures and refuelling capabilities)
.
299
To facilitate this restricted opening of NATO to Partners,
NATO committees were expanded in their scope to include
direct activities in support of the NACC and the PFP
.
The PFP was a creative compromise balancing between
reassurance of Russia and of the smaller democracies in
Central and Eastern Europe. PFP helps prepare interested
Partners for NATO membership - thus lowering the costs of
restructuring their militaries and integrating their forces
into NATO military planning. Should the political and
military situation in Russia and the former Soviet Union
change or other unforeseen events threaten the stability of
Central and Eastern Europe, NATO could expand quickly since
the states will have had a period of working toward NATO
standards via the PFP. Several months after the
announcement of the PFP, a senior US official asserted that
"...should the situation deteriorate in the East and Russia
and it became necessary at some step to draw the line
between Eastern and Western ... the Partnership for Peace
By 1996 15 PFP countries had joined the PARP.
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would put us in a better position to do that." 300 Absent
that worst case analysis, the PFP allowed for considerable
flexibility in direct and multilateral relationships among
potential partners - including Russia.
The PFP was not, however, without problems and
contradictions. Because the PFP was seen by many Central
and East European countries as a direct path into NATO , it
unintentionally encouraged competition between some Partners
racing to meet unspecified NATO criteria at the expense of
bilateral or multilateral settlement of regional disputes.
Also, by deferring enlargement, the PFP had the potential to
undermine reform governments in Central and Eastern Europe
who had made full NATO membership their primary foreign
policy goal. 301 Like the NACC, the PFP tends to emphasize
military- to-military cooperation with the potential to
undermine civil -military reform efforts in Central and
Eastern Europe. 302 Additionally, the trend in some PFP
countries has been to stress quantity over quality in their
IPP. Of the 232 PFP programs proposed by Hungary in its
1995 IPP there were only 4 that promoted democratic control
White House Information Service , 27 May 1994.
The US hoped to show that participation in PFP would have visible gains by providing 100
million dollars for Fiscal Year 1996 for PFP support programs.
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in
Transition (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995) 44. To compensate
NATO created a Political Military Steering Committee (PMSC) which links civilian oversight of
PFP programs and their military implementation. Under the PMSC (Chaired by the Deputy
Secretary General of NATO) countries can send representatives from any ministry that is most
relevant to the issue being raised in the 16-plus-l format or among a number of partners
coordinating activities.
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of the armed forces. These were limited to three
information exchanges among experts and one conference. 303
The PFP process also failed to promote transparency because
Partners have been reluctant to publish their IPPs with only
Hungary volunteering. In a worst case, the PFP had the
appearance of security enhancement without increasing
deterrence capacity for the Partner states. A participant
could participate in peacekeeping planning, but it was not
clear how preparation for peacekeeping was relevant to the
capability of, for example, the Baltic states to defend
their borders against an attack.
Interlocking Institutions: A False Promise of Peace
By 1994 the elements of a new European security
architecture were in place - NATO, the NACC, the PFP, the
CSCE, and to a lesser extent the EU and the WEU. The
missing ingredient was peace in the former Yugoslavia. In
1992 NATO embarked on a process of building peacekeeping
capabilities via interlocking institutions for collective
diplomacy to signal threats toward the warring parties. In
practice, however, there was no consensus on how and when to
conduct peacekeeping operations. What became a debate over
institutional architecture for peacekeeping obscured,
Jeffrey Simon, "Partnership for Peace: Guaranteeing Success," Strategic Forum 44 (September
1995) 3.
172
clouded, and inhibited the attainment of peace and security
in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1991-1995.
Institutions and Peacekeeping in post-Cold War Europe
At a June 1992 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in
Oslo, Norway, the US announced that it would contribute
manpower to a NATO and CSCE peacekeeping force in the former
Yugoslav republics. 304 Addressing the NAC, US Deputy
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger stated that: "The
United States is prepared to make essential contributions,
such as lift and logistics, to peacekeeping operations ... We
also do not exclude providing ground contingents on the same
basis as other nations." 305 While the German delegation
concurred, the United Kingdom and France were hesitant.
Britain was especially distressed that NATO could become
"Europe's policeman." In a speech to the Diplomatic and
Commonwealth Writers' Association prior to the meeting,
British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stated that "neither
marines nor parachutists nor new-fashioned Blue Helmets can
fight their way to peace among peoples mingled together
village by village." Yet Hurd conceded that: "NATO must
make its resources available when the international
At the Prague CSCE foreign minsters meeting in January 1992 the German delegation (with
strong support from Italy, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and Poland) proposed
creating standing CSCE peacekeeping forces. Because of opposition from the US, Britain and
France, the proposal was tabled. However, the idea was kept alive by the Dutch Foreign
Minister Hans van den Broek who suggested that NATO should have a peacekeeping role under
CSCE auspices.
USNATO Wireless File: Security Issues Digest 1088:5 (June 1992).
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community has decided that action needs to be taken." 306 For
France, there was an ongoing concern that any overture from
NATO to the CSCE would increase the role of the US in
Europe. Therefore France (joined by Belgium and Spain)
insisted that any peacekeeping request be made to individual
governments and not to NATO as an organization.
Because of the differing perspectives among key NATO
members toward peacekeeping, the Oslo meeting was mostly
symbolic. However, a political framework had been
established for institutional adaptation. The foreign
ministers stated that
:
The Alliance has the capacity to contribute
to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its
new and increased responsibilities for crisis
management and the peaceful settlement of
disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to
support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with
our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under
the responsibility of the CSCE, including by
making avaj^able Alliance resources and
expertise
.
NATO members were concerned not to create an automatic
mechanism for NATO peacekeeping and thus the case-by-case
language. Also, the offer included a requirement that NATO
forces could be made available in response to an official
CSCE request addressed to NATO (where consensus was required
for a response) and to its individual member states. This
procedural mechanism turned the relationship into
" interblocking" institutions. A consensus would have to
306
. Michael Evans, "UK Reluctant to Use Troops in Bosnia." The Times . (London) 3 June 1992,
11.
307
. Oslo Summit: Final Communique. NATO Office of Information and Press, 10 June 1992.
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exist in NATO for CSCE peacekeeping. Should a NATO member
(all of whom had overlapping membership in the CSCE) oppose
peacekeeping, it could discourage or veto an initial CSCE
request and still deflect blame for inaction onto the
institution
.
Nevertheless, NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner
suggested that peacekeeping could cover "not only transport,
other infrastructure facilities, and supplies of military
equipment, but also troops if necessary." 308 While
proclaiming the agreement historic, NATO stressed that it
did not indicate a commitment to intervene in the Balkan
conflict. Thus, the Oslo statement served two essentially
symbolic roles. The first was a veiled threat to the
warring parties in the former Yugoslavia that mechanisms for
the possible use of force were being incorporated by NATO
and the CSCE. The second provided continued impetus to the
CSCE for its scheduled review conference the following month
in Helsinki.
At Helsinki the CSCE foreign ministers welcomed the
NATO initiative, but failed to act. 309 The false promise of
NATO/CSCE peacekeeping in the Balkan crisis therefore
prompted NATO to look to the UN for an out-of-area mandate
See Robert Mauthner, "NATO Agrees to Peacekeeping Role in Europe." The Financial Times
(UK) 5 June 1992, 4.
Meeting on the sidelines of the summit NATO and WEU members did agree to begin joint naval
patrol exercises in the Adriatic Sea to enforce the UN arms embargo against the former
Yugoslav republics. This was, however, a largely symbolic action as the major violations of the
embargo were occurring over land.
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in spite of the fact that its own members were largely
responsible for blocking action in the CSCE. The CSCE did
identify itself as a regional organization under Article
VIII of the UN Charter (at Helsinki) and the UN was quick to
call on the CSCE for peacekeeping assistance in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. A copy of a UN request for CSCE assistance was
forwarded to NATO Headquarters prompting a divisive internal
debate in the Alliance as to how to respond to these
overlapping institutional requests. Some NATO members felt
that to get a mandate for planning out-of-area activities,
it was necessary to receive a formal request from the CSCE.
However, others argued that since the CSCE was now a
regional organization under the UN, the request to the CSCE
was sufficient to justify NATO planning. 310 As a result,
ongoing debates within and among institutions inhibited
international efforts to bring peace to the Balkans.
The Rise and Fall of the United Nations in the Balkans
Absent a consensus among its members for direct NATO
involvement in the Balkans, UN peacekeeping became the only
alternative for arranging international efforts to promote
peace. At the December 1992 NAC ministerial, NATO signaled
that it was prepared to undertake peacekeeping operations
under the authority of the UN Security Council and to
"respond positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary
Drew 9-10.
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General might take to seek Alliance assistance in the
implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions." 311
However, internal NATO disputes continued to block active
consideration of policy options toward attaining peace in
the Balkans. By early 1993, interlocking institutions were
becoming, at best, excuses for national inaction and, at
worst, obstacles to ending the conflict. In particular, the
UN had imposed an arms embargo on all parties in the former
Yugoslavia in 1991. Enforced by NATO (and the WEU)
,
the
embargo enhanced an imbalance of power favoring Serb forces
(which had inherited most of the military apparatus of the
Yugoslav National Army) allowing them to make territorial
gains and carry out a policy of ethnic cleansing. Lifting
the arms embargo became politically impossible once the UN
had deployed peacekeepers on the ground in 1992 for
contributing states worried that their troops would get
caught up in increased fighting if more weapons flowed into
the region.
This new procedural arrangement did mean that NATO
could now support UN humanitarian efforts and enforcement of
a no-fly zone over the region. By 1994 the NATO mission in
Bosnia-Herzegovina included protection of heavy weapons
• 312
exclusion zones and safe havens for civilian populations.
Communique Issued by the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 17 December
1992. NATO Office of Information and Press.
For an official UN perspective on the relationship with NATO see Kofi Annan, "UN
Peacekeeping Operations and Cooperation with NATO," NATO Review 41:5 (October 1993) 3-
7 Also see Dirk A. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia: Partners
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Operationally, the institutional cultures of NATO and the UN
clashed thereby contributing further to the false promise of
interlocking institutions. In response to the initial UN
request for assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO began
planning for military operations in the region. Charged
with making estimates on how to support the provision of
humanitarian assistance to alleviate the Serb siege of
Sarajevo, NATO planners began with the assumption that since
a peaceful environment did not exist, the UN request to
guarantee the delivery of aid in a hostile environment would
require up to 100,000 troops. Because UN peacekeeping
planning assumed a peaceful environment before forces were
deployed, the UN had estimated needing only 2000-4000
313troops
.
Though the US was extremely reluctant to place its
forces on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1993 NATO
military officials were instructed by the NAC to began
informal planning for a force of around 50,000 peacekeepers
- of which 25,000 would be US personnel - that could be
deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the event that a peace
settlement was reached. NATO planning included peacekeeping
activities such as: monitoring cease-fires and withdrawals
of forces; supervising disarmament and control of weapons;
escorting, controlling and protecting convoys; creating
in International Cooperation (The Hague. Netherlands: Netherlands Atlantic Commission,
1994).
Drew 12.
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safe corridors; creating and monitoring buffer zones;
providing logistical assistance; and removing hazardous
munitions. 314 However, working simultaneously in the UN and
NATO political bodies, and with troop commanders on the
ground, France successfully blocked formal NATO
consideration of command and control arrangements by
insisting they remain in the UN and thereby effectively
blocking any immediate or substantial NATO role in promoting
peace in the region. 315 By this point 141,000 people had
been killed and 3.5 million refugees had fled the conflict -
all in spite of UN and EU negotiated cease-fires and the
deployment of some 24,281 UN peacekeepers on the ground.
A New Russian Assert iveness and a Return to the CSCE
Just as Europe and the US were bypassing it in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the CSCE re-entered the debate over security
institutions in autumn 1993 . Russia promoted the CSCE as an
alternative to NATO's increasing role and to codify Russian
peacekeeping or peacemaking in the former Soviet Union. On
30 November Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev asked
the CSCE to support (especially financially) Russian
peacekeeping missions in the former Soviet Union and
suggested that the CSCE should take over the political
John Kriendler, "NATO's Changing Role - Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping",
NATO Review 41:3 (June 1993) 15-22.
Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. is Urging NATO to Prepare Force for Duty in Bosnia," The New
York Times , 11 March 1993, A 1,1 6.
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coordination of peacekeeping missions organized by the CIS,
NATO, the NACC, and the WEU. 316 The Russian proposal placed
NATO members in the difficult position of balancing the
strong opposition of the three Baltic countries and Ukraine
to the Russian proposal; the reality that NATO would not
assume a peacekeeping role in the former Soviet Union; and
a desire not to alienate Russia over the expanding role of
NATO. 1 Central and East Europeans were especially
concerned that the Kozyrev proposals were part of a return
to traditional Russian nationalism or even neo- imperialism.
While Moscow's rhetoric out-paced Russian capabilities,
growing public support for extreme Russian nationalists in
the December 1993 parliamentary elections fueled this
318
concern
.
The CSCE foreign ministers did not endorse the Russian
proposal, but agreed to strengthen the CSCE as a pan-
European forum for cooperative security and political
consultation on the basis of equality. In deference to
Russia, they also agreed: "...to pursue the possibility of
enhancing capabilities to apply CSCE crisis management
RFE/RL Daily Reports . 1 December 1993.
Estonia acknowledged that it may be necessary to allow Russia to undertake peacekeeping
operations for the CSCE in some parts of the former Soviet Union in particular cases. However,
Estonian Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste was adamant that Russia should only be permitted to
do so under strict conditions and only on a case-by-case basis. He stressed that under "no
circumstances should Russia be given a broad mandate to be the CSCE force." RFE/RL Daily
Reports . 30 November 1993.
See Suzanne Crow, "Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?" Radio Free Europe/ Radio
Liberty Research Report . 6 May 1994 and Sean Kay, The Political Victory of the Russian
Armed Forces: Assessing the Impact in the New Military Doctrine (Brussels: NATO Office of
Information and Press, NATODATA Service. 1994).
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arrangements on a case-by-case basis to situations involving
third-party forces when such arrangements are determined to
be supportive of CSCE objectives. 319 However, most NATO and
Central and East European countries had lost interest in the
CSCE. Thus the challenge was to find a creative way to keep
Russia facing West short of granting too much authority to
the CSCE. The solution would be found in another
institution - the PFP
.
Though President Boris Yeltsin welcomed the PFP, Russia
began using its participation in it to obstruct NATO
enlargement and restore Russian national pride. When
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev addressed NATO
defense ministers on 25 May 1994, he said that: "...it
wouldn't be correct for Russia to set forth some specific
conditions for cooperation or trying to say that we want to
occupy a better place, a so-called warmer place under the
sun, in the program. " However, Grachev was also clear that
Russia would request special privileges via an undefined
"active mechanism" for consultation with the West over
peacekeeping operations, strategic planning, and joint
exercises outside of the PFP. 320
The NATO members agreed to negotiate a "special status"
with Russia but strove to avoid any perception that they
were granting Russia a sphere of influence in the East or a
CSCE Ministerial Final Communique, "CSCE and the New Europe - Our Security in
Indivisible," November 1993. CSCE Secretariat in Prague, The Czech Republic.
Reuters. 25 May 1994.
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veto over NATO policy. But at the 10 June NACC meeting,
NATO appeared to defer to Russian sensitivities to the point
of conferring a de facto veto for Russia within the
Alliance. Kozyrev announced Russia's intention to join the
PFP but insisted on first negotiating a detailed and signed
cooperation program that would formalize a relationship
based on what Kozyrev called "no mutual vetoes or
surprises." 321 Kozyrev expected a formal piece of paper from
NATO signaling broad deference toward Russia to prove to
hard-liners in Moscow that NATO had given in to Russian
demands. 3 "" At a press conference in Moscow that afternoon
President Yeltsin said with regard to Russia's special
status that: "NATO has agreed... it is necessary to sign
such a protocol - even if some bureaucrats reject that
protocol, we will sign it anyway." 323
In Brussels, the NAC took up the prospects of
increasing dialogue with Russia. After lengthy discussion
between NATO Assistant Secretary General Gebhardt von Moltke
and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin, a deal
was announced on a framework for relations between Russia
and NATO. Kozyrev traveled to Brussels on 22 June and
signed the PFP coupled with a joint NATO/Russia declaration.
The declaration stressed that both NATO and Russia have an
important role in European security and that cooperative
Reuters. 10 June 1994.
Interview with a NATO official, Brussels, June 1994.
Reuters. 10 June 1994.
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relations of mutual respect and friendship between the
Alliance and Russia are a key element for security within
the entire CSCE area. The NATO/Russia special relationship
was designed to promote dialogue and cooperation in areas
where Russia has a unique and important contribution to
make, commensurate with its size and role as a nuclear
power, through the establishment of an extensive IPP. This
relationship would be based on the sharing of information on
issues regarding political
- security related matters having a
European dimension; political consultations, as
appropriate, on issues of common concern; and cooperation
in a range of security- related areas including, as
appropriate, peacekeeping. 324 NATO officials expressed
relief at the commitment by Russia to work with NATO which
could pave the way toward close military cooperation in
areas of shared interest - especially peacekeeping.
Toward Peace in the Balkans?
By 1995 several NATO operations were providing
operational support to enhance UN peacekeeping in the
Balkans. 325 Despite the hope that this institutional
Joint NATO-Russia Declaration, 22 June 1994. NATO Office of Information and Press.
This included operation "Provide Promise" which flew humanitarian assistance into Bosnia
(totalling several thousand sorties by 1995). Operation "Sharp Guard" was conducted jointly
with the WEU to enforce the UN arms embargo against the warring parties. Operation "Deny
Flight" used NATO air power to deny military flights by the warring parties over the region.
Operation "Able Sentry" was a UN mission including several hundred US ground forces placed
in Macedonia as a preventive "trip-wire" force to deter the spread of the war outside of its
current boundaries.
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activity could end the war, nearly 250,000 had now died. In
the fall of 1993 the US sought consensus among its NATO
allies for a more "robust" use of air power against
violators of UN resolutions to include targeting
transportation facilities, command and control sites,
weapons storage depots and other non-civilian stationary
targets. 326 European countries with troops on the ground
were reluctant to support this policy. However, by spring
1995 NATO agreed on a more robust use of air power to
support a new cease-fire negotiated by former US President
Jimmy Carter. 327 Responding to Serb violations of UN
resolutions in May, NATO bombed Serb ammunition depots and
brought forth the UN peacekeeper's worst nightmare: Serb
forces took several hundred peacekeepers hostage - some of
whom were chained to likely NATO targets as human shields.
Shortly after the release of the UN soldiers, Croatia
launched successful attacks against Serb-held territory it
had lost in 1991 and Bosnian government forces massed near
Sarajevo preparing to break the Serb siege of this so-called
"safe haven". NATO was fundamentally split on its response
This policy was publicly criticized by the UN political representative on the ground in Croatia.
Yasushi Akashi. He insisted that Serb attacks on UN Safe Areas were not sufficient to call in
NATO air strikes. Akashi publicly criticized US policy as "somewhat reticent, somewhat
afraid, timid and tentative" and insisted that the US should send ground forces to Bosnia. These
comments thoroughly discredited Akashi with the US, NATO Headquarters, and the Bosnian
Muslims. US Ambassador to the UN Madeline Albright complained to Secretary General
Boutros-Boutros Ghali that Akashi was out of line and that international servants "should
remember where their salaries are paid." Associated Press. 2 May 1994.
NATO also began planning for the possible deployment of forces to evacuate UN peacekeepers
in the event that they might be withdrawn.
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with the US quietly encouraging the Bosnian Muslims and the
Europeans attempting to maintain neutrality. The essence of
the crisis was summarized by a senior French military
official on 30 June 1995 who stated that: "If the Europeans
are on one side and the Americans on the other, it would be
like an earthquake in the Atlantic alliance." 328 US
Secretary of State William Perry was even more blunt in his
assessment of NATO in the summer of 1995: "Paralysed into
inaction, NATO seemed to be irrelevant in dealing with the
Bosnian crisis... It appeared to me that NATO was in the
process of unravelling." 329
In July Bosnian Serbs over-ran UN safe havens (Gorazde
and Zepa) in Eastern Bosnia in blatant defiance of NATO and
the UN. 330 The offensive borrowed heavily from Serb forces
occupying Muslim lands in Western Bosnia thus creating a
power vacuum that allowed Muslim and Croatian forces to make
simultaneous gains in Western Bosnia and Southern Croatia. 331
Recognizing this power shift on the ground, the US launched
a major diplomatic initiative in July and August 1995 to
bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina and restore the
Reuters. 30 June 1995.
Reuters. 20 November 1996.
According to some NATO officials, NATO sought to launch air strikes to protect these cities but
the request was turned town by the UN.
While Bosnia had been under a variety of cease-fires in 1994 and 1995, the Muslim forces had
regrouped and rebuilt their forces with outside assistance attained via violations of the UN arms
embargo. This was aided by an informal decision by the Clinton Administration to permit Iran
to export arms to the Muslims.
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credibility of NATO. 3,2 US determination was heightened by
the death of three of its most capable and experienced
diplomats on the Mt
.
Igman road outside Sarajevo.'" On 28
August Bosnian Serbs shelled Sarajevo killing 39 civilians.
NATO responded with Operation Deliberate Force in early
September. This was a major NATO air operation with narrow
political objectives: to end the shelling of Sarajevo, to
open the airport and the roads around Sarajevo, for safe
transit, to remove all Serb heavy weapons from a 12.5 mile
radius of Sarajevo and to deter attacks on other safe
havens. The air power combined with Muslims and Croat
territorial gains to push the Bosnian Serbs toward a
negotiated settlement that would retain Bosnia-Herzegovina
as a unitary state based on a 51-49% division favoring a US-
negotiated Muslim and Croat Federation. 334
Under the tutelage of US Assistant Secretary of State
for Europe and Canada Richard Holbrooke, the warring parties
On 25 July 1995 NATO agreed to prepare for a much more assertive use of air power should a
political decision be taken by the NAC to protect UN Safe Areas.
This included Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy Joseph
Kruzel, National Security Council official S. Nelson Drew, and Ambassador Robert Frasure.
Dr. Kruzel and Col. Drew were the brain-trust of US action not only in Bosnia but toward
NATO as a whole. This was particularly true regarding the PFP (Kruzel) and the Combined
Joint Task Forces (Drew) proposals of the January 1994 NATO summit.
Domestic political calculations also contributed to the decision by President Clinton to engage
the US. Congress had been asserting considerable pressure on the Administration with
bipartisan support for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims. The
Administration argued that such "feel good" measures were endorsed by members who knew
that such a step, taken unilaterally, would probably increase the bloodshed, split NATO and
raise the possibility of US troops being deployed to evacuate UN peacekeepers while entering on
the mound to train and supply Bosnian Muslims. Nevertheless, the Republican-led Congress
was now directing US Balkan policy and thus President Clinton's political future was linked to
an ability to reassert his authority in foreign policy. See Sean Kay, "Putting
Bosnia on the
White House Lawn," European Brief 3:1 (October 1995) 51-52.
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met in Dayton, Ohio, in October and reached an agreement on
a peace settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina signed on 15
December 1995. The political preconditions for peace were
not entirely due to NATO activity. There had been dramatic
shifts in the balance of power on the ground and the
Yugoslav patrons of the Bosnian Serbs in Belgrade needed to
gain favor with the West to end devastating UN economic
sanctions. However, the accord and the peace it hoped to
preserve depended on NATO and its institutional planning
begun in 1993 . Without a rapid deployment of strong and
credible peacekeeping forces the agreement would likely
unravel as adequate reassurance did not exist for the
warring parties in the absence of a credible peacekeeping
presence. Rapid deployment was necessary to reassure the
Muslims and Croats who feared that the Bosnian Serbs might
negotiate a cease-fire only to regroup in the hope that the
Serb- led Yugoslavia would intervene and annex Serb territory
in Eastern Bosnia in the name of "Greater Serbia" . Such
Serb actions might prompt Croatia to annex Western Bosnia.
335
Only NATO could meet these requirements because the plans
that the Alliance had undertaken since 1993 in the NACC,
PFP, and NATO were quickly put into place through the Bosnia
Peace Implementation Force (IFOR)
.
335
At a London dinner reception earlier in 1995 for Croatian President Fanjo Tudjman, the leadei
of the British Liberal Party Paddy Ashdown asked the Croatian how he viewed Bosnia in 10
years. Tudjman reportedly took his dinner napkin and drew a map of the region where there
was no Bosnia at all - rather an expanded Croatia and an expanded Serbia having
divided the
territory.
187
Without NATO the warring parties would not have been
sufficiently reassured of their protection while agreeing to
end hostilities. A temporary international coalition might
have been attainable for peacekeeping. However,
establishing such a force would have required consolidating
a multinational force, infrastructure, and a new command and
control structure. Because there was urgency to the
peacekeeping deployment, only NATO had the standing
integrated plans, command and control and infrastructure to
act quickly. Under the framework of Operation Joint
Endeavor, NATO was able to deploy rapidly some 60,000 troops
to Bosnia-Herzegovina - of which about 1/3 were Americans. 336
NATO troops were given a mandate by the UN Security Council
to use "all necessary force" to maintain the integrity of
its mission of peace implementation. In late 1995, NATO's
Crisis Management Organization (CMO) was activated to
coordinate operation Joint Endeavor. This included elements
from operations, intelligence, logistics, systems divisions,
and liaison elements coming together in one planning cell to
streamline and lower the transaction costs of this
The specific military tasks of IFOR as approved by the NAC were: to ensure self-defense and
freedom of movement; to supervise selective marking of boundaries and Zone of Separation
(ZOS) between the parties; to monitor and - if needed - enforce the withdrawal of forces to their
respective territories, and the establishment of ZOS; to assume control of the airspace over
Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the movement of military traffic over key ground routes; to
establish Joint Military Commissions, to serve as the central bodies for all Parties to the Peace
Agreement; and to assist with the withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to IFOR. IFOR
Fact Sheet (June 1996), NATO Office of Information and Press.
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multilateral military action. 337 in so doing, NATO
demonstrated that after four years of institutional
activity, it had moved from adaptation in theory to practice
in terms of its missions. NATO had become more flexible,
could field new and creative command structures, and at the
same time continue to facilitate the use of raw power when
necessary. However, NATO had also shown that it could not
function in the absence of American leadership.
IFOR and the Partnership for Peace
The multilateral nature of IFOR, which brought together
military forces from thirty- three countries, was greatly
enhanced by the PFP. Eager to show their willingness to
contribute to a NATO operation, and hopefully enhance their
prospects for membership in NATO, over a dozen PFP countries
joined IFOR. 8 The exercises that PFP countries had taken
with NATO paved the way for quick integration of contingents
from PFP countries totaling nearly 10,000 personnel. 3 " The
importance of this contribution was acknowledged by the NATO
foreign ministers meeting in Berlin in June 1996 who stated
that
:
Partnership for Peace has become a permanent
element of European security cooperation and has
337
. See General George Joulwan, "SHAPE and IFOR: Adapting to the Needs of Tomorrow,"
NATO Review 2 (March 1996) 6-9.
338
.
Including Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland. Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden and Ukraine.
339
.
For example, in October 1995 (just prior to IFOR deployment) staff officers from nine
NATO/PFP countries participated in operation Cooperative Light as a command post exercise
simulating the establishment of a buffer zone between two warring parties.
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demonstrated its value in the current IFOR
operation. We are particularly pleased that 12
Partners have joined us in this endeavor, which
has benefitted from the experience and
interoperability gained in the last two years from
the participation of Partner troop contributors injoint PFP exercises and other PFP activities.
This first common experience in IFOR charts the
course for future security cooperation. We hope
to ensure that cooperative relationships developed
during the IFOR operation between Allies and
Partners con^nue in the future to enhance the
Partnership
.
Through IFOR the PFP countries gained operational experience
in the NATO command structure that could never be attained
through exercises and seminars alone. For Hungary, IFOR
meant a direct increase in its security as its territory was
used as a staging ground for US forces going in and out of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. A former Warsaw Pact country now had a
NATO base on its soil. More generally, PFP participation in
IFOR could only help those countries sharing the risks in
their quest for NATO membership.
The PFP also provided an institutional framework to
bring Russia into IFOR under a NATO command. Russia had
been critical of NATO's Operation Deliberate Force - with
President Boris Yeltsin labeling the attack on Serbs
genocide and threatening to withdraw from the PFP if the air
attacks did not stop. Eventually realizing that the US
initiative was bringing peace to the Bosnians, Russia co-
sponsored the Dayton talks and agreed to send 2000 troops to
Bosnia-Herzegovina under a NATO command with a Russian
General serving in the IFOR command at SHAPE. Operating
Final Communique of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session Meeting in
Germany, 3 June 1996. NATO Office of Information and Press
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under NATO command and alongside American troops in the
Posevina Corridor (one of the most dangerous areas of
operation) would help show Moscow that NATO was not working
against Russia. IFOR had become an inclusive model for
NATO-Russian cooperation. 341
IFOR would also strengthen the PFP process itself.
Military command and control problems are most likely to
increase proportionally to the amount of participants in a
multinational operation. However, the movement toward
common procedures attained via the PFP had lowered this
probability. Nevertheless, some serious interoperability
and language barriers hindered the command and control of
PFP participants in IFOR. Experiencing these problems in
action would feedback to the PFP countries who might then
compensate for them in their future military planning via
their IPP and PARP, resource allocation, and future budget
plans. NATO could contribute by helping to identify areas
for further improvement in future exercises and training.
Peace without Security?
IFOR completed its major military tasks by the summer
of 1996. Warring parties were successfully separated
thereby creating an environment in which the non-military
aspects of rebuilding could begin. The Dayton Accords were
premised on the conclusion that a lasting peace would
Interview with a senior US official at the Department of Defense, March 1996.
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require reintegration of a multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina
requiring reconciliation among the parties. Thus freedom of
movement, expression, and association guaranteed through
free and fair elections was necessary. This responsibility
fell on the Organization for Cooperation in Europe (OSCE -
the CSCE was renamed OSCE in December 1994) and on the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
,
342
In addition to
organizing elections, the OSCE was responsible for arms
control and human rights guarantees in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 343
Successful implementation of the civilian aspects of
the Dayton accords would be essential for lasting security.
Thus IFOR was tasked to play a limited but important role in
this process by the NAC
. Within its capabilities and
resources, and the limits imposed by carrying out its key
military tasks, IFOR was mandated to:
1 . help to create secure conditions for the
conduct by others of non-military tasks
associated with the Peace Agreement, including
free and fair elections,-
2 . assist the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees and other international
organizations in their humanitarian missions
and assist the movement of these
organizations; assist in the observation and
prevention of interference with the movement
See Carl Bildt, "Implementing the Civilian Tasks of the Bosnian Peace Agreement," NATO
Review 5 (1996) 3-6.
The Hague War Crimes Tribunal (established in February 1993) meeting in the Netherlands
would indict and prosecute war criminals, and other international agencies including the EU
would channel aid for economic reconstruction and provide administration in some cities (such
as Mostar). Reconstruction costs were estimated by the World Bank to cost up to 6 billion
dollars. Aid programs would be organized by the EU through a conference of donor countries.
By summer 1996 $1.8 billion had been pledged. William Drozdiak, "European Governments
Respond with Relief," The Washington Post , 22 November 1995, A22.
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of civilian populations, refugees and
displaced persons, and respond appropriately
to deliberate violence to life and person;
3 . assist in the monitoring of the clearance of
minefields and obstacles.
In carrying out its basic mission, NATO indirectly
contributed to a number of non-military operations by
contributing over 400 Civil Affairs personnel to IFOR in
support of the Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation
(CJCIMIC) program which unites active and reserve civil
affairs officers from around the world. Their specific role
was to identify needs and projects for rebuilding civil
infrastructure and institutions and to coordinate with
international organizations, non-governmental organizations
and humanitarian agencies to obtain necessary materials,
money, and manpower to meet these needs. 345
NATO military and civilian representatives worked in
consultation with the World Bank and a variety of non-
governmental organizations to identify over 200 projects for
infrastructure reconstruction. 346 IFOR also made use of
344
345'
346
IFOR Fact Sheet (June 1996).
IFOR Fact Sheet - Civil Military Cooperation. NATO Office of Information and Press, 20
August 1996.
Infrastructure rebuilding became a substantial challenge to creating peace in Bosnia. By summer
1996 there remained up to six million land mines; 80 percent of power generators were
damaged or out of operation; 40% of bridges destroyed; and telecommunications inoperative in
large parts of the country. Additionally, 30 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's health facilities,
50 percent of its schools and 60 percent of its housing have been damaged. Per capita
income is
$500, industrial output is 5 percent of its former level, and war has left an overwhelming
external debt and arrears mostly owed to commercial banks and bilateral creditors. In addition
to 250,000 dead, 200,000 were wounded, about one fourth children. There are some two
million displaced persons within Bosnia-Herzegovina and some one million outside the
territory.
80 percent of Bosnia's population depends upon humanitarian assistance.
Central and federal
ministries are weak and low level political institutions are embryonic at best. Christine
Walhch
(World Bank), "Policy Forum: Bosnia - After the Troops Leave," The Washington
Quarterly
19:3 (Summer 1996) 82-83.
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NATO's Infrastructure Program to build bridges, repair
roads, and provide staff for similar projects such as power,
natural gas, water, and telecommunications in carrying out
its deployment mission. 347 By March 1996 80 percent of
Bosnia's major roads were open for use - a key contribution
to freedom of movement. 348 Small but symbolic steps toward
reconciliation included IFOR assistance in transporting 87
school children on an educational field trip from Tuzla to
Zagreb and arranging for local schools to receive computers
as donations from private voluntary organizations . Computer
and public administration expertise was also made available
to the OSCE to help it prepare for the process of electoral
reconciliation
.
Most importantly, establishing a secure environment
leading to new elections would require apprehension of
indicted war criminals for trial in the Hague. NATO was
willing to arrest such figures if they were to happen upon
them - but not to seek them out. Not wishing to spark
confrontations, NATO commanders applied a strict
interpretation of this mandate. Thus while NATO could
provide security as a rapidly deployed peacekeeping force to
help aid the voluntary separation of the warring parties, it
347
348
For example, IFOR provided increased security presence when cargo of a strategic nature such
as electrical transformers and hydroelectric turbines and turbine shafts were transported
over
disputed territory.
Joint Press Conference of Secretary General and Supreme Allied Commander Europe at NAIO
Headquarters. 18 March 1996. NATO Office of Information and Press. For example, IFOR
troops rebuilt the Sarajevo Airport access road and the road which leads to the primary
gas
facility outside Sarajevo.
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was not well suited for policing or long-term security
provision. 349 However, the other institutions charged with
facilitating the civilian elements of long-term peace in
Bosnia-Herzegovina remained weak. Thus on 15 November 1996
President Clinton announced what had been in the works for
months - that US and NATO forces would remain in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and in substantial numbers for an additional 18
months in a follow on Stabilization Force or SFOR.
Analysis
As realism predicts, the effort to build interlocking
institutions failed to prevent or end war in the Balkans and
at times made matters worse. Nevertheless, realism alone is
insufficient to explain the institutional activity that did
enhance reassurance in Central and Eastern Europe during a
highly unstable period of European history and contributed
to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1995. Institutional
planning and outreach to Central and Eastern Europe via the
PFP allowed NATO to move quickly into effective peacekeeping
via IFOR. However, NATO's capacity to move Bosnia-
Herzegovina from peace to lasting security was extremely
limited - as was that of other institutions such as the UN,
OSCE, and EU. Most significantly, IFOR and SFOR
The serious nature of this institutional weakness was underscored hy Bosnian President Ali ja
Izetbegovic in August 1996 who said that: "No one can expect us to legalize something that
have been fighting against and ask us to accept the results of a war of conquest and
genocide...As days go by our doubts and questions are multiplying." Reuters. 14 August I!
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demonstrated that NATO only worked when it was led by the US
in its traditional alliance functions.
Tasks
NATO formally identified four tasks it was to perform
after the Cold War: promote stability, enhance and expand
consultation, deter aggression against member states, and to
maintain the general balance of power in Europe. To this
NATO added linking institutional cooperation with free-
market and democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe
and organizing and undertaking peacekeeping missions.
Additionally, NATO sought a contradictory goal of preventing
a Russian veto over Alliance activity while building a
special NATO-Russia relationship.
Organizational Capabilities
After the Cold War, NATO remained a highly formal
institution with low autonomy. However, its member states
increasingly gave NATO authority to socialize states from
the former Warsaw Pact into the West. NATO expanded its
formal structures to give PFP participants access to NATO
officials and national delegations. Through the NACC and
PFP process, extensive opportunities were created for
military-to-military cooperation designed to increase
Partner security via training, expertise, and conditional
integration into NATO. Nonetheless, as the Balkan
experience shows, when a real crisis emerged and member
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state interests diverged, NATO was ineffective. Only after
the absence of action had threatened the institutional
credibility of NATO and a balance of power on the ground was
attained did the interests of its member states converge
sufficiently to bring peace to the Balkans. When national
interests coalesced, NATO's institutional functions were
generally quite effective.
Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures
The desire to assist democrats in Central and Eastern
Europe via NATO's institutional activity was sincere. The
NATO countries felt a strong moral obligation to help those
who endorsed principles of democracy and the peaceful
resolution of international and domestic disputes. NATO
also sought to enhance norms of acceptable international
behavior by strengthening other institutions such as the
OSCE . Indeed, NATO's formal membership rules were
transformed from restricted to conditional to support these
objectives. NATO decision-making procedures remained
fundamentally unchanged. However, new NATO institutions,
the NACC and PFP, developed independent procedures of their
own addressing a range of direct and indirect NATO-related
activities
.
Capacity for Change
NATO's survival after the Cold War was dependent upon a
capacity for change. As an institution, the evolution of
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new tasks and institutional structures indicated a high
degree of change. However, when the end of a war required
peacekeeping and NATO was put into formal military action
for the first time in its history, it was only with strong
American leadership that it functioned. Therefore in key
ways, NATO had not adapted sufficiently to the changing
dynamics of European security.
Conclusion: The Mixed Record of NATO Adaptation
The primary lesson of the early years of NATO's post-
Cold War adaptation was that the institution did not
function in the absence of US engagement. The US placed a
high value on NATO but had no clear vital interests in
Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond containment of the conflict.
However, when NATO's inability to act began to undermine its
credibility and draw into question its very purpose, the US
intervened. As President Clinton said addressing the US on
27 November 1995 on the NATO plans for peacekeeping: "The
only force capable of getting this job done is NATO, the
powerful, military alliance of democracies that has
guaranteed our security for half a century now. . .And as
NATO's leader and the primary broker of the peace agreement
the United States must be an essential part of the
mission... If we're not there, NATO will not be there."
3 "
President Bill Clinton, Address to the Nation, 27 November 1995. The White House, Office
the Press Secretary.
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However, Europe's security dependence on the US after the
Cold War would not be politically sustainable. Keeping the
Americans in Europe would require Europeans to take more
responsibility for their own security - even though they had
performed so poorly in the Balkans prior to 1995. Pressure
was also increasing on NATO from some PFP countries for
enlargement as a reward for participation in IFOR and as a
means of preventing a similar crisis from occurring in the
future. Thus after Bosnia, European security would require
a fundamentally new - and potentially conflicting -
institutional processes of external enlargement and internal
restructuring
.
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CHAPTER VI
NATO ENLARGEMENT:
SHAPING THE POST- COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Introduction and Overview
Chapter Six shows that the strategy of NATO enlargement
as adopted in January 1994 is primarily institutional in the
goals of rewarding political and economic reform in Central
and Eastern Europe. However, this well-intentioned
institutional strategy may actually decrease security in
Europe depending on the form that NATO enlargement takes.
This chapter traces the evolution of the NATO enlargement
policy, surveys realist and institutional arguments for and
against enlargement, and outlines a course of action that
will allow enlargement to proceed in a way that increases
security in Europe. Specifically, it argues that NATO
enlargement primarily to build democracy and manage conflict
promotes a false promise. NATO's Partnership for Peace and
other complementary institutions are the best means for
performing these tasks . The strongest argument for
enlarging NATO is to stabilize the countries on the eastern
German border to create a hedge, not against a Russian
threat, but between Germany and Russia. However, NATO
enlargement is fraught with danger and the primary task of
NATO as an institution must be to adapt its institutional
form to ensure that no state views enlargement as decreasing
its security.
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NATO Enlargement: Who. Where. When, How, and Why?
The policy of NATO enlargement was approved by its
members at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. Formally, NATO
enlargement (planned for April 1999) will be gradual,
transparent, and contribute to a broad concept of European
security of which NATO is an important, but not sole,
element in a comprehensive security architecture. 351 While
this was a well - intended policy of stabilizing Central and
Eastern Europe and hedging against a renewed Russian threat,
it was not well implemented and at times seemed to cause
more problems than it solved.
NATO Enlargement and Russia: Cooperation or Competition?
Russia has been steadfast in its opposition to NATO
enlargement. President Boris Yeltsin has warned of the
flame of war spreading throughout Europe and his former
National Security Advisor Alexander Lebed once warned of
World War III if NATO enlarges. 352 Officials from the
Russian Ministry of Defense have signaled that Russia will
establish a new Warsaw Pact style defense alliance in the
FSU and may re-target nuclear weapons at new NATO members.
Pro-western Russian reformers are bewildered by the
Correspondence from a senior US State Department official. July 1995. See Sean Kay,
"American Strategies Towards the Enlargement of European Security Institutions: Partnership
or Cold Peace?," in Jarrod Wiener, ed.. The Transatlantic Relationship (London: Macmillan
Press, 1996) 42-65.
Atlantic News 271 1 (20 April 1995).
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enlargement policy complaining that it feeds Russian
nationalism. 353
NATO has hoped to assuage Russia's concerns by claiming
that enlargement would be formally open to all interested
countries in the CSCE region - including Russia. 354
Privately, few officials in NATO countries considered
Russian membership an option. The requirements for
admission to NATO would be so high that if it qualified,
"Russia would be a very different place - a true Western
democracy." 355 Internal differences between the US and
Germany over how to approach Russia became public in
September 1994. At a conference in Berlin, German Defense
Minister Volker Ruehe rejected Russian membership. Ruehe
stated that it would "blow NATO apart, it would be like the
United Nations of Europe, it wouldn't work." 355 He added
that some former Warsaw Pact countries could join NATO
before the year 2000. At the same meeting, US Secretary of
Defense William Perry indicated that he would not rule out
Russian membership in NATO but that it would not happen in
the foreseeable future.
353
354
For a survey of Russian views of NATO enlargement see Aleksandr Konovalov, Audrey
Kortunov, and Sergey Oznobishchev, "The Bankruptcy of 'NATOmania': This Concept Offers
Nothing Positively New for Either Russia or the West." Nezavisimava Gazeta. 20 March 1996.
In FBIS-SOV-96-086-S, 2 May 1996, 5-8.
Keeping the door to NATO membership open to Russia was pushed strongest by the US and
Canada.
355
.
Interview with a senior official from the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
November 1 994.
Setting high standards for membership would also likely exclude a number of
Central and
Eastern European states.
Reuters. 9 September 1994.
356
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Wanting NATO to speak as one voice, the Clinton
Administration formulated a dual-track strategy in the
autumn of 1994 to accelerate an internal NATO dialogue over
enlargement while accommodating Russian concerns by
strengthening the CSCE - Russia's preferred security
institution. The policy adapted American diplomacy to a
perceived frustration with the PFP in Central and Eastern
Europe. The US proposed the creation of a NATO working
group to define criteria for expansion. 357 A State
Department official insisted: "...this policy is not
designed to create an obstacle but to begin a process." 358
However, the US supported enlargement while making it
difficult in practice. According to US and NATO officials,
it was hoped that the study would allow NATO to defer the
hard decisions on enlargement by two years until after
scheduled Russian and American presidential elections.
By stressing the CSCE, the US hoped to demonstrate to
Russia that there are inclusive opportunities for security
cooperation other than NATO - and to signal a change in the
traditional American view toward the CSCE. As a senior
Administration official stated on 1 December 1994, the US
was :
According to US Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe: "NATO should only want new
members who have passed beyond ambitions toward the territory of their neighbors, who have
accepted the rights of their minorities, and who have established real and working democratic
systems." Presentation to the Defense and Security Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.
North Atlantic Assembly Annual Session Meeting in Washington D.C., November 1994.
Interview with a senior State Department official, November 1994.
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...making clear that NATO will expand, butthis is going to be part of a larger European
security structure that involves many differentinstitutions - the European Union and inparticular the CSCE...We consider, for the UnitedStates, NATO still to be the number one
organization from our point of view, but we
certainly want to increase the role of CSCE thisis a strategy that emphasizes our desire to have
an inclusive relationship between NATO and all thePartners for Peace, that when NATO expansion
occurs, its not going to be directed against
Russia, but part of the broader policy ofintegration. CSCE fits into this larger .policy as
an institution where Russia is a member.
However, when NATO Secretary General Willy Claes met with
senior US officials at the State Department in November
1994, the American participants said surprisingly little
about the CSCE linkage. While the US did support a change
of name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe - OSCE. The US appeared to want to create the
appearance of a strengthened OSCE without granting the
institution too much authority. 360
From Partnership to Cold Peace: A New Approach
When Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev travelled
to Brussels in December 1994 to sign Russia's PFP/IPP, he
declined at the last minute. Kozyrev declared shock and
surprise at NATO's discussion of expansion even though the
US had briefed Russia on its plans in advance. America's
NATO allies were also uncomfortable with the US approach.
The US sought to complete the review of enlargement criteria
White House Information Service. 1 December 1994.
The US did propose a "beefing up" of OSCE capabilities to include non-proliferation,
peacekeeping within the CIS, preventive mechanisms for addressing ethnic conflict, economic
development, and proposed involving the institution more directly in the resolution of long-term
problems in the Balkans.
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in the following spring but this was rejected by the
European members as moving too fast. 361 On 22 November 1994
German NATO Ambassador Hermann von Richthofen cabled his
foreign ministry complaining that: "...the US
Administration is moving quickly to expand NATO without
consultations on the consequences for the Alliance." 362 Von
Richthofen concluded that without a clear sense of mission
and strategy, "...the Alliance is divided and in crisis." 363
Intra-alliance differences were papered over on 1 December
when NATO foreign ministers stated that:
We expect and would welcome NATO enlargement
that would reach to democratic states to our East,
as part of an evolutionary process, taking into
account political and security developments in the
whole of Europe. Enlargement, when it comes would
be part of a broad European security architecture
based on true cooperation throughout the whole of
Europe. It would threaten no one and would
enhance
3(fjjtability and security for all ofEurope
.
The ministers approved the US plan for a NATO working group
to review enlargement and to report to the NAC by the end of
the year. They also endorsed the continued strengthening of
the CSCE.
On 5 December President Clinton attended the Budapest
CSCE Summit to advance the second track of US policy. He
stated that
:
John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond." International Affairs 71:2 (1995) 245.
Associated Press. 1 December 1994. Richthofen specifically noted existing differences within
NATO over expansion that included Greece and Italy favoring Romania, Bulgaria, and possibly
Malta while northern NATO countries wanted to prioritize admission of Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic.
Associated Press. 1 December 1994.
NATO Office of information and Press. 1 December 1995.
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We must not allow the Iron Curtain to be
replaced by a veil of indifference. We must not
consign new democracies to a grey zone... We seek
to increase the security of all, to erase the oldlines without drawing arbitrary new ones, tobolster emerging democracies and to integrate the
nations of Europe into a continent where democracy
and free markets know no borders but where every
nation's borders are secure.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin responded that:
...a system of blocks, that is to say
something we have left behind, is now coming back
- the NATO bloc on the one hand - and Russia on
the other ... Without compromise on this issue
between NATO and Russia, there would be no point
in continuing a partnership ... Otherwise we will go
our own ways, and why have a partnership at all?
Yeltsin added that if NATO expands, it risks bringing a
"Cold Peace" to Europe. President Clinton was described by
aides as expressing "concern and a state of perplexity about
what the Russians were up to." 367 More rueful was the
Georgian leader, and former Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard
Shevardnadze who lamented that: "The Cold War is
over ... Beware of the Peace."
38
Responding to Russian sensitivities, the formal US view
of enlargement was revised by US Assistant Secretary of
State Richard Holbrooke writing in Foreign Affairs in March
1995. Holbrooke wrote that:
1. The goal remains the defense of the Alliance's
vital interests and the promotion of European
stability. NATO expansion must strengthen
security in the entire region, including
_
nations that are not members. The goal is to
promote security in Central Europe by
White House Information Service. 5 December 1994.
Reuters. 5 December 1994.
Reuters. 5 December 1994.
Reuters. 6 December 1994. For a survey of the decisions made at the Budapest
Summit
Victor-Yves Ghebali, "After the Budapest Conference: The Organization for
Security an
Cooperation in Europe." NATO Review 43:2 (March 1995).
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integrating countries that qualify into the
stabilizing framework of NATO.
2. The rationale and process for NATO's
expansion, once decided, will be transparent,
not secret. Both Warsaw and Moscow ... should
have access to all aspects of the alliance's
thinking in order to understand that NATO
should no longer be considered an anti-Russian
alliance
.
3. There is no timetable or list of nations that
will be invited to join NATO.
4. Each nation will be considered individually,
not as part of some grouping.
5. The decisions as to who joins NATO and when
will be made exclusively by the Alliance.
6 . Although criteria for membership have not been
determined, certain fundamental precepts
reflected in the original Washington treaty
remain as valid as they were in 1949: new
members must be democratic, have market
economies, be committed to responsible
security policies, and be able to contribute
to the Alliance.
7 . Each new NATO member constitutes of the United
States the most solemn of all commitments: a
bilateral defense treaty that extends the US
security umbrella to a new nation. This
requires
6S)
ratif ication by two-thirds of the US
Senate
.
Holbrooke added that the US would make more vigorous use of
the OSCE's consultative and conflict prevention mechanisms.
Within this context he stressed that "...if the West is to
create an enduring and stable security framework for Europe,
it must solve the most enduring strategic problem of Europe
and integrate the nations of the former Soviet Union,
Holbrooke's reference to NATO as a bilateral treaty was misleading. The NATO treaty is
bilateral document but rather a multilateral commitment to self-help and mutual aid. Rich;
Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foretell Affairs 74:2 (March/April 1995) 45-
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especially Russia, into a stable European security
. ,,370
system. 11
Holbrooke also endorsed a proposal by former National
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski that Moscow should be
offered a formal treaty of cooperation between NATO and
Russia. 371 Holbrooke noted that there would be numerous
difficulties but that the US was not ruling it out: "...the
US government as well as its major allies have supported
development of this important new track (emphasis added) in
the European security framework." 372 In early in 1995,
Russia had quietly approached Washington indicating that it
might accept a slow and limited expansion of NATO under
certain circumstances. Moscow sought a guarantee that the
process would not be rushed, that there would be no nuclear
weapons stationed on the territories of new members, that
Russia could be a member of NATO eventually, and that the
end result would be a forum for East-West cooperation on
security issues, and a NATO/Russia non-aggression pact. 373
US and NATO officials characterized the Russian
position as a substantial change in rhetoric though it
remained unclear if Russia was seriously altering its stance
Holbrooke 46.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," Foreign Affairs 74:1 (January/February 1995).
Holbrooke 5 1 . Holbrooke suggested that such an arrangement would require negotiation over a
broad range of issues including the pace of NATO expansion, the state of other Russian NATO-
ties such as the PFP, the degree to which the OSCE has been turned into a more useful
organization and the implications of events such as the fighting in Chechnya.
R. Jeffrey Smith and Daniel Williams, "Russia Intends to Pursue Guarantees from
NATO," Ik
Washington Post , 11 March 1995, A21.
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on NATO enlargement or if it was using a softer tone as part
of its opposition strategy. The US hoped to renew the
discussion of NATO expansion within the context of a NATO-
Russian dialogue. As Vice-President Al Gore said in Tallin,
Estonia on 14 March:
It is important to understand that the
process by which NATO expands is a process that
must take place at the same time the relationship
between NATO and Russia is deepened and clarified.
Both processes must take place simultaneously and
both processes must take place in full open,
public view74with no surprises and no sudden
movements
.
Without detail, the Gore comments unintentionally obfuscated
the issue of NATO enlargement and NATO-Russian relations.
Nevertheless, the same week, EU foreign ministers meeting in
France agreed that NATO should "consider an agreement,
treaty or charter between the Atlantic Alliance and Russia
in parallel with the enlargement of NATO to show Russia that
we are not neglecting it", said French Foreign Minister
Alain Juppe (summarizing the EU position) . It was necessary
in order to "find something to reassure Russia", Juppe
added
.
375
In fact, the Russian position on NATO enlargement had
not changed. On 15 March Boris Yeltsin sent a directive to
374
.
Reuters. 13 March 1995. Vice-President Gore was invoking the language of Russian Foreign
Minister Kozyrev from June 1994 who agreed to sign the PFP while insisting on first
negotiating a detailed cooperation program that would formalize a relationship based on what
he
called "no mutual vetoes or no surprises."
375
Reuters. 18 and 19 March 1995. Following this meeting British Foreign Secretary
Douglas
Hurd stressed that while Russia could not veto NATO policy, such an agreement would be based
on the principle of "no vetoes and no surprises" borrowing even more
directly from Kozyrev's
language At this meeting differences were aired among the European members.
France
supported a formal NATO-Russia treaty while Germany pushed for a "charter"
that would not
require ratification by all members and would be less legally binding.
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Kozyrev castigating him for being weak on NATO and ordering
a harder line. Thus Kozyrev said in Paris on 20 March:
"Why rush things if we run the risk of creating new lines of
division? 1,376 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher
asserted that Kozyrev seemed to believe that "...there had
been some change in the position of the United States or
NATO, that we were going at a different pace than
bef ore .. .That is not correct." 377 Nonetheless, following a
meeting in Geneva on 23 March with Christopher, Kozyrev
declared: "The honeymoon has come to an end.", 378
The PFP and Russia: Bringing Moscow In
Following a Moscow meeting with US Secretary of Defense
Perry on 3 April Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev
linked Russian compliance with the CFE treaty to NATO
expansion and insisted that: "Countermeasures could be
taken... we might create necessary military groups in the
most threatening directions and set up closer cooperation
with other CIS countries." 379 The next day, the speaker of
the upper house of the Russian parliament told Perry that
the parliament was unlikely to ratify the START- 2 treaty if
Reuters. 20 March 1995.
Reuters. 20 March 1995.
Associated Press. 23 March 1995. At the meeting, Secretary Christopher delivered a personal
letter from President Clinton to Boris Yeltsin outlining the US approach to NATO enlargement.
Reuters. 3 April 1995. The Russian military had been pushing for a renegotiation of the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty since early summer 1993. The NATO linkage may have
simply offered the Russian armed forces an excuse to push their case.
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NATO expanded. Russia's first Deputy Defense Minister
Andrei Kokoshin was quoted by Nevazismava Gazeta as saying
that the expansion of NATO would create instability in
Europe by removing the "semi-demilitarized zone which has
now emerged in Central and Eastern Europe" and that "it is
necessary to abandon the false impression that NATO
expansion is inevitable and unavoidable." 381
Russia's concerns were intensified by a series of
public statements from Visegrad and NATO countries
suggesting that the process of expansion was accelerating.
For example, on 3 April Czech President Vaclav Havel said:
"There are a number of indications that we are seeing a new
momentum on the subject of future membership of the new
democracies in the North Atlantic alliance ... One year ago,
NATO membership did not seem likely." 38 On 4 April
President Lech Walesa told the BBC that, as during World War
II, Poland was being "let down by the West" and that Russia
threatened European security. The next day Polish Prime
Minister Jozer Oleksy travelled to NATO Headquarters. Prior
to his departure from Warsaw, Oleksy told reporters that in
the debate over NATO expansion: "Russia has no
significance ... Poland defines its own aims and goals ... Other
countries can have their opinions on the subject, but they
cannot have any influence." Oleksy told NATO ambassadors
Interfax . 3 April 1995. In OMRI Daily Digest, 4 April 1995.
Nezavismava Gazeta , 4 April 1995. In OMRI Daily Digest, 5 April 1995.
Reuters. 3 April 1995.
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that: "Our answer to the question when NATO should open up
to new members is - as soon as possible." 383 On 14 April
Robert Hunter, US Ambassador to NATO, said in Prague that
the decision to expand NATO "is made, now it's just a matter
of doing it right." 384
Though NATO's timetable had not changed, American
officials sought to clarify the situation. On 24 April
Secretary of State Christopher said that: "The processes of
NATO expansion has proceeded on precisely the same timetable
that we decided on last December ... this timetable has not
been altered because of other events since that time... It is
a deliberate timetable." He added that "NATO is not a
social club. . .Any decision on enlargement will be taken with
great care and deliberation and precision." 385 In Brussels
two days later, NATO Secretary General Claes insisted that:
"The European security architecture is not possible without
Russia... It is not possible to give an answer on the timing
of expansion. 1,386 Nonetheless, the following week Russian
Foreign Minister Kosyrev warned that if NATO expands,
Associated Press. 5 April 1995.
Associated Press. 14 April 1995. Ambassador Hunter said that NATO rules would be applied
strictly to each new member and that each would have to join and contribute to the NATO
integrated military command structure. "An ally is an ally is an ally . . . . You join the Alliance
and you do what allies do... if necessary, countries joining NATO will accept deployment on
their territory of whatever is required for security", he added. Also see Robert Hunter,
"Enlargement: Part of A Strategy for Projecting Stability into Central Europe," NATO Reviev
42:1 (May 1995).
Reuters. 24 April 1995.
Associated Press. 26 April 1995.
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nationalists could devour him and that he would have to
write his memoirs "from the Gulag." 387
At a Moscow meeting between Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin in May 1995 commemorating the 50th anniversary of
the end of World War II, the US was prepared to assure
Russia that it could be a member of NATO and that it would
give written assurances to that effect and on the non-
deployment of nuclear weapons on the new member territory. 3 *
The US worked tirelessly to get Yeltsin to commit fully to
the PFP and attained a promise by Yeltsin to join it and
begin a special NATO-Russia dialogue. On NATO expansion, '
President Clinton said that:
I made it clear that I thought that anything
done with NATO had to meet two criteria. Number
one, it must advance the interests of all the
Partners for Peace, the security interests of all
of them, including Russia. And number two, it
must advance the long-term goal of the United
States which I have articulated from the beginning
of my presidency, of an integrated Europe, which I
believe is very important, and I think Russia
shares both of those objectives.
Assurances by Clinton may not have been enough for the
Russians. As Sergei Karagonov, a Yeltsin advisor, said on
11 May: "You cannot build up a special relationship with
Russia when you are talking about enlargement at the same
time." 390 To this Andrei Androsov, head of the Russian
Izvestia . 27 April 1995. OMRI Daily Digest, 28 April 1995.
Michael Dobbs and R. Jeffrey Smith, "US Offers Assurances on NATO", The Washington Post,
7 May 1995, Al.
Associated Press. 8 May 1995.
Reuters. 11 May 1995.
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Foreign Ministry's NATO Department added: "We need NATO to
change its attitude from expansion to real partnership ... If
the same treatment continues, I fear cooperation will be
affected. " 391
At a 30-31 May NAC ministerial, NATO renewed its
commitment to enlarge and welcomed Russia's decision to
implement an IPP and begin a new NATO/Russia dialogue.
Addressing the NAC Kozyrev insisted that:
Russia's position regarding NATO expansion
has remained unchanged. We continue to believe
that it does not meet either the interests of
Russia's national security or the interest of
European security as a whole. Furthermore, the
hasty resolution of the issue may threaten the
establishment of truly mutually advantageous and
constructive relations between Russia and NATO and
the usefulness of Russia's involvement in the PFP.
It will not create greater stability and security
either... we suggest to ha^t and think rather than
act hastily and blindly.
In a formal letter to the NAC, Kozyrev was more blunt: "A
decision about the enlargement of NATO to the East would
create for Russia the need for a corresponding correction of
its attitude toward the Partnership for Peace." 393 After the
ministerial, NATO officials suggested that following the
completion of the enlargement study the issue would be
placed on a back-burner. "Something like this has to be
Reuters. 11 May 1995.
NATO Office of Information and Press. 31 May 1995.
Associated Press. 30 May 1995. Also on 31 May, Secodnya quoted a high ranking Russian
defense official as saying that: "A set of measures have been approved that should
prevent
NATO expansion. " The report stressed that Russia's decision to join the PFP was conditional
on NATO not expanding. OMR1 Daily Digest, 1 June 1995.
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driven through and there is not much drive in NATO at the
moment", said one NATO official. 394
Some American officials nonetheless sought to continue
momentum toward enlargement. US Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott articulated a broad defense of enlargement on
the basis of NATO's institutional functions." 5 According to
Talbott, candidates for NATO membership should be judged
according to the strength of their democratic institutions
and their ability to meet the obligations of membership.
The process would be transparent, open, and ongoing. NATO
enlargement would promote reform in post -Communist Europe
through respect for democracy and international norms of
behavior and explicit preconditions for membership, so that
enlargement of NATO would be a force for the rule of law
both within Europe's new democracies and among them. 396 The
institution would impact domestic politics within potential
member states who would have full civilian control over the
military by establishing parliamentary oversight over
military affairs, and appoint civilians to senior defense
positions. The policy would promote conflict or dispute
resolution by making convincing progress in resolving
disputes with their neighbors peacefully and show they are
committed to multi-ethnic democracy. Finally, stability
Reuters. 31 May 1995.
Strobe Talbott, "Why NATO Should Grow," The New York Review of Books XLI1:13 (10
August 1995) 27-30.
Talbott 28.
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394
395'
396
would be promoted via the extension of NATO's classic
mission
- as a hedge against a resurgent Russian threat.
The NATO Enlargement Study
In September 1995 NATO completed its enlargement study
explaining the "how" and "why" of enlargement but not the
"who" and "when" or airing potential negative consequences.
NATO viewed the policy as:
1. Encouraging and supporting democratic reforms,
including civilian and democratic control over
the military;
2 . Fostering in new members of the Alliance the
patterns and habits of cooperation,
consultation and consensus building which
characterize relations among current Allies;
3. Promoting good-neighbourly relations, which
would benefit all countries in the Euro-
Atlantic area, both members and non-members of
NATO ;
4. Emphasizing common defense and extending its
benefits and increasing transparency in
defense planning and military budgets, thereby
reducing the likelihood of instability that
might be engendered by an exclusively national
approach to defense policies;
5 . Reinforcing the tendency toward integration
and cooperation in Europe based on shared
democratic values and thereby curbing the
countervailing tendency towards disintegration
along ethnic and territorial lines,-
6. Strengthening the Alliance's ability to
contribute to European and international
security, including through peacekeeping
activities under the responsibility of the
OSCE and peacekeeping operations under the
authority of the UN Security Council as well
as other new missions;
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7. Strengthening and broadening the Trans-Atlantic relationship.
New members must conform to the "purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations, and the safeguarding of
the freedom, common heritage and civilization of all
Alliance members and their people, founded on the principles
of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." 398
According to NATO, enlargement seeks to avoid drawing new
divisions in Europe after the Cold War. In this context,
the enlargement study stressed that: "A stronger NATO-
Russia relationship should form another cornerstone of a
new, inclusive and comprehensive security structure in
Europe ... This further development of the NATO-Russia
relationship, and its possible eventual formalization,
should take place in rough parallel with NATO's own
enlargement, with the goal of further strengthening
stability and security in Europe. 399 NATO-Russia relations
"Study on NATO Enlargement," NATO Office of Information and Press (September 1996) 2.
Study 2. New members will be expected to: conform to basic principles embodied in the
Washington Treaty: democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law; accept NATO as a
community of like-minded nations joined together for collective defense and the preservation of
peace and security, with each nation contributing to the security and defense from which all
member nations benefit; be firmly committed to principles, objectives and undertakings
included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document; commit themselves to good faith
efforts to build consensus within the Alliance on all issues, since consensus is the basis of
Alliance cohesion and decision-making; undertake to participate fully in the Alliance
consultation and decision-making process on political and security issues of concern to the
Alliance; establish a permanent representation at NATO HQ; establish an appropriate national
military representation at SH APE/SACLANT; be prepared to nominate qualified candidates to
serve on the International Staff and in NATO agencies; provide qualified personnel to serve on
the International Military Staff and in the Integrated Military Structure if and as appropriate;
contribute to Alliance budgets, based on budget shares to be agreed; participate, as appropriate,
in the exchange of Allied intelligence which is based entirely on national contributions; apply
NATO security rules and procedures; and accept the Documents which provide the basis for the
existing policies of the Alliance. Study 24-25.
Study 9.
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would reflect Russia's significance in European security and
be based on reciprocity, mutual respect and confidence, and
no "surprise" decisions by either side which could affect
the interests of the other. 400
While acknowledging that there are benefits from
stationing allied troops on a new member's territory, the
study underscored that the redeployment of existing Allied
forces from current locations or pre-positioning of
equipment would be expensive and potentially provocative.
Thus the presence of Allied conventional forces on a new
member territory might take a variety of forms in terms of
exercises, dual basing of air assets, or the prepositioning
of equipment and material. Nonetheless for new members, the
peacetime stationing of other Allied forces on their
territory should neither be a condition of membership nor
foreclosed as an option. New members should be prepared in
principle for such an event but there is no immediate
necessity for allied forces to be stationed on new member
territory. The collective defense principles of Article 5
would be applied to all new members - including nuclear
defense planning and deterrence. However the study also
concludes that: "There is no a priori requirement for the
stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new
members" and that there is no need to change current NATO
posture under existing circumstances. New members would
400
Study 9-10.
218
choose to accept the military consequences of membership not
only in principle, but also in practice if the strategic
environment changes. NATO walked a fine line by assuring
that it would not invite in states solely as consumers of
security while at the same time seeking to allay Russian
fears
.
Toward Enlargement?
Some partner countries welcomed NATO's discussion of
the modalities of enlargement. Poland, however, remained
skeptical and claimed that NATO was buying time with
delaying tactics because of Russian opposition and American
indecisiveness
.
These concerns were heightened by the
formal NAC acceptance of the enlargement study in December
1995 which was coupled with a decision to begin a year long
consideration of the implications of enlargement via
briefings to interested parties and an invitation for
countries to signal their intention to apply for NATO
membership. The best thing that Polish Deputy Foreign
Minister Andrzej Towpik could say about the study was: "I
am happy with this document for three reasons, it is on
time... it is a very substantial document, and it takes the
discussion into a new stage." 401 During the first week of
October 1995, NATO officials confirmed that the Alliance
would put enlargement "on the backburner" until after
Reuters. 28 September 1995.
presidential elections in Russia scheduled for June and July
1996. 2 US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake was
reported to have suggested that NATO be "dull and boring" on
1 ,403enlargement
.
However, by the spring of 1996 the US had made a firm
decision to move NATO toward enlargement. Concerned that
the US was viewed as too deferential to Russia and hoping to
attract votes from Americans of East European descent,
senior US officials indicated that at a NATO heads of state
meeting in early 1997 "two, possibly three, states" would be
invited to initiate negotiations toward joining NATO. 404 The
message to Moscow was firm - NATO will enlarge, it will do
so on its own terms and Russia should take advantage of the
opportunity to build a special NATO-Russia relationship. 405
In March 1996 (newly appointed) Russian Foreign
Minister Yevgenii Primakov suggested that Russia might be
open to a deal on enlargement if new members agreed not to
402
403
404
-
405
For further discussion see "NATO Seen Slowing Down Enlargement Process," Per Spiegel. 21
August 1995.
Interview with a senior European official, October 1995.
Interview with a senior National Security Council official, March 1996. There are some 23
million Americans who trace their heritage to Eastern Europe including over 9 million Poles.
As there are a dozen states where Uiey constitute more than 5 percent of the electorate, talcing a
firm position in favor of NATO enlargement is a no-lose political decision. See Michael Dobbs,
"Enthusiasm for Wider Alliance is Marked by Contradictions," The Washington Post, 7 July
1995, A1,A6.
This view was put forward strongly to the Central and East European aspirants to NATO in a
speech by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Prague in March 1996. Christopher
suggested that a failure by Moscow to take advantage of the special relationship with
NATO
would be similar to the rejection of the Marshall Plan of the late 1940s and that only
Russia
could isolate itself. See Warren Christopher, "A Democratic and Undivided
Europe in Our
Time," Cernin Palace, Prague, Czech Republic, 20 March 1996. US Department of
State,
Office of the Spokesman.
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station nuclear weapons on their territory and if they only
join NATO's political structures without military
integration. Primakov and his staff at the Russian foreign
intelligence services (where he was previously director) had
decided that Moscow's hostile tone opposing NATO enlargement
was accelerating the drive by Central Europeans into the
NATO orbit. Primakov concluded that the best way to slow
enlargement was to make friendly initiatives to the West
knowing that they would be unacceptable to some NATO members
and acceptable to others - thus dividing the Alliance. 406
Russia hoped to take the steam out of the enlargement
process as Western countries entered into more serious
discussions about the consequences and costs of the policy.
This shift in Russian rhetoric regarding NATO
enlargement combined with a Russian effort to lobby
individual NATO members against enlargement rather than
These views were initially drawn out in a report by senior Russian officials in April and May
1995. Their report, titled "Russia and NATO: Thesis of the Council for Foreign and Defense
Policy" was chaired by senior Yeltsin Advisor Sergei Karaganov. The report recommended that
the Russian government not accept NATO enlargement as inevitable and argued that an active
and reasonable policy can enable deferment or even cancellation of NATO's enlargement plans.
The report rejected seeking "compensation for NATO enlargement" as signaling consent. The
study also rejected threats of costly countermeasures to enlargement which would undermine the
Russian economy. The report stressed that supporters of enlargement are a minority in the West
but that they occupy key decision-making posts, and they are the most active group. "As
enlargement becomes a closer perspective, and its economic, military, political and cohesion-
related costs become more obvious, the numbers of opponents of enlargement might grow, with
their opposition getting stronger... This development can be largely prompted by debates in
political and academic circles in NATO countries, first of all in the United States...", the report
advised. Thus the group advised that: "We should not act against the West; instead, we should
help it to avoid making a mistake dangerous for everyone, first of all for the West itself."
Finally, the group advised that Russia should tone down its rhetoric and stress cooperation -
thereby denying the West justification to enlarge the Alliance. Thesis of the Council for
Foreign and Defense Policy," May 1995.
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addressing their opposition directly at NATO. For example,
earlier in the year President Yeltsin appealed several times
by telephone to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to stop the
drive toward enlargement in the run-up to the June
presidential election. Mr. Kohl responded positively to
Yeltsin's appeal by urging NATO to be generally more
sensitive to Russian security concerns at a gathering of
NATO specialists meeting in Munich in February 1996. Kohl's
shift was largely tactical but also showed that Germany was
increasingly worried about the impact the policy was having
on Russia. Nevertheless at the same meeting, US Secretary
of Defense William Perry acknowledged that: "NATO
enlargement is inevitable and if NATO enlargement is a
carrot encouraging reforms, then we cannot keep that carrot
continually out of reach." 407 Endorsing this perspective and
hoping to appeal to voters of East European origins,
President Clinton used his one foreign policy speech of the
1996 general election to commit the US to support NATO
enlargement in 1999. As NATO accelerated toward its planned
announcement of initial candidates for membership in 1997,
NATO undertook serious efforts to decrease Russian
opposition offering a formal NATO/Russia charter. The
charter would reflect an ongoing process of building a
special NATO-Russia relationship and codify a variety of
Comments of Kohl and Perry at the annual Wherkunde meeting of defense specialists, Munich.
Germany, February 1996.
222
institutional mechanisms enhancing a broad range of
consultation (such as institutionalizing the military-to-
military planning and cooperation attained in IFOR) to
provide Russia with a voice, but not a veto, within NATO. 40
The Great Debate: Turning Theory on its Head
Major differences exist between, and within, realist
and institutionalist approaches to understanding NATO
enlargement. Many analysts are skeptical about the
prospects for enlargement. At a conference of senior
international security specialists held at Harvard
University in May 1995, an anonymous vote was reportedly
taken 29-1 opposing NATO enlargement. As one senior State
Department official concedes, enlargement is not popular
among academics and the US and NATO have not done a very
good job of explaining what it is about. 40 " Another
Administration official was more blunt complaining that
"...there is a very adverse trend in the conventional wisdom
on the part of the thoughtful elite." 410 Actually, there are
some unlikely theoretical partnerships of realists and
institutional scholars favoring enlargement and realists and
institutionalists opposed. Many of these analytical
perspectives have had a direct impact on the policy process.
Interview with a senior NATO official, Brassels, Belgium, September 1996.
Interview with a senior State Department official, April 1996.
Reuters. 28 June 1995.
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Realist Arguments in Support of NATO Enlargement
Realists favoring NATO enlargement generally draw from
balance of power analysis which suggests that Europe is more
secure if there is two-power balancing. Moving the Cold War
line farther East will increase security in Europe because
Russia remains a threat to the rest of Europe and it will
lessen the chance that a united Germany will find itself in
security competition with Russia. Realists assert that
Russia may return to its great power status and pursue
traditional imperialist behavior. Thus, according to this
realist perspective, it would be best to enlarge NATO
rapidly while Russia is incapable of mounting a major
preventive response thereby assuring NATO's future as an
anti-Russian alliance. Moreover, expanding NATO to include
a group of willing countries with sizeable military assets
would add to the West's resources (including some 100
million consumers in Central and Eastern Europe)
,
defray
some of the deepening cuts in defense spending among NATO
countries, and open up new arms markets for current NATO
member states
.
Peter Rodman, a former National Security Council staff
member, argues for NATO enlargement in such geostrategic
terms, suggesting that: "The only potential great power
security problem in Central Europe is the lengthening shadow
of Russian strength, and NATO has the job of counter
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balancing it." Henry Kissinger concludes that without
NATO enlargement, Central and Eastern Europe will again
become a vacuum in which German and Russian security
competition will develop. 412 Similarly, Zbigniew Brzezinski
suggests that while NATO enlargement should not be viewed as
hostile toward Russia, it should replace the strategic
vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. 413 Though Kissinger
and Brzezinski put it more diplomatically, their view is
summarized by William Safire as seeing Russia as
"authoritarian at heart and expansionist by habit... The time
to push the protective line eastward is now, while Russia is
weak and preoccupied with its own revival, and not later,
when such a move would be an insufferable provocation to a
superpower." 414 Moreover, as Jonathan Eyal maintains,
delaying enlargement until Moscow does something to warrant
a threat could provoke or escalate crises and thus it is
. 415
preferable to enlarge during a time of peace.
Some realists acknowledge that NATO enlargement will
draw new lines in Europe but that this will be a positive
development . Enlarging NATO to include Poland and the Czech
Peter Rodman, "4 More for NATO," The Washington Post , 31 December 1994. Rodman
suggests that the question is "whether the West is prepared to consolidate the new status quo that
emerged in Central Europe in 1989, the present reality that the Central European and Baltic
democracies are free and independent sovereign states that have opted to associate with the
West." Peter W. Rodman, "Understanding with Moscow," The Washington Post, 16 January
1996, A9.
Kissinger Diplomacy , 823-825.
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe...".
William Safire, "Strategic Dilemma", The New York Times 1 December 1994, A32.
Jonathan Eyal, "Beware of Russians Bearing NATO Gifts," The Wall Street Journal Europe . 19-
20 April 1996, A6.
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Republic in particular would settle the question of the
Eastern frontier of Germany and remove a major historical
reason for German aspirations in the East. As Conor Cruise
O'Brien speculates: "A new wave of national pride - perhaps
early in the new century - might cause Germany to resent its
subordinate position within a NATO perceived as
dominated.
. .by the United States, France, and Britain.
Germany might then withdraw from NATO ... and set up its own
system of alliances in Central Europe." 416 Kissinger adds
that, if the Visegrad states' requests to join NATO are
rejected and the states bordering Germany are refused
protection, "Germany will sooner or later seek to achieve
its security by national efforts, encountering on the way a
Russia pursuing the same policy from its side." 417 Stephen
Pelz maintains that inclusion of the Visegrad countries into
NATO would permanently settle Germany's eastern frontier,
bind Germany in the West, and reassure both the West and
Russia as to its growing economic and political power. Pelz
suggests that this would provide a clear and defensible line
between the West and the disputes to the East with a new
buffer zone comprised of Finland, the Baltics, Belarus and
Ukraine whose security would be respected by Russia and the
West if guaranteed in a treaty.
418 This approach would
Conor Cruise O'Brien. "The Future of 'the West'," The National Interest 30 (Winter
1992/1993) 9.
Kissinger "Expand..."
Stephen Pelz, "Enlarge NATO - Now", draft.
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purposefully draw lines between East and West and recognize
spheres of influence which already exist informally. Such a
"Yalta II" would bring clarity and predictability to
European security.
A similar argument has been suggested by the foreign
policy spokesman of the German Social Democratic Party
Karsten Voigt
.
Voigt believes that, left alone, "...the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe could fall victim
yet again to the rivalries and tensions that have plagued
the region from time immemorial; only through integration
can we ensure that the 'old game' of competing spheres of
influence does not return." 419 Voigt stresses that: "...in
so far as the Germans like happy neighbors, they also think
that the presence of the United States is an insuring
element, a stabilizing component to prevent our neighbors
from perceiving that something might happen ... This is what
you objectively call a stabilizing factor... So it has not
only to do with an outside threat, it's an internal
balancing element inside the European security structure as
, 420
such
.
Realist support for NATO enlargement also draws on
alliance theory. Some Central and East European countries
may naturally want to associate with the winning side in the
Karsten Voigt, "NATO Enlargement: Sustaining the Momentum", NATO Review 2 (1996)
19.
Presentation by Karsten Voight, Social Democratic Party Foreign Policy Spokesman, to the
Congressional Research Service NATO Conference, February 1996.
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Cold War. By joining NATO, they hope to share the benefits
of the West's relative gains - sort of "sharing the spoils
of victory" as Randall L. Schweller puts it. 421 If NATO
rejects their requests for membership, these countries may
engage in destabilizing balancing behavior - by forming
regional alliances, establishing bilateral security
guarantees with countries from within NATO, or pursuing
expensive and provocative self-help national military
buildups
.
422
Realist Arguments Against NATO Enlargement
Some realists point to the absence of balancing
alliances among the Visegrad countries or the Baltics as
evidence that they do not really feel threatened. Looking
at the facts on the ground, these realists point to the
dissolution of the Russian armed forces and their dismal
performance in Chechnya, and the fact that there would be
considerable warning time of a renewed Russian threat to
Central and Eastern Europe. To enlarge NATO in the absence
of a threat may cause renewed security competition among
states not included in NATO or provoke Russia to respond by
reintegrating parts of the former Soviet Union as a
defensive act. Rather than promoting stability, NATO
Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing die Revisionist State Back In,"
International Security 19 (Summer 1994) 79.
Joshua B. Spero and Frank Umbach, "NATO's Security Challenge to the East and the
American-German Geo-Strategic Partnership in Europe," Bericht des BlOst NR. 39/1994, 16-
17.
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enlargement would thus create instability which does not
currently exist. Placed within the context of the rise and
decline of great powers, this relative gain by the West
could prompt hegemonic war in the worst case. Some realists
add that NATO is the wrong institution for consolidating
democracy and with the US reducing its commitments abroad,
the security guarantee would be a false promise of security
for new members. Alternatively, the EU would be better
suited for meeting new security challenges.
Michael Brown stresses that the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe need membership in the EU, and not NATO.
He notes that if the Central and East European countries
were really threatened they would be increasing their
defense capabilities. In reality Poland, the Czech
Republic, and Hungary have been reducing military
conscription and their mechanized and infantry forces. 423
Moreover, despite the suggestion of a "security vacuum" in
Central and Eastern Europe, the German government has urged
NATO to move slow on enlargement and to signal restraint
toward Russia. 424 Brown concludes that NATO should expand in
the event of serious Russian threats toward the West.
Poland, for example, is reducing its conscription time from 18 months to one year while
disbanding entire divisions and reducing the total number of its armed forces. In August 1996
the Czech Minister of Defense proposed a draft plan for a major cut of 10 000 from its existing
60 000 troop levels combined with a costly force modernization program. Two similar plans
which had previously been presented to the Czech Parliament were rejected as being too costly.
Michael Brown, "NATO Expansion: Wait and See," The Washington Post, 26 December 1994,
A29. Also see Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion", Survival 37:
1
(Spring 1995) 34-48.
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However, if NATO enlarges toward Russia's borders in the
absence of a threat, its future will be assured for a long
time as it will have caused a new Cold War. 425 Ironically,
such a development would be good for the new members but
decrease the security of current members.
To Michael Mandelbaum, NATO enlargement represents a
significant shift in the European balance of power likely to
prompt balancing behavior by Russia. Mandelbaum asserts
that Europe already has a functional security regime in the
shape of the CFE (and START) agreement which would be
seriously undermined by enlargement. 426 Mandelbaum notes
that "...the countries under active consideration (Visegrad)
are precisely those best placed to make a successful
transition to democracy and free markets without NATO
membership." 427 Theoretically, if Russia is to be contained
it makes little sense to expand NATO only to the Visegrad
countries and thereby create a buffer-zone open to Russian
interference. If NATO is to be a neo- containment mechanism
then it should include Ukraine and expand right up to
Russia's borders. 428 However, even in this event, Richard K.
Betts warns that: "Under realist norms, the West should
Discussion with Michael Brown. Cambridge, MA, 20 May 1995.
See Michael Mandelbaum, The Dawn of Peace in Europe (New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1996).
Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion," Forei gn
Affairs 74:3 (May 1995) 9-13.
Mandelbaum "Preserving..." 10.
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leave Ukraine to its fate - tragic for the Ukrainians, but
safer for everyone else." 429
John Mearsheimer has reservations about NATO
enlargement based on his assumption that institutions can do
little to promote or cause peace and security. NATO
enlargement clouds a more concrete debate over whether NATO
should be maintained at all. Mearsheimer concludes that
NATO is needed as an insurance policy against a new Russian
threat but that enlargement may bring about that threat in a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Thus not only do institutions not
cause peace, but well-meaning institutionalists are
promoting policies that may decrease security. Mearsheimer
views NATO as provocatively backing Russia, like a wounded
animal, into a corner. 43 ' Moreover, the only real security
guarantee that comes from NATO is the stationing of US
forces (conventional or nuclear) on a members' territory.
Because new members are not likely to get this, enlargement
could encourage new members to exacerbate small crises in
order to get a firmer security guarantee. In this vein,
George Kennan writes that: "...it never pays... for one
great power to take advantage of the momentary weakness or
distraction of another great power in order to force upon it
concessions it would never would have accepted in normal
circumstances .. .Over the long run, it almost always revenges
Richard K. Betts, in Snyder and Jervis 278.
Discussion with John Mearsheimer. Cambridge, MA, 20 May 1995.
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itself." To Kennan NATO enlargement is "...in the highest
degree deplorable." 431
Former National Security Council official Philip
Zelikow suggests that NATO enlargement can do little to
promote reform or resolve interstate conflicts because NATO
is a state dominated institution and merely a tool of the
member states. Zelikow suggests that "...NATO membership
for Poland seems to confer few tangible benefits to Poland
or to current NATO members that cannot be achieved through
the Partnership for Peace." 432 "Citing other analogies, such
as 'NATO membership helped stabilize democracy and stem
authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece and
Turkey', neither elaborates a chain of logic or applies that
reasoning to, say, Poland or Hungary", Zelikow maintains. 433
Similarly, Fred Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense in
the Reagan Administration, notes that for five years before
joining NATO, Greece and Turkey received considerable
American economic assistance which aided their transition
and that no such expenditure is likely to be forthcoming in
the East. He also notes that if: "Slovakia is a vacuum,
George Kennan, At Century's Ending: Reflections. 1982-1995 (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1996) 330.
Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions," Survival 38:1 (Spring 1996) 14.
Zelikow 15. Similarly, Owen Harries, stresses that even the idea that a "western" community
can be expanded is based on a false premise. Arguing that the "West's" identity was based
largely on a threat from the East, the cohesiveness of the West will disintegrate after the Cold
War. Owen Harries, "The Collapse of the West," Foreign Affairs 72:4 (September/October
1993) 41-53.
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why not Slovenia; if Slovenia, why not Macedonia, Moldova
or Belarus?" 434
Charles L
.
Glaser stresses national interest in
security cooperation and maintains that NATO has an
important role to play in the future of Europe as currently
constituted. Glaser asserts that NATO remains the best
mechanism for dealing with three major challenges to
contemporary European security: resurgent Russia, war in
the East, and improbable conflict in the Western community
and that there remains a strong case for realigning NATO -
not as an expanded collective security mechanism, but rather
as a low-cost insurance policy. 435 The continued American
military presence in Germany should decrease any German
desire to attain nuclear weapons. However, the same policy
will not necessarily be duplicated for countries such as
Ukraine. Thus Glaser makes a case for revamping NATO rather
than making it an expanded system of collective security.
Fred Ikle, "How to Ruin NATO," The New York Times . 11 January 1995, A21. Ikle has also
co-chaired a commission with Sergei Karagonov, an advisor to President Yeltsin, that included a
number of senior American and Russian national security specialists. They conclude that the US
and Russia share common security interests and that their policies should be harmonized. "Any
eastward expansion of NATO that would exclude Russia would be detrimental to the
harmonization of US and Russian defense policies," the study concludes. Fred C. Ikle and
Sergei A. Karagonov (Co-Chairman), Harmonizing the Evolution of US and Russian Defense
Policies (Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1993). Members of the
study group included Alexei Arbatov, General John R. Garvin, Catherine Kelleher, Benjamin S.
Lambeth, General Edward Meyer, Nikolai V. Mikhailov, Serge Rogov, John D. Steinbruner.
Dmitri Trenin, and Paul D. Wolfowitz.
Charles L. Glaser, "Future Security Arrangements for Europe: Why NATO is Still Best," in
George W. Downs, ed.. Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: The University
of Michigan Press, 1994).
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These theoretical concerns entered the US policy debate
in the summer of 1995 when US Senator Sam Nunn announced
strong opposition to NATO enlargement. Nunn suggested that
no one had explained the "...why, or at least why now" of
enlargement
.
Nunn argued that NATO enlargement would
undermine reformers in Moscow and, because of Russia's
conventional weakness, Russia would be forced to respond by
deploying nuclear weapons - thereby undermining security for
all Europeans. Nunn was concerned that enlargement was
creating the worst possible scenario of decreasing military
capabilities and increased political commitments. The
senator charged that the policy was promoting a false
promise similar to that offered by the League of Nations
before World War II. According to Nunn:
NATO is fundamentally a military alliance.
If you denigrate the military side of it, then it
becomes a political and psychological alliance,
which is something very dif f erent . . . The last thing
we need is a repeat of what happened before World
War II, when commitments were made that were not
backed up by3gmilitary capabilities andintentions
.
Nunn suggests that enlargement should be dependent upon a
country first qualifying for EU membership and that it be
linked to Russian behavior. If Russia were to make
aggressive moves against other states, violate arms control
accords, or if democracy should collapse then NATO should
enlarge
.
Senator Sam Nunn, "The Future of NATO in an Uncertain World," Speech to the SACLANT
Seminar 95. 22 June 1995, Norfolk, VA.
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Inst i tut ionalist Arguments in Support of NATO Enlargement
Institutionalists supporting NATO enlargement generally
maintain that the goal is to promote a united Europe and
expand a zone of democracy, stability, and peace. As NATO
Secretary General Javier Solana suggests:
. . .what we are expanding is a European,
indeed Atlantic, civic space. I deliberately
include our military arrangements into this
definition of "civic space" . The postwar
experience in Western Europe suggests that
political and economic progress and security
integration are closely linked. Once their
security is taken care of, countries can devote
themselves with more confidence to their longer-
term evolution. And a responsible military,
firmly embedded in our democratic societies and
under civil control, is part and parcel of that
civic space, as are military structures th^t, are
transparent, defensive, and multinational.
Some institutionalists particularly feel that, once in NATO,
new members will not nationalize defense policies in the
pursuit of self-help because they will attain an important
psychological reassurance. William E. Odom argues that the
best argument for NATO's expansion:
...is found in its inception-. the concern of
its proponents with internal political and
economic affairs in Western Europe. While their
national motives were at odds - Germany seeking
early independence, France seeking to prevent a
new German military threat - leaders in both
countries realized that a US military presence
within an Atlantic alliance structure would create
the security and political context for economic
recovery and the building of new international
relations. To play its role the United States had
not only to be a military hegemon; it also had to
bring its political ideology to Europe. A purely
realist
4
American approach to NATO would have
failed
.
Javier Solana, "Speech by the Secretary General at the North Atlantic Assembly Meeting,"
Athens, 20 May 1996. NATO Office of Information and Press.
William E. Odom, "NATO's Expansion: Why the Critics are Wrong," The National Interest
(Spring 1995) 45.
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Ron Asmus, Richard Kuglar, and F. Stephen Larrabbee addthat
:
East
-Central Europe's democrats well
understand that democracy will succeed only iftheir states belong to a secure European andWestern political, economic, and military
community. The West, too previously understood
this link - as demonstrated with the case of WestGermany. That nation might never have become a
stable Western democracy had it not been acceptedinto NATO's fold. Similarly, NATO membershiphelped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian
backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece and
Turkey
.
Among the advocates of NATO enlargement, this trio of RAND
analysts (Asmus, Kuglar, and Larrabbee) have had
considerable influence on US policy.
Jamie P. Shea suggests that NATO enlargement should
come before EU membership for the Visegrad countries based
on NATO's founding principles which created "...a climate of
confidence and stability which allowed governments not to
overspend on weapons or to shut themselves off from their
neighbors, but to use their scarce resources for
infrastructure renewal, for education, and for social
reform." 440 Though NATO may incorporate instability by
enlarging, Shea maintains that it faces a dilemma of either
taking in these countries or dealing with them from the
outside. One way or another these crisis will affect NATO
and are more easily managed within the institution. Thus
Shea argues: "...if one is not actively spreading security,
one is increasing one's own vulnerability to
Asmus (et al) 30.
Jamie P. Shea, "Enlarging NATO Eastward?", in Marco Carnovale, ed., European Security and
International Institutions after the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) 86.
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insecurity.
. .The situation cannot be frozen in a timeless
most important guarantee granted in NATO is reassurance and
that NATO has always been:
...seen as providing political reassurance,
and if push came to shove, the Americans wouldprovide air support and logistics. It was theKorean War which produced US ground troops in
Western Europe, not the Washington Treaty. NATO's
security guarantee has always been much more aquestion of day-to-day cooperation, joint
exercises, and military integration than ofbinding obligations. The credible guarantee hasbeen the practice of 'doing' security together,
not the legal document.
For addressing Russia and Ukraine, Shea stresses the
importance of the PFP where "...facile notions like a
'security vacuum' only disguise the large-scale military
cooperation that is already taking place and that will give
Central and East European countries special consultative
rights vis-a-vis NATO through the PFP... This will convey a
special responsibility, if not a binding security
guarantee ... This is no minor privilege." 443
Some analysts conclude that the solution to potential
security competition caused by one institution (NATO) can be
offset by another institution (OSCE or EU) . The dual-track
strategy of strengthening the OSCE and institutionalizing a
special relationship between NATO and Russia is a case in
point. 444 In January 1997, Ron Asmus circulated a paper
balance of calculable forces. 441 Shea stresses that the
441
Shea 87.
Shea 88.
Shea 94-95.
See Sean Kay, "NATO and the CSCE: A Partnership for the Future," Paradigms: The Kent
Journal of International Relations 7:2 (Winter 1993) 59-77.
442
443
444
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among senior officials in the three Baltic countries
advancing a multi
- institutional solution to the inevitable
sense of loss and insecurity that will result from the
Baltic states being left out of NATO. 445 Resolving this
issue would be central to NATO enlargement for as Asmus
writes: "If mishandled, the Baltic issue has the potential
to develop into the proverbial train wreck which could
potentially derail NATO enlargement as well as poison the
West's relations with Russia." 446 Asmus notes that, rightly
or wrongly, many in the West do not see the Baltic states as
an area of vital strategic interest; moving NATO into the
Baltics would be completely unacceptable to Moscow; there
are problems involving Russian minorities in some Baltic
countries; the Baltics are largely indefensible in the
absence of a credible deterrent; and the Russian enclave of
Kaliningrad being encircled would further add to Russia's
heightened concerns over enlargement. As a senior Danish
official, who is a firm supporter of NATO enlargement to
include the Baltic countries, insists-. "...it is of
paramount importance that NATO enlargement does not decrease
the security of the Baltic states."
447
Asmus proposed that a multi-institutional strategy
could resolve the Baltic security dilemma. First, the three
Also see Hans Beniiendijk and Jeffrey Simon, "Baltic Security and NATO Enlargement".
Strategic Forum 57 (December 1995) 1-4.
Ron Asmus, "NATO Enlargement: An Alliance Strategy for the Baltic States," January 1996.
Personal correspondence from a senior Danish defense official, 1 1 May 1996.
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Baltic countries should institutionalize defense cooperation
among themselves. Second, involvement of the Nordic
countries aiding and assisting Baltic hard and soft security
via a wide range of cooperative programs should increase.
The third (and central) pillar of the strategy would be
coordination of NATO and EU enlargement policies so that
"...the EU flag would go up in Estonia at the same time that
the NATO flag goes up in Warsaw." 448 Fourth, the process of
NATO enlargement should be clearly open-ended. Finally,
further institutional efforts should be made to modify
Moscow's concerns over NATO enlargement by including Russia
in the emerging web of institutional security cooperation
wherever possible and that the West should look for ways to
encourage constructive Russian-Baltic security interaction.
Because the Asmus draft advocated an "Estonia first" policy,
the proposal actually had the adverse effect of decreasing
Baltic cooperation as competition and jealously resulted in
Latvia and Lithuania. More problematic, the proposal was
viewed by some senior Baltic officials as trying to deal
with the Baltic problem at the expense of their prospects
for joining NATO. As a result, all three Baltic countries
jointly and specifically rejected the Asmus proposal. 449
Asmus 13. Asmus maintains that of the three Baltic countries, Estonia is the most qualified for
EU membership.
Personal correspondence from a senior Estonian official at the Estonian Ministry of Defense,
March 1996. For further discussion see Einar Rull, "Russia Speeds Up NATO," The Baltic
Times 28 March - 3 April 1996, 21.
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Some advocates of NATO enlargement maintain that
membership should come before linkage policies promoting
reform. For example, Jeffrey Simon maintains that setting
the criteria for civil -military relations too high may be an
obstacle that is impossible to overcome. Effective civilian
control over the armed forces includes constitutional
provisions for a clearly-defined division of authority
between the president and government over the running of the
military in both peace and war. Civilian control requires
parliamentary oversight of the military via effective
control over the defense budget with a civilian defense
ministry in control over the general staff and military
commanders, and a general restoration of the prestige of
post -Communist militaries. If NATO was to require all of
these as pre- requisites for membership, the Visegrad
countries would not qualify. Subsequently they would not be
rewarded for the considerable steps they have made since
1989. 450
Nevertheless, some observers see value in the process
of promoting enlargement itself. Adrian Karatnycky suggests
that the diplomacy of NATO enlargement has had a positive
impact on Russian behavior by focusing Moscow on its
relations with the West and constraining its capacity to do
Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion (Washington
DC: National Defense University Press, 1995) and Jeffrey Simon, NATO Enlargement and
Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations (Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 1996).
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damage in its near abroad. Karatnycky notes that after NATO
deferred enlargement in 1994, "Russia proceeded with a
barrage of aggressive behavior in neighboring republics,
threatened Ukraine with economic blackmail, acted as a bully
at international forums, wooed Iran and Iraq, tried to
topple Azerbaijan's president and launched a war against
Chechnya." 451 If properly and carefully implemented in ways
that reassure the Russian public", Karatnycky writes, "the
process of NATO's eastward expansion can have a salutary
effect on Russia's fundamental internal debate over its
foreign and defense policies.
Some observers are sympathetic to the "democratic
peace" theory which posits that democracies do not go to war
with each other and thus spreading the zone of democracy in
Europe is in NATO's interest. 452 For example, Harlan
Cleveland suggests that NATO should be use to facilitate the
creation of an informal "Club of Democracies." 4 Allen Sens
maintains that the West's own principles are at stake and
enlargement would: "...stand as a testament to the strength
of Western commitment to its own principles ... To refuse to
extend NATO membership to peaceful, democratic countries
Adrian Karatnycky, "Open Up the Club," The Washington Post , 7 July 1995, A21.
See Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1993) and "Bruce Russett, "Can a Democratic Peace Be
Built?" International Interactions 18:3 (Spring 1993) 277-282, and Kim Edward Spiezio.
Bevond Containment: Reconstructing European Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner
Publishers, 1995).
Harlan Cleveland, Birth of A New World: An Open Moment tor International Leadership (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 1993) 204-220.
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asking for admittance, especially when such membership has
been openly suggested by Alliance leaders, would be an
affront to those principles." 454
Some supporters of NATO enlargement back its
transformation into a collective security institution like
the League of Nations. In this context, NATO should enlarge
quickly and include Russia. Formally the US has pursued
this option as a carrot toward Russia knowing well that
Russian membership in NATO is not an option. However,
former CIA director William Colby chaired a panel arguing
for rapid expansion of NATO to include Russia on the premise
of collective security. 455 Other observers sympathetic to
collective security see NATO stopping short of Russian
membership but support an expansion of its internal
collective security functions. This perspective claims that
NATO does impact Greek-Turkish relations and this can be
duplicated by expanding NATO to include countries where
there are similar tensions such as Hungary and Romania. In
August 1996 Hungary and Romania successfully completed a
treaty (signed on 15 September 1996) that would lower
bilateral tensions over Transylvania which had been an
increasing source of distrust between the two countries,
because of the sizeable Hungarian minority population in the
Allen G. Sens, "Saying Yes to Expansion: The Future of NATO and Canadian Interests in a
Changing Alliance," International Journal L (Autumn 1995) 684.
Also see Coral Bell, "Why an Expanded NATO Must Include Russia," Journal of Strategic
Studies 17 (December 1994) 27-41.
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region. Because NATO had identified a need for a settlement
of outstanding regional disputes for entrance into the
Alliance, four years of delay over the treaty had begun
hindering both countries' prospects for NATO membership by
1996. The pressure from American and NATO representatives
on these two countries linking their cooperation with
membership in NATO did have a positive impact moving them
toward the treaty. However, US Ambassador to NATO Robert
Hunter may have overstated its importance when he proclaimed
in Budapest on 28 August that: "It is now impossible for
Hungary and Romania to go to war." 456
Finally, some analysts conclude that NATO enlargement
is necessary given that NATO has committed to it. After its
leaders having said repeatedly that NATO will enlarge,
failure would damage NATO's credibility. Thus NATO should
proceed with a limited enlargement that would do the least
harm - perhaps limited to the Czech Republic and Poland
while keeping the option open to enlargement in the
future. 457 Others argue that perhaps NATO should enlarge
politically but not militarily. Using Denmark and Norway,
or France and Spain as a model, NATO could bring in new
members without provocative military deployments or
integration into the NATO military command structures.
458
Reuters. 28 August 1996.
See James W. Morrison, NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Arrangements
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995) and Kay "American Strategies..."
See Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO Enlargement: Historical Aspects", in Jeffrey Simon, ed.,
NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options (Washington, DC: National Defense University,
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Institutional
i
st Arguments Against NATO Enlargement
Though some inst itut ionalists see value in maintaining
NATO after the Cold War, many are opposed to NATO
enlargement. Making NATO function in the absence of a
threat is difficult enough - enlarging NATO could weaken
consensus and decision-making in the institution. If it
took 16 NATO members over three years to agree to intervene
substantially in Bosnia, then it makes little sense to
enlarge soon. Moreover, a public debate over the costs of
enlargement could damage NATO as an institution. Others
suggest that because NATO emphasizes military issues, the
quest for membership is distracting aspirants from advancing
economic reform. Forced to increase their defense budgets
to become compatible with NATO standards, these countries
will have to divert resources from precious social programs
already being cut. In this view, if NATO is to expand to
include countries that are full democracies, then how will
it decide when a stable or a market economy is flourishing
and is NATO the best institution to make that sort of
judgement? Also, how will NATO reconcile leaving some
countries that meet its standards out of enlargement because
of strategic concerns vis-a-vis Russia? Faced with this
sort of institutional dilemma, the EU, the OSCE, or the PFP
would best promote security for post-Cold War Europe.
1995) 21-42 and Condalezza Rice, "Now, NATO Should Grow," The New York Times, 8 July
1996, A23.
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Additionally, historical analogies which see NATO as the
primary source of stability in Europe tend to forget that,
at its origins, NATO came complementary to a massive
infusion of US economic aid via the Marshall Plan. As
neither the US or its European allies are prepared to
accompany enlargement with this kind of economic assistance,
sole reliance on NATO may offer a false promise artificially
raising expectations of what it can actually do for new
members
.
Some institutionalists assert that NATO and Europe
should have more urgent priorities than enlargement. As
former EU chief Jacques Delors has complained, the US was
"overhasty" in pushing for NATO enlargement which is "a
premature initiative which was badly timed." 459 Karl-Heinz
Kamp summarizes this dilemma for NATO: ". . .what is not
needed now is a revived debate on a rapid expansion of NATO
to the East, or even specific timetables for the admission
of particular Central and Eastern European countries ... This
would put unhealthy pressure on an alliance still in the
process of adjusting to new realities, and it would raise
expectations in Eastern Europe that the West cannot
realistically meet." 460 NATO enlargement may be a relative
gain for the West and an irresistible temptation.
Rick Atkinson and John Pomfret, "East Looks to NATO to Forge Links to West," Ik
Washington Post . 6 July 1995, A 1,1 6.
Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995)
116-129.
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Nonetheless, gains often have costs which may be to the
detriment of the institution.
Charles A. Kupchan asserts that enlargement would
destroy consensus and turn NATO into a talk shop while
drawing new dividing lines. 461 Kupchan agrees that NATO was
an important institution promoting internal collective
security during the Cold War. However, he is skeptical as
to whether this can be duplicated in the absence of a
threat. 462 Making NATO too large would destroy any ability
of the Alliance to attain consensus in dealing with security
challenges as disparate interests would collide among the
member states. This position is supported by former Deputy
Undersecretary of State Arnold L. Horelick. Testifying
before the US Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
Europe in April 1995, he asserted that enlargement without
first reconceptualizing the nature of the Alliance "displays
the same kind of logic that leads a couple in a deeply
troubled marriage to forgo marital therapy and have a new
baby instead." 463 Horelick was especially concerned than an
expanded NATO would make institutional "governance matters
Charles A. Kupchan, "Expand NATO - And Split Europe," The New York Times. 27
November 1994, Ell.
Kupchan describes NATO enlargement as a train wreck waiting to happen. Either it wdl not
proceed thus damaging the hopes of Central and East European and also NATO itself, or it will
go forward and auain divide Europe.
Testimony of former Deputy Undersecretary of State Arnold Horelick before the Senate
Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Europe, 25 April 1995.
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worse" and thus it would be difficult to respond to
challenges in a larger NATO. 464
As an alternative to NATO enlargement, Kupchan calls
for the creation of an "Atlantic Union" that would subsume
the EU and NATO. The Atlantic Union would replace NATO's
emphasis on territorial defense with a broad mandate to
preserve peace in the Atlantic area via collective security.
Such a move would not be based on an ant i -Russian premise
nor would it ask electorates in the West to extend new
defense commitments. Kupchan writes that:
The elimination of NATO's Article V guarantee
would weaken the alliance's deterrent power, but
as along as Russia continues to pose no danger to
Western or Central Europe, the tradeoff makes
sense. Western Europe enjoys a deep and stable
peace that would not be shaken by a more relaxed
American commitment, especially if US troops stay
put on the continent. Indeed, although officials
on both sides of the Atlantic are reluctant to
admit it, the absence of a common threat has
already eroded the credibility of Article V. By
explicitly recognizing this change and seeking to
include Russia m a new Europe, the Atlantic Union
promises to make a pan-European community of
democracies a reality, not just rhetoric to
placate Moscow as Poland enters a NATO that_65
everyone knows will never go further East.
Kupchan concludes that: "By sacrificing depth for breadth,
the Atlantic Union promises to lock-in the most profound
transformation of our century; the creation of a community
of North Atlantic democracies among which war has become
unthinkable . " 466
Horelick Testimony.
Charles A. Kupchan, "A More Perfect Atlantic Union". The Washington Post. 18 April 1996,
A25; and Charles A. Kupchan, "Reviving the West: For an Atlantic Union," Foreign
Affairs
75:3 (May/June 1996) 92-104.
Kupchan "A More Perfect..."
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The Atlantic Union proposal did not gain serious
support in US elite academic or governmental circles.
However, Charles and Clifford A. Kupchan's arguments in
favor of a new Concert of Europe have. Kupchan and Kupchan
assert that as a military alliance, NATO's functional
utility is limited after the Cold War and that a new form of
collective security based on the Concert of Europe should
form the basis of a European security order. 467 In this
view, NATO would aid in a period of transition but would not
be the dominant institution in the new order. Though the
Kupchans have not specified it, the 5 Power Contact Group
consisting of the US, the United Kingdom, Germany, France,
and Russia meeting to promote peace in Bosnia represents
such an informal concert arrangement
.
Some institut ionalists who oppose enlargement question
the impact on economic and political reform in potential new
members. If NATO membership is a carrot promoting reform,
what incentive will new members have to continue reform once
in NATO? Also, by emphasizing the need to move toward NATO
military standards and NATO integrated command structures,
the wrong aspects of reform may become prioritized in some
Central and East European countries. Instead of working
toward currency reform, for example, a state might be
tempted to purchase expensive F-16 fighter planes to show
Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of
Europe," International Security 16:1 (Summer 1991) 114-161.
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their commitment to NATO. Indeed, in 1996 the Czech
Republic sought to purchase six F-16s from the US in order
to enhance its quest for NATO membership. At a cost of $25
million per airplane, six F-16s would take up one fifth of
the entire Czech defense budget. If the Czech Republic were
to actually replace its out-dated Soviet made Mig-21s, it
would require 24, not 6 fighters. Clinton Administration
officials responded by privately urging Czech officials to
dramatically increase defense spending.
Finally, enlargement may enhance political and economic
reform in a new NATO member but hinder it in a state left
out. For example, a reform politician having strongly
advocated NATO membership as the primary foreign policy
objective could be punished by voters for not fulfilling a
promise. Also a state like Romania, which has done nearly
everything that has been asked of it, could be left out of
NATO because of its history and geographic location - even
after having reduced tensions with Hungary. Inclusion of
Hungary absent Romania, could push Romania into a defensive
arms race out of their historical fear of Hungary and the
issue of Hungarian minorities living in Transylvania. Any
arms race in Romania would come at the expense of economic
reform there. In Russia, the most liberal and pro-Western
of Russian thinkers are bewildered at the policy which they
view as playing directly into the hands of nationalist and
anti-democratic forces in Russia.
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Analysis
NATO enlargement remains a work in progress. For the
project to succeed, NATO will have to adapt its
institutional form so that it does not decrease the security
of current, new, or non-members. No matter how it is
packaged, enlargement moves the military responsibility of
the US and Germany - Moscow's two twentieth century enemies
- closer to Russia's borders. Though not intended as such,
enlargement challenges Russia's pride, serves as a bruising
reminder that Moscow was on the losing side of the Cold War,
and leaves even moderate Russians feeling that they are
being punished for the sins of their Soviet forefathers. If
enlargement proceeds in a way that appears threatening to
Russia, it is not unreasonable to expect that Moscow might
redeploy dilapidated nuclear forces with weakened command
and control capabilities targeted at new NATO members and,
possibly, current members. Additionally, Russia may take
steps to de-stabilize states on its Western periphery in an
effort to create a new anti-NATO alliance including Belarus,
Ukraine and the Baltic countries if the threat is perceived
as high enough. In sum, if handled poorly, NATO enlargement
risks decreasing security for nearly everyone involved.
NATO enlargement could damage the transatlantic
relationship on which European security is currently
dependent. Specifically, the US Senate may balk at the
costs and the increased security commitments to regions that
have never been considered vital to US national security.
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Even the low end estimates of enlargement costs are
extremely high. The RAND Corporation forecasts costs
between 20-110 billion dollars and the US Congressional
Budget Office between 61-125 billion dollars of which the US
would be required to pay 5-19 billion. The wide range in
estimates reflects variations in institutional form
involving new NATO members. For example, the RAND estimates
assess three military scenarios for NATO enlargement to
include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. A limited
military enlargement based on existing self-defense support
in the new members would cost $20 billion dollars of which
55 percent would be paid by new members, 33 percent by all
of NATO, and 12 percent by the key members (US, Germany,
Britain, and France) . A strategy that would help prepare
new members for joint power projection (such as IFOR) would
cost $42 billion of which 25 percent would be paid by new
members, 2 5 percent by full NATO, and 5 0 percent by the key
members. Finally, a full forward presence based on a
containment model would cost $110 billion of which 20
percent would be paid by new members, 25 percent by full
NATO, and 55 percent by the key members.
468
The US Congress will inevitably wonder why it should be
spending money to protect countries that are not threatened
while they are cutting US domestic spending. Many observers
468
Carla Anne Robbins, "Devil is in Details of NATO Expansion: Cost Questions Cloud Plans to
Add Three New Members." The Wall Street Journal . 9 August, 1996.
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of the Congress point out that the Republican Contract with
America supported NATO enlargement as did legislation
introduced in the House of Representatives and by
presidential candidate Senator Robert Dole. However, there
was no substantial debate over the legislation. While
voting non-binding legislation to enlarge NATO, Congress
passed formal legislation cutting the routine US payment for
NATO infrastructure from 229 million to 86 million dollars
in 1995. Before departing the Senate to run for president,
Bob Dole proposed a fund of 61 million dollars to aid the
Visegrad countries in their efforts to join NATO. Given the
estimated costs of enlargement, Dole's initiative was not a
serious gesture. 469 A supporter of the Dole proposal,
Congressman Benjamin Gilman (Chairman of the House
International Relations Committee) , was clearly playing
election-year politics when he said that there was "...no
excuse for the unending delay that the Clinton
Administration orchestrated in expanding NATO." 470 Actually
It was especially unclear where the money for the Dole initiative would come from. The 1997
State Department budget request included $60 million Foreign Military Financing for the U.S.
government's Warsaw Initiative grant program which aids Central and Eastern European
countries for their participation in the PFP. A separate State Department program provides $7.8
million in loan subsidies to finance up to 72.5 million in loans to qualifying countries. Philip
Finnegan and Theresa Hitchens, "U.S. Budget Battle Brews Over Aid to Turkey, Greece,"
Defense News , 1 April 1996. Given the desire in Congress to cut State Department funding, it
was unlikely that new money would be made available for the Dole initiative but rather
redirected from other programs. As the 60 million for PFP programs appeared a likely
candidate, the Dole initiative potentially risked drawing its own lines in Europe by diverting
money away from countries most needing funding for their PFP activities and wealthier
countries already in line for the first wave of NATO membership. More likely, nothing would
really change at all as the PFP money already available might simply be renamed and remain
available to all PFP countries.
Reuters. 4 June 1996.
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the congressional action was dangerous to the candidate
states, promoting a false promise that could lure them to
believe that there would be automatic Senate approval for
enlargement. Some NATO officials hope that when the time
for ratification of NATO enlargement comes, the US Senate
will go first as it would pave the way for the remaining
parliaments. Thus, the US is in need of leadership and
education in a Congress that is increasingly losing its
institutional memory and reducing US commitments abroad.
NATO enlargement needed a Vandenberg- style resolution in
advance of negotiations on treaty accession - and yet the
person sitting in Vandenberg' s chair in 1996 was the most
virulent isolationist in the US Senate, Jessie Helms. 471
American public opinion is also a constraint on NATO
enlargement. According to a study by the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, 24 percent of the US public support NATO
membership for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary.
However, when the issue of sending troops to resist a
Russian invasion of Poland is raised, 50 percent of the
public is opposed and only 32 percent in favor.
47
" If
Americans are not willing to equate Warsaw with Wichita,
Prague with Pittsburgh, or Budapest with Boston, then NATO
cannot afford the loss of credibility that would come in the
For a moderate example of Helm's views of international institutions see Jesse Helms.
"Saving
the U.N." Foreign Affairs 75:5 (September/October 1996) 2-7.
John E. Rielly, "The Public Mood at Mid-Decade", Foreign Policy 98 (Spring 1995) 89.
253
event of some (unlikely) attack on Poland or any other new
member
.
The third major problem with NATO enlargement is that,
while increasing stability is the formal goal of the policy,
the most likely new members are candidates primarily because
they are stable and are not threatened. However, the Baltic
countries are potentially unstable and threatened. NATO
enlargement that does not include the Baltic countries - as
it will not - will consign them to a grey area of Russian
influence, possibly prompt serious Russian violations of the
CFE treaty, and in a worst-case lead to overt or covert
action against Baltic sovereignty with Russia drawing a new
Cold War line at the Polish/Lithuanian border. 473 When
Ukraine and Kaliningrad are added to the geostrategic
setting, NATO could face a potentially explosive situation
in the region. Only NATO troops or nuclear weapons
stationed in the Baltic territories would provide for
credible Baltic defense and that is highly unlikely. In
this context, it is reasonable to question whether such
potential instability right at Polish borders - which
currently does not exist - would be in Warsaw's interests or
that of any other NATO member.
This possibility has raised serious concerns in Finland and Sweden who have both questioned
how NATO enlargement increases security in the Baltic region. Not comfortably assured, both
countries have indicated that for their part, they do not want NATO membership but rather will
continue to work within the PFP.
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On 14 May 1996 Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev
warned that (Poland and Lithuania's) "...early entry into
NATO would create definite difficulties for Russia in
relation to the Kaliningrad region.
. .We would not want to be
cut off from the special defensive district of Kaliningrad
by NATO states," Grachev said. 474 In response, Russia might
create defensive alliances with its former Soviet allies and
could not rule out preemptive military action by its armed
forces against states determined to join NATO. 475 The same
day that Grachev spoke, a Polish public opinion poll showed
that 47 percent of Poles believed that an alliance between
Russia and Belarus was a danger to their country's
interests. Because the causal linkage accelerating Russian-
Byelorussian strategic cooperation was Poland's quest for
NATO membership, there appeared be a serious conflict
between what Poland wanted from NATO and the security and
stability that it thought it was getting.
In sum, there are many legitimate reasons to have
serious concern about the potential impact of NATO
enlargement as both realists and institutionalists opposed
to enlargement warn. Nevertheless, a strong case for
enlarging NATO to include Poland and the Czech Republic
combined with an intensive institutional adaptation can be
made. Drawing from realism, NATO enlargement would enhance
Reuters. 14 May 1996.
Nezavisimava Gazeta , 1 1 April 1996. 0MR1 Daily Report, 12 April 1996.
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NATO's traditional mission by keeping the Americans in, the
Germans constrained, and the Russians out by permanently
settling the border between Germany and its Eastern
neighbors. Limited NATO enlargement can promote reassurance
in an area where uncertainty has led to catastrophic war
repeatedly in European history - not as a hedge against a
Russian threat, but rather, a hedge between Russia and
Germany
.
4
"" The risks are extremely high in implementing
this strategy. Therefore NATO's institutional form will
have to be adapted considerably to ensure Russia that
enlargement is not a threat to it and so that those
countries left out of NATO are not destabilized in the
process
.
Tasks
The primary institutional task of NATO enlargement will
be to promote reassurance for Russia and those countries
left out of NATO. Reassurance can come in three ways.
First, NATO and Russia can complete a charter specifying a
new consultative arrangement opening a wide array of
institutionalized NATO-Russia cooperation building on the
positive experience of Russia's involvement in IFOR and
stressing areas of shared interests. Second, NATO should
leave enlargement open in principle but stop for a long
A look at the map suggests that including Hungary and Slovenia in this arrangement woulc
contribute to this geostrategic foundation of NATO enlargement. However, under current
circumstances, there is no need for haste in including these countries.
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pause of five to ten years before additional members are
admitted. If there is to be a "second wave" of enlargement
to give aspirants a reason to continue to cooperate with
NATO (eg by contributing to peacekeeping) invitations should
be limited to small countries not bordering the former
Soviet Union such as Slovenia or even non- traditionally
neutral countries like Ireland or Austria. Third, NATO
should be very cautious, and as transparent as possible, in
how it expands its infrastructure in these countries. The
primary focus of NATO activity for new members should be
training for non- traditional challenges such as
peacekeeping. Nuclear deployments and stationing of foreign
troops should be explicitly ruled out unless defensive needs
mandate such activity. Fourth, and most importantly, NATO
must dramatically redesign its internal functions so that it
is clear to Russia (and to the US Congress) that the
Alliance has truly adapted to the post-Cold War security
environment
.
Organizational Capabilities
NATO's basic organizational capabilities need not
change with regard to its new members except to the extent
that headquarters installations will be required. NATO will
remain a highly formal organization with low institutional
autonomy. NATO's evolved rules for membership should remain
conditionally open with one caveat. The new members must
agree that they will not block further NATO expansion. In
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this sense, new members will have an interim period in which
they will not share fully in the decisions with regard to
further enlargement as a condition of their own joining.
Though NATO may never enlarge again, or only do so in a
limited way, this option keeps the perspective towards
membership open for aspirant countries.
Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures
Expanding democracy and promoting economic reform
should be decoupled from NATO enlargement per se . NATO does
not have a credible history in this area aside from Spain
and there is no evidence that the Spanish experience is
especially relevant to that of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. Likewise, NATO should not promise to
resolve all conflicts among new members though it can and
should continue to promote consultation and the peaceful
settlement of disputes when possible. Linking NATO too
closely with internal crisis management may raise false
hopes that NATO can independently cause peace. Indeed, this
false promise may encourage NATO members to pursue dangerous
policies against other states thinking that NATO will come
to their aid if they get themselves into trouble. NATO
should promote the norms and principles that its members
value - through an enhanced and strengthened Partnership for
Peace
.
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Capacity for Change
The entire success or failure of NATO enlargement to
enhance security will rest on the capacity of its members to
adapt NATO's institutional form to the post-Cold War
security environment. This means implementing a major
internal restructuring of NATO based on a new burdensharing
arrangement. For NATO to increase security, it must move
from theory to practice in its institutional adaptation by
restructuring transatlantic security after the Cold War.
Conclusion: Enlarge NATO, But Do No Harm
Placing NATO, and therefore US influence, as a hedge
between Germany and Russia can have a major effect on the
future of European security. However, it will only be
positive if democratic Russia understands that enlargement
is not an anti-Russian act. The institutional form of
enlargement will have a major impact on whether or not
Russia is sufficiently reassured. If NATO is perceived as
an implicitly anti-Russian alliance taking advantage of a
weakened state with wounded pride and a lot of nuclear
weapons, history will not be kind to those who rushed the
expansion of NATO without a full airing of the potentially
negative consequences. If NATO's institutional form is
adapted with a careful application of both realist and
institutional signposts of what might go wrong, then NATO
enlargement may enhance peace and security into the 21st
century. Most importantly, enlargement must not distract
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from an even more central issue confronting NATO and the
future of European security - internal restructuring.
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CHAPTER VII
INSTITUTIONAL REALIGNMENT:
RESTRUCTURING TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR
Introduction and Overview
Chapter Seven shows that, contrary to realist
predictions, European members of NATO are either unwilling
or unable to "go it alone" and scrap NATO in favor of an
independent European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)
.
It shows why efforts to build the EU, a Franco-German Corps,
and the Western European Union were ineffective. NATO has
established a framework for post-Cold War institutional
functions based on the Combined Joint Task Forces concept.
CJTF will bring the ESDI into NATO as an operational
burdensharing mechanism making NATO a standing institution
from which states that are willing, and have political
support from the other members, can draw from NATO assets to
manage European crises. With this internal transformation,
France has gradually returned to NATO's military structures.
If successful, internal restructuring will demonstrate the
value of NATO's institutional functions as the primary
peacetime activity of NATO will be based on Article 4
consultation and the procedures and infrastructure that NATO
has available for coalitions of willing states to take on
certain missions. Nevertheless, serious political and
operational obstacles draw into question NATO's capacity for
change. For NATO to continue to function, a renewed
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transatlantic relationship which reflects the shared
interests of the US and Europe is needed.
Institutional Realignment
As NATO members contemplated enlargement, they embarked
on an internal adaptation to make the institution better
reflect the changed dynamics in the transatlantic
relationship. The end of the Soviet challenge, declining US
involvement in Europe, and a growing potential for the EU to
assume an independent security role were the major events
leading to this institutional change. The process often
took the form of competition between the US and some of its
European allies who wanted a European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI) to be created independent of NATO. However,
this option was constrained by the existing institutional
framework which affected the means and approaches toward
national security that key West European states pursued.
Absent credible independent capabilities, an accord was
reached in 1996 that the ESDI would be formed within NATO.
This institutional realignment was dramatized by France's
military rapproachment to NATO military planning.
Contending National Views and Institution-Building
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union completed in
1991 sought to create a common foreign and security policy
via an ESDI built through a revitalized WEU. The EU members
agreed that a community of 350 million citizens with two
nuclear powers should be able to exert influence in security
matters and take more responsibility for their own affairs
after the Cold War. However, the leading European states
split over the form an ESDI would take; Britain wanted it
subordinated to NATO, France wanted it fully independent of
NATO, and Germany sought to reconcile both views. 477 France
was most adamant in its support for an ESDI. Paris hoped to
propel European integration and confine the united Germany
within an institutional framework France could dominate.
France also worried that the US presence in post-Cold War
Europe would decline and that Washington could no longer be
relied on.
Early signals from Washington suggested that the
Europeans had reason for concern about the US role in
European security. The Bush Administration began cutting US
forces stationed in Europe dramatically and insisting that
the Europeans take responsibility for burdensharing and
management of the Balkan crisis while aggressively opposing
an ESDI. 478 President Bush let the Europeans take the lead
See United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Statement of the Defence Estimates 1994 (London:
UK Ministry of Defence, 1994); French Ministry of Defence, Livre Blanc sur la Defense
(Paris: French Ministry of Defence, 1994); and Federal Ministry of Defence, White Paner on
the Security of the Federal Reouhlic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the
Bundeswehr (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defence, 1994). Among the smaller states, Portugal,
the Netherlands, and Denmark supported the British view. The remaining Continental powers
were (to varying degrees) sympathetic to the French position. Italy was sensitive to both views.
Under President Bush the US promised to retain some 150,000 US troops in Europe or available
to the European theater. However, some proposals popular in the US Congress suggested
25,000 would suffice while others counseled 50,000 - 70,000. For discussion of US force
levels in Europe see Colin L. Powell, "The American Commitment to European Security,"
Survival 34:2 (Summer 1992) 1 and Don M. Snider, "US Military Forces in Europe: How Low
Can We Go?", Survival 34:4 (Winter 1992-1993) 24-39. Snider maintains that a militarily
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in the Balkans confident that efforts toward the ESDI would
collapse there. 479 The Clinton Administration sent early
signals that reinforced Europe's concerns about America's
dependability. In May 1993 a senior State Department
official said that economics would shape US foreign policy
and that the US would have to define the extent of its
commitments commensurate to this priority - suggesting a
shift in attention from Europe to Latin America and Asia. 480
Secretary of State Warren Christopher mused that the US had
been too Eurocentric in its foreign policy priorities. 481 In
1994, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin suggested in an annual
report that: "For their part, US allies must be sensitive
to the linkages between a sustained US commitment to their
security on the one hand, and their actions in such areas as
trade policy, technology transfer, and participation in
multinational security operations on the other." 482 Also in
1994, the US House of Representatives approved a proposal
(rejected by the Senate) calling for Europe to reimburse 75
percent of the total costs of stationing US troops in
significant force would have to include 75.000 US ground forces. The Clinton Administration
has settled on the figure of 95,000.
Interview with a senior Pentagon official, Washington DC, March 1996. This was a common
view among US and NATO officials at NATO headquarters in 1992. European concerns were
heightened when Canada announced on 5 February 1992 that it would withdraw its standing
forces in Europe because of overstretched commitments and costs.
Daniel Williams and John M. Goshko, "Reduced US World Role Outlined but Soon Altered,"
Washington Post , 26 May 1993, Al. The official was widely recognized to be Undersecretary
of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff.
Stanley R. Sloan, "Transatlantic Relations in the Wake of the Brussels Summit," NATO Review
42:2 (April 1994) 27-31.
Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington
D.C.: Department of Defense, 1994) 9.
264
Europe. The proposal would have provided for the withdrawal
of US troops if Europe did not agree.
Ongoing divisions between the US and its allies over
the Balkans, especially American reluctance to commit ground
troops, added to Europe's concerns. For France, this split
was a clear indication of the need for Europe have an
independent capability for handling crises. As French
Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said in November 1994: "...the
conflict in Bosnia has shown the necessity to move beyond
NATO and American guarantees to build a credible European
defense that could back up our common foreign policy
interests." 483 Conversely, in the US view, the futility of
European efforts reinforced the view that an ESDI was
unworkable
.
Despite such European frustration with the US, an
independent ESDI would be redundant to NATO (should the US
commitment remain credible), expensive, and could harm
European integration if EU members became worried about
supranational intrusions into their national security. It
might also damage the transatlantic relationship, on which
Europe still depended, if not carefully managed. Thus the
EU approach to building the ESDI took two conflicting forms
promoting a gain for the EU while strengthening the
transatlantic relationship by demonstrating operational
William Drozdiak, "US and Europe in Serious Rift Over Bosnia War." The Washington Post.
27 November 1994, Al.
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burdensharing. Reconciling the desire to go independent
from NATO and strengthen NATO at the same time would
eventually prove insurmountable.
The Limits of European Union: A False Promise of Security
The Bush Administration sent strong signals in 1991
that European initiatives creating an ESDI at NATO's expense
would be met with firm US resistance. For example, at the
November 1991 NAC ministerial session in Rome, French
President Francois Mitterand questioned the emphasis on NATO
characterizing the Alliance as: "...a good one, but it is
not a Holy Alliance." President Bush was terse in his
response insisting that: "If you have something else in
mind, if you want to go your own way, if you don't need us
any longer - say so." 484 In compromise language, the Rome
Summit endorsed the cost effective use of Alliance resources
and concluded that: "Integrated and multinational European
structures, as they are further developed in the context of
an emerging European defense identity, will also
increasingly have a similarly important role to play in
enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common
defense." 485 During the preparations for the Rome meeting,
the ESDI language was the most contentious issue in the
Quoted in Charles Krupnick, "Not What They Wanted: American Policy and the European
Security and Defense Identity," in Alexander Moens and Christoph Antsis. eds..
Disconcert
Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995) 130.
Rome Declaration of Peace and Cooperation, 7-8 November 1991.
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discussion of NATO's new strategic concept. Some members
viewed the language as carte blanche support for an ESDI.
Others noted its placement, at the very end of the
communique, showed the priority NATO put on the ESDI.
Moreover, the language was clear - an ESDI would have to
strengthen NATO. 486
While NATO prepared for the Rome summit, Europe was
engaged in a parallel process drafting the Treaty on
European Union to be signed at Maastricht, the Netherlands,
in December. The European leaders endowed the European
Union (EU) with a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
based on an evolutionary construction of an ESDI . There was
consensus among the Europeans on the need for an ESDI
.
Unable too speak or act with one voice during the 1990-1991
Persian Gulf War, Europe had shown an inability to protect
its vital interests on its own. 487 Thus many of the
countries gathered at Maastricht believed it was necessary
to build a European capability for defense and power
projection. Nevertheless, major internal differences over
the form of an ESDI and its relationship to NATO hindered
the goal
.
Discussion with J. Michael Legge. NATO Assistant Secretary General and Chair of the Strategy
Review Group at the Belgian Royal Defence College, Brussels, 23 January 1992.
The Gulf War borrowed heavily from NATO assets and command and control - including
arrangements made for British and French forces under US command. Nonetheless, Europe was
reluctant to grant political credit to NATO for aiding the mobilization and operation offerees in
the Gulf while seeking to promote the WEU - even though the latter did very little.
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In December 1990 France and Germany proposed a formal
relationship between the EU and WEU so that the WEU would
"...in time become part of Political Union." 488 The WEU had
been dormant since the mid-1950s. In October 1984 it was
reactivated to signal burdensharing intentions among the
Europeans and to enhance movement toward the Single European
Act (1986) which established the framework for political and
economic union in Europe to take place in 1992
.
Operationally the WEU was limited to minesweeping activities
during the Iran/Iraq war and coordination of European
efforts to enforce a naval embargo against Iraq and perform
mine- sweeping duties during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-
1991. Shortly after its reactivation, Portugal and Spain
joined the WEU. The Franco-German initiative would have
signaled a major increase in the WEU profile.
The US responded to the Franco-German proposal with a
terse diplomatic demarche delivered to WEU members signaling
strong US opposition to the Franco-German proposal. The US
insisted that: all decisions to commit an ESDI to out-of-
area activity involve consultation with the US; there
should be no WEU integrated command structure duplicating
that of NATO; and there should be no "backdoor" security
commitment to Central and Eastern Europe via WEU enlargement
Agence Europe 5388 (10-11 December 1990) 3-4. The WEU had been dormant during die
1970s.
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that implicitly extended the American commitment to NATO. 489
A compromise was broached by Britain and Italy on 4 October
endorsing an ESDI via the WEU which would be subordinated to
NATO. The Anglo- I tal ian initiative would have reserved the
WEU for out-of-area operations with NATO retaining sole
responsibility for security within the European area. Such
mission-based burdensharing would be attained via a Europe
Reaction Force consisting of forces separate from the NATO
structure. However on 14 October, France and Germany
responded by insisting that the EU have clear ties to the
WEU, that the EU promote an independent European armaments
agency, and that Europe develop military units that would be
solely allocated to the WEU
.
490
The Maastricht Treaty reflected a compromise between
these competing views. The EU members agreed that: "The
common foreign and security policy shall include all
questions related to the security of the European Union,
including the eventual framing of a common defense policy,
which might in time lead to a common defense." 91 The
Maastricht accord did not create a formal tie between the EU
and WEU. Instead it identified the WEU as an integral part
of the development of the Union and as its defense
See "NATO's Outlook Clouded by French-German Plan," The Washington Post . 19 October
1991, A20 and U.S. Wary of European Corps, Seeks Assurance on NATO Role," The New
York Times , 20 October 1991, A 12.
Kelleher 56-57.
Maastricht Treaty on European Union, J.4. 1 . The Treaty entered into force in November 1993
after receiving approval from the 12 member state parliaments.
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component. Non-WEU members of the EU were invited to join
or become observers. European members of NATO not belonging
to the WEU were offered the same opportunity. In keeping
the WEU informally linked to the EU, the problem of neutral
countries such as Ireland using veto authority over WEU
activity was avoided. Similarly Denmark, which is an EU
member in NATO, but not the WEU, could not obstruct its
development. In 1992, Greece joined the WEU. Iceland,
Norway, and Turkey have become associate members and
Denmark, Austria, Sweden, and Ireland observers. The
members agreed that the EU may request the WEU to implement
decisions and actions taken by the EU which have defense
implications. 92 In a separate statement, the 9 WEU
ministers at Maastricht affirmed the need for a genuine ESDI
and a greater European responsibility on defense matters.
Formally, the WEU would be the defense arm of the EU and at
the same time strengthen the European pillar of NATO. 493
The Franco-German Corps
The Maastricht compromise produced a disparity between
the EU's foreign policy aspirations and its military
capabilities. To compensate, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Treaty on European Union. Article J. 4. 2.
Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European
Union and with the Atlantic Alliance. Maastricht, the Netherlands, 10 December 1991. EU
members hoped that the WEU would develop through an evolutionary process beginning with a
loose contribution to the development of the EU complementary to NATO and eventually
leading to a common EU defense.
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and French President Francois Mitterand announced the formal
establishment of a Franco-German Corps on 21 May 1992. 494
The Eurocorps, as it became known, enlarged the existing
Franco-German brigade to a corps-level unit of 35,000
troops. France and Germany hoped to use the Eurocorps to
enable the WEU to act in accordance with the directives of
the EU by: aiding in the defense of NATO territory;
assisting in peacekeeping activities outside the NATO area;
and assisting in humanitarian operations. 495 Operationally,
the corps is composed of the French 1st Armored Division
(based in Germany) , and the German 10th Panzergrenadier
Division which wears a dual -hat with NATO meaning that it is
available both to the Eurocorps and NATO for planning and
operational purposes. The forces are largely stationed in
Germany with headquarters in Strasbourg, France. In
peacetime the forces remain national with the only standing
multinational activity taking place at the staff level in
Strasbourg
.
Initially, France hoped that Germany would assign
specific forces solely identified as Eurocorps assets.
However, Germany insisted that the Eurocorps be transparent
The origins of Franco-German security cooperation lie in the Elysee Treaty of 1963 which
outlined broad political and defense cooperation. In 1987 France and Germany created a joint
brigade of 4000 troops. In 1988 they established a joint Defense and Security Council to
oversee the brigade and identify other areas for cooperation - including sharing information on
nuclear issues. See Scott A. Harris and James B. Steinberg, European Defense and the Future
of Transatlantic Cooperation (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1993).
William Drozdiak, "France, Germany Unveil Corps as Step Toward European Defense," The
Washington Post , 23 May 1992, A 15.
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and complementary to NATO command structures. Wanting the
Eurocorps to provide momentum toward the ESDI, France was
left with little choice but to accept the German position
regarding NATO. American and NATO planners were especially
concerned that the Eurocorps could contribute to instability
and uncertainty in a crisis if command and control
relationships were unclear. Adhering to NATO's concerns,
Germany and France signed an agreement with SACEUR on 22
December 1992 to place the Eurocorps under NATO command in
the event of a crisis. 496 France was integrating its
military with Germany outside of NATO but allowing that the
assets be available to NATO in a crisis. In theory, France
was moving away from NATO to build an ESDI. However, in
practice, Paris was actually moving closer to Allied
military planning. 497
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain joined the Eurocorps
which became operational on 30 November 1995. However,
because the Eurocorps took three years to become
operational, it was not a credible effort to deal with the
immediate conflict in the Balkans. The EU participants were
using action within an institutional context as a guise for
According to one account, the classified details of the agreement between NATO and the
Eurocorps consisted of three parts: the Eurocorps would be assigned to NATO command it the
Alliance came under attack; under NATO command during crises and NATO-run peacekeeping
operations; and in peacetime, when the Eurocorps was not under NATO command, NATO's
command had the right to review its operations so as to determine its compatibility with
NATO's planning, training, and doctrine. Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the
United States and NATO," Political Science Quarterly 111:1 (Spring 1996) 29.
This point was stressed by German military officials who hoped to convince NATO of the value
of the Eurocorps.
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crisis management. As Peter Schmidt wrote: "...France and
Germany tend to agree much more on institution building than
on hard-core security policies." 498 The Franco-German corps
did symbolize a fundamental reconciliation and unprecedented
cooperation between these two historical enemies. 499
However, the popular refrain in NATO circles that the
Eurocorps is little more than a "parade army" continues to
ring true.
The Western European Union
The WEU faced similar constraints as the Eurocorps
though its members hoped to give it a greater operational
role. Meeting at Petersberg near Bonn on 19 June 1992, the
WEU leadership agreed that while contributing to NATO's
Peter Schmidt, "ESDI: A German Analysis," in Charles Barry, ed., Reforming the Trans-
Atlantic Relationship (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996) 42. Shortly
after activation, the Eurocorps began limited exercises including training maneuvers in the
French and Belgian Ardennes. Additionally, the Eurocorps and WEU conducted a joint exercise
called Crisex dealing with decision-making procedures, command and control, and eventual
deployment of forces. Crisex took place in Brussels, Metz, and on the Canary Islands for each
respective element of the exercise. European Information Service, European Report,
"Defense/Security: From Bit Player to Major Actor for WEU," 1 1 November 1995. To
complement the Eurocorps, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have organized a land force
(EUROFOR) and a maritime force (EUROMARFOR).
Beyond the corps, France and Germany were pursuing further military cooperation including:
regular meetings of ministerial working and expert groups, the purpose of which is to further
develop common projects; an exchange of officers, including between staffs; intensification of
leadership and language training by means of officer and officer candidate exchanges;
cooperation in training and exercising, for instance by temporarily establishing Franco-German
exercise naval forces; use and development of training facilities, for instance, the combined
Army Aviation training center in Rennes/France; conduct of analyses and studies, for instance,
in the field of air defense; promotion of friendly ties by way of over sixty affiliations;
furnishing of mutual support in humanitarian operations, for instance, in the operations in
Cambodia and Somalia, doing so at conceptual level by elaborating common airlift plans for
providing humanitarian aid, and by devising a common medical training concept for
humanitarian operations. Federal Ministry of Defense White Paper , 60.
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common defense in accordance with Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, "...military units of WEU member states
acting under the authority of WEU could be employed for
humanitarian and resource tasks; could be employed for
humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks, tasks of
combat forces in crisis management, including
peacemaking." 500 However, the WEU also endorsed a proposal
forwarded by British Minister of Defense Malcom Rifkind
which assured that the WEU would not create its own
independent military command structure. The WEU tasked its
military officials to identify a variety of assets (such as
the Eurocorps, the new British-Dutch amphibious force, or
the Multinational Airmobile Division) which could be made
available on a case-by-case basis. 501 This proposal was
designed to avoid overlap between WEU and NATO member state
commitments. As with the Eurocorps, institutional
limitations of the WEU forced France to compromise and re-
evaluate its security priorities.
Politically, the WEU kept apace of the changing
institutional dynamics by reaching out to Central and
Western European Union Council of Ministers, "Petersberg Declaration," Bonn, 19 June 1992.
In accordance with these objectives, the WEU created a planning cell in Brussels as part of its
WEU international secretariat (which was moved from London to Brussels). The cell was
activated in October 1992 consisting of a forty member coordinating group of military officials
tasked to: prepare contingency plans for the employment of forces under WEU auspices;
prepare recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrangements,
including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might be selected; and to keep
an updated list of units and combinations of units which might be allocated to the WEU for
specific operations.
The British-Dutch amphibious force and the Multinational Airmobile Division (Central) are
assigned to NATO but could be made available to the WEU.
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Eastern Europe. Like NATO, the WEU was reluctant to expand
a formal security guarantee. The Petersberg Declaration
created a "Forum for Consultation" to bring interested
countries from the former Warsaw Pact into a dialogue with
WEU countries. Meeting in Luxembourg on 9 May 1994, the WEU
foreign ministers invited nine Central and East European
countries to join the WEU as "Associate Partners". The WEU
now had four levels of participation including Members,
Associate Members, Associate Partners, and Observers. The
new Associate Partners included Poland, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia. Associate Partners have no security guarantee
and cannot veto decisions taken by the WEU. They can attend
alternative weekly sessions of WEU ambassadors in Brussels
where they can raise security concerns. Associate Partners
could also contribute troops to WEU peacekeeping missions.
The Associate Partners proposal was intended to limit WEU
outreach to those Central and East Europeans most likely to
qualify for EU membership. Some in the WEU hoped that this
limited approach could be more effective than NATO's PFP -
in spite of the fact that the WEU had no independent
operational functions. 502
Despite this institutional activity, the WEU's outreach
to the East was not a major problem for NATO - or even
Interview with a senior WEU official, Washington DC, November 1994.
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Russia. 503 By 1995 the WEU had not become a credible
institution for organizing the conduct of significant
military operations. Recognizing its continued weakness,
the WEU foreign ministers met in Lisbon on 15 May 1995 and
took modest steps toward strengthening its operational role.
At Lisbon, the WEU established a politico-military group to
support the WEU Council, and created Situation and
Intelligence Centers. Additionally, the ministers accepted
an Anglo- Italian proposal to advance planning for a WEU
intervention force in humanitarian crises, but failed to
agree on procedures for financing such operations. The WEU
also approved a White Paper which assessed security threats
including: unresolved border disputes, terrorism, organized
crime, migration, and proliferation of nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles. Absent from the assessment was the sort
of conflict immediately challenging European security - the
Balkans
.
Ultimately, the WEU is a security institution without a
military infrastructure. Like NATO, peacetime forces which
The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling the WEU decision an attempt to "create
a new model of military-political alliance in a limited space in Europe. " This was mild language
compared to the vehement Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. ITAR-TASS. 12 May
1994. In RFE/RL Daily Reports, 13 May 1994. On 1 December 1994 Russian Foreign
Minister Kosyrev came close to endorsing the WEU's activities telling the WEU Parliamentary
Assembly in Paris that: "NATO, which was born in response to the division of Europe, could
promote partnership leading to European unity, if only the Alliance is not used to draw new
dividing lines... Europeans themselves, including the WEU, should take care of the Unity of
Europe/' Address by Andrei Kosyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, to the WEU
Parliamentary Assembly, Paris, 1 December 1994. Most Associate Partners appreciated the
increased cooperation with the WEU as a potential link to the EU. However, some felt that they
were being given "take it, or leave it" proposals from the West.
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might be made available to the WEU remain national -
including the Eurocorps
.
However, unlike NATO, the WEU has
no peacetime supreme commander, no peacetime military
headquarters, and no standing command and control structure.
Without infrastructure, training, and major exercises, the
WEU has no capability to project power or promote stability
in the event of a crisis threatening its member states.
Moreover, the absence of sufficient satellite,
transportation, and other logistical capabilities, common
language and compatible communication arrangements, the
incorporation of standardized and interoperational
equipment, or exact location of equipment made the WEU
fundamentally weak.
Weaknesses in WEU satellite and intelligence
capabilities were exposed in the fall of 1994 when the US
announced it would no longer share intelligence with its
European allies enforcing the naval arms embargo of the
Balkans. Responding to the US announcement, President of
the WEU Assembly, Sir Dudley Smith stated that: "The US
dominate the NATO command structure in the Adriatic area and
the withdrawal of US ships and aircraft would make a mockery
of the embargo operat ions ... This example also proves just
how much Europe needs to be autonomous where intelligence
gathering, satellite reconnaissance and logistical support
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are concerned. A week later, Smith qualified his remarks
to stress that it is "vital not to weaken NATO because of
its essential role in maintaining peace in Europe... any such
weakening cannot be allowed to happen." 505
An ESDI standing alone against a revitalized Russian
challenge at current force levels would prove a
destabilizing imbalance. At the conventional level the
relationship between Russia and the combined French, German,
and British forces is 4:1 for heavy tanks, 1.5:1 for light
tanks, 2:1 for armored vehicles, 3.75:1 for towed or self-
propelled guns, 7:1 for multiple-warhead rocket launchers,
and 2.6:1 for combat aircraft. 506 Building a credible
independent ESDI from scratch would thus prove very
expensive. The lowest level of independent military
capability is estimated to cost $27 billion over 25 years
and would still require the aid of US systems to make it
function. The highest level of independent ESDI activity
would cost $95 billion over 25 years. The higher level
WEU Press Release. 1 1 November 1994. To compensate for this technological weakness, a
WEU Satellite Center was inaugurated at Torrejon, Spain on 28 April 1993. The center receives
its instructions from the WEU permanent council and is responsible for intelligence gathering;
the verification of arms-control agreements; monitoring crises affecting European security; and
monitoring environmental hazards. The Torrejon project became a priority for France which
hoped to give the WEU advance warning supervision of disarmament treaties, collection of
strategic and wartime intelligence data, navigational assistance, electronic warfare capabilities,
etc,. France and Germany have also begun a joint project to develop a new line of military spy
satellites. In July 1996 Italy joined the project. The program is well-funded at $2. 1 billion and
is thus a priority for the EU.
On the record interview with Sir Hugh Dudley Smith, President of the WEU Assembly,
Washington D.C., 18 November 1994.
Claude Carlier, "NATO and the European Union," in Papacosma and Heiss 145.
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would be more effective but still not equal the capabilities
available in the existing framework in NATO. 507
Another constraint is the general inability of the
European countries to form a European wide military-
industrial base. Article 223 of the founding Treaty of Rome
excludes the production of and trade in arms, munitions, and
war material from the normal rules of the common market when
essential security interests are involved and thus rather
than integrate a European arms industry, states have
continued to buy nationally. The EU and WEU have sought to
identify areas of potential cooperation by incorporating the
Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) into the WEU and
renaming it the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG)
.
Also within the WEU, the Political Division has created an
Armaments Secretariat. In October 1993, France and Germany
announced plans for the creation of a joint armaments agency
to focus on procurement for the Eurocorps but possibly to be
expanded in the future. The purpose of the armaments agency
is to integrate national armaments responsibilities to the
extent possible in terms of organization, administration,
and implementation of projects. 508
Assuming these high costs and military responsibilities
would be very difficult given the steep decline in European
Morton B. Bennan, et al, The Independent European Force: Costs of Independence (Santa
Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1993).
A major initiative under this framework has been a feasibility study for a Future Large Am
begun in 1993. Additionally, an industrial consortium (EUROFLAG) has been established
within the EU to conduct other feasibility studies for joint projects.
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defense spending. By 1994, 6 of the 16 NATO countries had
reduced defense spending as a percentage of GNP to below 2
percent. 509 As former NATO Secretary General Willy Claes
said in a speech to NATO parliamentarians in November 1994:
"It is obvious that the sharp decline in most European
defense budgets makes it inconceivable that Europe could
create its own integrated military organization alongside
the one in NATO - and it would be a useless waste of money
anyway." 10 In an April 1996 speech in Washington D.C.,
German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe said that: "...we
would be fools if we did not take advantage of the fact that
we already have a solid and functioning Alliance with
enormous capabilities ... we do not have to start from
scratch." 511 Any habits of political and military
cooperation and practices in NATO had evolved over a 45 year
period. Even then, mobilizing NATO for the use of force in
Bosnia-Herzegovina proved extremely difficult. Recreating
that same institutional culture within the WEU in the
absence of a threat and in the presence of an existing
Belgium 1.8, Denmark 1.9, Germany 1.8, Luxembourg 1.1, Portugal 1.6, and Canada 1.7.
Two countries were just over 2 percent (Italy 2. 1 and the Netherlands 2.2). The average of
NATO Europe had dropped from 3.6 (1980-1984 average) to 2.5. NATO Office of Information
and Press, NATO Handbook: Partnership and Cooperation (Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, 1995) 358.
Willy Claes, "Address to the Fortieth Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly,
Washington D.C., 18 November 1994.
Lecture by Volker Ruehe at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International
Studies, The
New NATO", German Information Center: Statements and Speeches XIX:7 (30
April 1996) 3.
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alternative in NATO would require a convergence of national
interests which Europe was far from attaining. 512
Combined Joint Task Forces
The failure of institutions to deal adequately with the
early years of the Balkan crisis prompted the US to
formulate a proposal to realign NATO in late 1993.
Recognizing that NATO could not survive if its sole purpose
was to deal with Article 5 missions and that there might be
occasions when the US might not necessarily participate
directly in a non-Article 5 NATO mission, the Clinton
Administration recommended a reorganization of NATO command
structures based on Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) that
would permit the creation of an ESDI that was separable but
not separate from NATO. A CJTF is a multinational, multi-
service, task- tailored force consisting of NATO and possibly
non-NATO forces capable of rapid deployment to conduct
limited duration peace operations beyond Alliance borders,
under the control of either NATO's integrated military
structure or the Western European Union.
513 Drawing on a
practiced US tradition of combining assets from the three
services of the armed forces, CJTF would open up
multinational command and control outside of the traditional
Even in NATO, capabilities were being limited by a 60 percent cut in infrastructure spending
between 1991 and 1995.
Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," Survival 38:
1
(Spring 1996) 84.
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NATO structures so that coalitions of the willing could use
assets from the NATO command structure once a political
consensus was reached in the NAC
.
The US had made a major policy shift in its endorsement
of ESDI
.
As Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said in advance
of the Brussels Summit:
The European allies have had a long
desire... for a capacity for military action for
missions such as peacekeeping, humanitarian relief
and other things that could be undertaken without
American participation. They had the desire to
have a European pillar to the NATO Alliance. In
fact, we don't object to that.
Addressing the NAC, President Clinton said that: "We
support your effort to refurbish the Western European Union
so that it will assume a more vigorous role in keeping
Europe secure ... While NATO must remain the linchpin of our
security, all these efforts will show our people and our
legislatures a renewed purpose in European institutions and
a better balance of responsibilities within the
transatlantic community." 515
NATO endorsed the strengthening of the European pillar
through the WEU and stated that NATO's organization and
resources will be adjusted to facilitate this.
Specifically, NATO agreed that:
We therefore stand ready to make collective
assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of
consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for
514
Press Briefing by Secretary of the Treasury Lloyd Bensen, Secretary of State
Warren
Christopher, and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. The White House Office of the
Press
Secretary, 7 January 1994.
515
.
Remarks by the President to the North Atlantic Council Summit. NATO Headquarters,
Brussels, Belgium. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 10 January
1994.
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WEU operations undertaken by the European Alliesin pursuit of their Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy. We support the development of separablebut not separate capabilities which could respondto European requirements and contribute toAlliance security.
The NATO leaders directed the NAC and the NATO military
authorities to study the development and adaptation of
NATO's political and military structures and procedures for
Alliance missions, including peacekeeping, and to improve
cooperation with the WEU to reflect the emerging ESDI.
The institutional bridge between NATO and the ESDI/WEU
would be CJTF. Since 1991 NATO had recognized the need for
smaller, more mobile and more rapidly deployed forces via
the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) . However, the ARRC
was designed for Article 5 contingencies (collective
defense)
.
As the crisis in Bosnia had shown, NATO would be
most effective by using Article 4 (institutional
consultative functions) to serve as a framework for
organizing non-Article 5 operations. For Article 4
operations to succeed within the context of a shared
NATO/WEU operational framework, it would be necessary to
lower the transaction costs of building coalitions for peace
by institutionalizing command and control arrangements that
could be readily adapted to the specific needs of each
operation
.
Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters. Brussels, Belgium. 10-11 January 1994. NATO
Office of Information and Press.
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As Charles Barry observes, the unique aspect of the
CJTF is an unprecedented development in military doctrine.
CJTF will
:
...institutionalize the task force concept, a
command and control arrangement normally employed
for crisis response by ad hoc coalitions. In
fact, deploying CJTF's is intended to become the
primary modus operendi of NATO in peacetime. Task
forces are formed rapidly, employed for specific
short-term contingencies, and then disbanded.
With the CJTF concept, NATO's military hopes to
invent a unique, hybrid capability that combines
the best attributes of both coalition and alliance
forces: that is, rapid crisis response by highly
ready multinational forces, backed by political
terms of reference, standardized procedures, 517
regular exercises and in-place infrastructure.
CJTF would give NATO flexibility to respond to new missions
in or around Europe, facilitate the dual use of some NATO
command structures for NATO and/or WEU operations, and
permit PFP countries to integrate themselves into NATO run
operations. 518 This would be done by establishing
multinational, tri- service headquarters, based on deployable
self-contained elements in NATO common structures, but
adapted further, whenever necessary, to incorporate forces
from nations in and outside NATO that are not currently
within the integrated military command.
Through CJTF full NATO contributions to a NAC-mandated
or WEU-run operation would not be necessary as coalitions of
the willing could engage in peacekeeping or other non-
traditional activities while benefiting from existing NATO
structures including areas such as logistics, airlift, and
517
Charles Barry, "ESDI: Toward a Bi-Polar Alliance?", in Barry RefonninMhe
Transatlannc 77.
51f
\ Stanley R. Sloan, "Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and New
Missions for NATO," CRS
Report tor Congress 94-249 S (17 March 1994) 2-3.
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airborne surveillance. The Clinton Administration saw CJTF
as a means of enhancing the PFP by using NATO commands to
integrate partner countries which might participate in non-
Article 5 NATO or WEU operations. Washington also hoped
that, through the CJTF, France might be brought closer to
NATO military planning. Most important for the US, CJTF
would be a pragmatic means of ensuring that NATO remains the
core security institution in Europe while Europeans assume
greater responsibility for their own security. 519 Thus in
principle, the policy could bring together what had been
quite disparate national perspectives toward the future
institutional form of transatlantic security cooperation.
Obstacles to Implementing the CJTF Concept
Failed attempts to implement the CJTF initiative
demonstrated that the underlying tensions which had blocked
the restructuring of West European security had not gone
away. As Simon Lunn, Deputy Secretary General of the North
Atlantic Assembly, asserts: "The general perception that
the (Brussels) Summit reconciled differing attitudes among
the Allies towards an ESDI did not happen. . .unfortunately
that obstacles to creating a workable ESDI have been removed
is far from true."
520 Though it initially appeared that a
519
. This assessment of CJTF and the ESDI was developed in a series of interviews with senior
US
officials and senior officials from two European defense ministries in November 1994.
See Sean
Kay, "Common Defence, Common Burden." European Brief 2:3 (December 1994)
13-15.
52
°. On the record interview with Simon Lunn, Deputy Secretary General of the North
Atlantic
Assembly, Washington DC, 18 November 1994.
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major compromise on the ESDI had been reached, the CJTF
quickly stalled. NATO and WEU military officials were able
to complete planning early but without further political
guidance, military planning could only proceed so far. 521
The US was particularly concerned that NATO's
infrastructure for Article 5 missions remain intact and that
no duplication take place. Additionally, the US worried
that while formulated under an Article 4 mission such as
humanitarian relief, natural disasters, or peacekeeping a
CJTF could come under attack and possibly involve Article 5
of the NATO treaty. Washington wanted assurances that CJTF,
especially those used by the WEU, would not drag the US into
conflicts where it had no desire or interests in
intervening. Moreover, for nearly a year France insisted on
a separate command structure for non-Article 5 NATO missions
such as those which do not involve existing command
structures. The French position raised serious questions
about the continued relevance of the NATO integrated
military command and why the US should remain a part of it
given that Article 4 missions were those most likely to be
carried out by NATO or the ESDI
.
By March 1994. SACEUR completed a draft operational concept for CJTF command and
control. On 28 June the WEU sent NATO a detailed analysis of operational requirements for a
CJTF. Follow-on studies were presented to the NATO Military Committee in September 1994.
Differences on the WEU role emerged over defining the support role of NATO commanders in
WEU -led CJTF operations; the potential for the WEU to select their own headquarters
(including national commands or in the Eurocorps headquarters) to function as a CJTF; and the
WEU's access to NATO assets. Barry "ESDI:...", in Barry 77.
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Also because it did not participate in NATO military
planning, France sought to increase political oversight of
CJTFs. In the US view, CJTFs, once mandated by the NAC,
would answer directly to the immediate field commander with
command support from SACEUR. Increasing political oversight
over CJTFs was viewed by the US (and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in particular) as an unwarranted intrusion on the
ability to carry out effective military operations. France
also wanted one form of CJTF to be "national" meaning that a
state acting alone could take on an independent mission with
NATO assets or possibly head up a multilateral operation
with its own command structures but drawing from NATO
assets. This was rejected by Washington as a dangerous
infringement on multinational military planning.
The US was sending conflicting signals in its
endorsement of the ESDI. Since the debacle of US
involvement in Somalia in 1993, the US military and US
Congress were insisting that the US maintain clear command
and control of its operations and assets. Moreover, the
political leverage that the US gains in Europe stems not
only from its overall capabilities and command structures,
but also from its actual troop presence. The absence of
direct US involvement in a ground operation, for example,
would make it very difficult for the US to wield influence
over its allies as the Bosnian experience prior to IFOR
showed. For its part, France was internally divided as much
of the posturing towards CJTF was related to forthcoming
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presidential elections in 1995 and neo-Gaullist pressures to
ensure France's distance from NATO. This political concern
about the rapproachment to NATO was reflected in the fact
that most of the problems with CJTF were raised by the quai-
d'Orsay rather than the Ministry of Defense.
By summer 1995, with the West floundering in Bosnia and
the future of CJTF unresolved, some NATO planners expressed
exasperation that the prospects for making the concept
operational were slim. As one senior NATO planner
complained: "France insists on a special relationship and
will likely continue to use the threat of its veto power to
prevent such NATO operations from proceeding, if Frances'
direct participation is not required." 5 "" Some military
planners at SACLANT gave up on CJTF and proposed reforming
NATO command structures based on functional responsibilities
and new sub- commands to coordinate regional operations. 523
These planners proposed a NATO realignment which would
redesign existing commands to allow NATO to act outside its
geographical boundaries and even conduct offensive
operations to meet future threats such as a ballistic
Interview with a senior NATO official, Washington D.C., November 1994.
This internal NATO military adaptation would include regional coordinating of NATO
commands with specific tasks including transportation; command, control, communications and
intelligence; and logistics. Additionally, the SACLANT proposal would develop a common
simulation and training system to help NATO militaries coordinate high technology warfare. In
September 1996 the NATO Military Committee did agree to advise the NAC on creating a three-
tier command structure based on current divisions between the Atlantic and European commands
at the top, with the reorganization being done largely at lower levels.
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missile attack on a member state or Persian Gulf style
crisis
.
524
American representatives at SHAPE also expressed
reservations about command and control in the event of a
deal on CJTF
.
SHAPE stressed that non-Article 5 CJTF
activity could become large-scale operations requiring NATO
to have complete command and control. This position left
some Europeans feeling that SHAPE was insisting on a veto
over any European operation not involving the US. 525 By
1996, the NATO Military Committee had agreed to six main
principles which CJTF must meet: 1.) preserve the
integrated military structure; 2.) provide for separable
but not separate forces in support of the ESDI; 3.)
maintain a single command structure for Article 5 and non-
Article 5 missions; retain the role of the Military
Committee in advising and transmitting strategic guidance
from the NAC to NATO Military Authorities (including the
Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, SACEUR, and
SACLANT) ; avoid ad hoc participation in NATO bodies; and
preserve the ability of Major NATO Commands to do timely
contingency planning. 526
Theresa Hitchens and Robert Holzer, "Commanders: Reform NATO to Address New
Missions," Defense News (26 June) 4,50.
Raphael Estrella, Rapporteur, "The Reformation of NATO," Draft General Report of the North
Atlantic Assembly Defence and Security Committee DSC (96) 2 (May 1996).
Daniel W. Christman, "NATO's Military Future," loint Forces Quarterly (Spring 1996) 79.
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Bringing the ESDI into NATO
Several factors contributed to a resolution of the
disputes over CJTF leading to a deal codified at the Berlin
meeting of NATO foreign ministers in June 1996. 527 Concern
was growing in NATO that the one year time limit to the IFOR
mission in Bosnia could bring about renewed war after its
scheduled withdrawal in December 1996. NATO officials
believed that it was important that IFOR meet its one year
commitment so that the conduct of future Article 4 missions
would not be impeded. The US and its allies thus needed a
political means of reducing the US presence in Bosnia while
keeping a meaningful force in place - possibly via a CJTF.
CJTFs were used in IFOR though they were not formally placed
within the conceptual debate in NATO or the ESDI . In order
to accommodate force contributions and staff from non-NATO
and non-European countries, AFSOUTH had been transformed
into a CJTF headquarters. However, the European members
insisted that without a US role after IFOR, they would also
leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. As one senior European diplomat
commented on 26 February 1996:
IFOR will not be extended. We are now
starting to discuss what, if anything, will
replace it. European troops on the ground without
any US involvement is not a good idea. But we're
aware of the dangers of a vacuum... If Combined
Joint Task Forces opened up - - and we are aiming
for an agreement^in Berlin... I would expect that
to play a role.
Much of the information in this section was gathered in interviews with a senior official from
the French Ministry of Defense in February 1996 and senior officials from the
National Security
Council and the Pentagon in Washington D.C., in March 1996.
Reuters. 29 February 1996.
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A senior French official stressed: "The need to do
something quickly for the European pillar of NATO because of
a possible premature American departure from Bosnia is
plausible ... But we do not want to discuss that idea
publicly." 529 Another European official said that: "The
exit strategy is complete lunacy, it is hindering the long-
term success of the mission." 530 In the view of many
Europeans, with their forces accounting for 2/3 of the IFOR
ground forces, burdensharing in NATO had arrived and the US
had to continue its role if the Europeans were to stay.
France's return to NATO military planning also
facilitated a deal on CJTF (see below) . Additionally, NATO
recognized that before it could enlarge to include new
members, it needed to get its house in order. As Czech
President Vaclav Havel said in a speech at SHAPE
headquarters on 27 April 1995, NATO must redefine its aims
and purpose before admitting new members. "The expansion of
NATO should be preceded by something even more important,
that is a new formulation of its own meaning, mission, and
identity," said Havel. 531 By spending most of 1996 focusing
on internal reforms designed to promote peace and stability,
Reuters. 29 February 1996. After a visit to Washington in early May, EU External Affairs
Commissioner Hans van den Broek indicated that he had found "widespread support" for the
need for Europe to be prepared for a new responsibility in Bosnia after IFOR. Enraged by
v
den Broek's comments, French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette said: "It was irresponsit
for people to talk of IFOR being replaced by the WEU. Everyone should stick to his job. . .tl
the cows will take care of themselves." Reuters. 7 May 1996.
Reuters. 12 March 1996.
OMRI Daily Digest, 28 April 1995.
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NATO could downplay its plans for enlargement during the
Russian presidential elections held that summer. NATO hoped
to show Russia in advance of its June/July 1996 presidential
elections that the Alliance which was enlarging was a
transformed NATO.
In late February 1996 John Kornblum (Assistant
Secretary of State for US and Canada) and Alexander Vershbow
(Director of the European Directorate at the US National
Security Council) traveled to Paris to broker a deal on
CJTF
.
The agreement reinforced the principle that future
European peacekeeping operations could draw on NATO force
structures, equipment and logistical support even if US
forces were not involved. France acknowledged that the ESDI
must occur within NATO and the US accepted the possibility
that NATO assets could be used for WEU operations in which
the US would not participate. 532 Any WEU command arrangement
would have to meet NATO standards, use equipment completely
compatible with that of the Alliance and receive the prior
approval of the NAC
.
This Franco-American rapproachment paved the way for
NATO to make the CJTF concept operational. Europe had not
entirely reassured the US that they will not use NATO assets
in a way that might draw the US into military conflicts that
it does not have interests in. However, a stress on
Paris also dropped a request for a form of CJTF to be organized around NATO headquarters
where France had assigned officers and another based on national commands. See
"Way is
Cleared for Joint European Forces," lane's Defense Weekly. 27 March 1996.
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procedures in the NAC mandating the establishment and use of
a CJTF headquarters would allow the US to exert influence
over this possibility. Moreover, the continued weakness of
the WEU meant that it was unlikely that the US would allow
it to act if the challenge were serious. As one US official
participating in the Paris talks asserted: "There's not
going to be a separate WEU ... There 1 11 be one defense pot
organized around NATO, with forces separable from NATO if
the Europeans want to do something." 533 For the short-term,
it was not necessary for the US to decide how far it might
allow CJTF to go into WEU control because it was hard to
imagine any situation serious enough to involve NATO assets
in which the US would not lead.
The Berlin Accord: Political Guidance for CJTF
Meeting at Berlin on 3 June 1996, the NATO foreign
ministers approved the CJTF compromise. Endorsing the
development of the ESDI within NATO, the ministers welcomed
the completion of the CJTF concept, directed the Military
Committee to make recommendations for its implementation,
and established a Policy Coordination Group (PCG) to link
political oversight from the NAC to the military viewpoints
developed in the Military Committee. 534 NATO established
Craig R. Whitney. "NATO Looks to Peacekeeping by Europeans on their Own," The New York
Times
.
3 March 1996, A6.
Within the International Military Staff, a "Capabilities Coordination Cell" will be established to
aid the Military Committee in providing planning guidance to the Major NATO Commander and
aid in the Military Committee's providing advice to the NAC.
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three principles to guide its adaptation including:
performing its traditional mission of collective defense and
adopting flexible and agreed procedures to undertake new
roles in changing circumstances; preserving the
transatlantic link; and the development of the ESDI within
NATO.
NATO stressed the need to be able to mount non-Article
5 operations based on one integrated command structure that
can perform multiple functions in a cost-effective manner.
What had traditionally been ad-hoc task force arrangements
would be institutionalized via the placement of CJTF
headquarters "nuclei" permanently placed in selected NATO
headquarters. The CJTF command nuclei would be the minimum
personnel necessary around which a complete headquarters
could be built once the NAC had a approved a NATO or non-
NATO CJTF operation. The nuclei would provide the basic
elements of necessary military experts for the
implementation of multinational, multiservice military
functions. To avoid duplication and reduce costs, nuclei
command personnel would be dual -hatted to the parent
institution (NATO or WEU) . Once a CJTF had been approved by
the NAC, the CJTF nuclei would be reinforced with "modules"
which are additional staff elements to be assigned based on
the particular political and military needs at the time.
CJTF headquarters would have to meet a number of basic
elements including: supporting the three main objectives of
the NATO transformation process including responding to new
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missions; be adaptable for new members and non-members
alike; and provide support for the WEU's operational needs;
ensure that collective defense requirements can take
priority if they arise; preserve both the transatlantic
nature of NATO and a single integrated military structure;
and be done with minimum added costs. 535
The ESDI would develop within NATO via full
implementation of the CJTF concept grounded on "sound
military principles and supported by appropriate military
planning and permit the creation of militarily coherent and
effective forces capable of operating under the political
control and strategic direction of the WEU. 1,536 NATO
committed to prepare, within a transparent and complementary
process, for WEU- led operations including planning and
exercising of command elements and forces. 537 Additionally,
NATO endorsed the development of the ESDI within NATO by:
"conducting at the request of and in coordination with the
WEU, military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU
53
5
.
Barry "NATO's Combined...". 86.
536
.
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Berlin. Germany, 3 June 1996.
According to the final communique this would be based on: identification, within the Alliance,
of the types of separable but not separate capabilities, assets and support assets, as well as, in
order to prepare for WEU-led operations, separable but not separate, HQs, JQ elements and
command positions, that would be required to command and conduct WEU-led operations and
which could be made available, subject to decision by die NAC; and elaboration of appropriate
multinational European command arrangements within NATO, consistent with and taking full
advantage of the CJTF concept, able to prepare, support, command and conduct the WEU-led
operations. This implies double-hatting appropriate personnel within the NATO command
structure to perform these functions. Such European command arrangements should be
identifiable and the arrangements should be sufficiently well articulated to permit
the rapid
constitution of a militarily coherent and effective operational force.
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missions identified by the WEU." 538 The release of NATO
assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations would be
authorized by the NAC
.
The NAC would then keep itself
informed on the use of NATO assets through monitoring with
the advice of the NATO Military Authorities and through
regular consultations with the WEU Council. 539
Remaining issues to be settled by NATO included:
ensuring that CJTF development complements any revision of
NATO's command structure; taking account of the WEU via
full development of "separable but not separate"
capabilities; providing for the possible involvement of
non-NATO nations in a CJTF; and maximizing cost-
effectiveness and avoiding duplication. Additionally,
considerable demands may be placed on CJTFs as they may need
to be able to deploy at short notice, move at short notice,
and take advantage of the most technologically sophisticated
military systems. 540 Specific deployment strategies, the
sharing of communications and intelligence, specifications
for deployment time, and which of NATO's eight existing
Berlin Communique. Such planning would at a minimum: prepare relevant information on
objectives, scope and participation for illustrative WEU missions; identify requirements for
planning and exercising of command elements and forces for illustrative WEU-led operations;
develop appropriate plans for submission through the MC and NAC to the WEU for review and
approval.
The Berlin communique also expressed satisfaction with the growing ties between NATO and
the WEU. The ministers endorsed the completion of a new agreement between NATO and the
WEU on security measures for the protection of shared classified information and expressed a
desire to build on consultative mechanisms based on joint NATO-WEU Council meetings and
those between the WEU Permanent Council and SACEUR.
Anthony Cragg, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning, "The Combined Join
Task Force Concept: A Key Component of the Alliance's Adaptation," NATO Review 44:4
(July 1996) 7-10.
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Major Subordinate Commands would become CJTF headquarters
also remained to be settled by NATO military planners.
Most importantly, the planning and conduct of exercises
utilizing CJTF would help move the concept from theory to
reality, incorporate lessons from IFOR, and help identify
areas for further development. As Charles Barry notes,
formulating a substantial program of CJTF exercises is
essential to its success. Regular CJTF exercises, such as
the large annual maneuvers that NATO undertook during the
Cold War, will "gradually yield a valuable reservoir of
staffs, units and service members experienced in new
operations and procedures for NATO." This is especially
important as it is "one thing to develop contingency plans,
operational concepts and doctrine for one nation; it is
quite another to harmonize the rapid deployment of forces by
16 or more nations." 541
Central to the conduct of large scale exercise will be
a realignment of the NATO integrated military command
structure to increase the European role but preserve key US
commands. A proposed reform popular in US planning circles
would have SACEUR and SACLANT remain US officers and their
deputies be Europeans. However, the Deputy SACEUR and
Deputy SACLANT could be nominated by the members of the WEU
or the EU and then approved by the NAC as part of an
interlocking process. The Deputies could also be the most
Barry "NATO's Combined...", 82-83.
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senior military officers in the WEU defense structure.
Should the NAC decide on a mainly European CJTF operation
with only a supporting NATO role, the Deputy SACEUR (or
Deputy SACLANT) would assume control of the operation, with
full access to the assets of the integrated command
structure. Alternatively, should the NAC decide on a WEU-
run CJTF, the Deputy SACEUR (or Deputy SACLANT) would shift
to his European (WEU or EU) command function and run the
operation independent of US or NATO support. 542
In mid- 1996 the theoretical debate over CJTF took on a
sense of urgency in NATO planning for a post -IFOR
peacekeeping force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While the
military tasks provided for by NATO were very successful,
the civilian side of the Dayton accords had fallen behind
and some sort of substantial military presence was required
to maintain the fragile peace. Having committed to a one
year mission in IFOR, the US was under considerable pressure
to find a functional alternative through which it could
reduce its commitment. A follow-on force might be a perfect
opportunity for the Europeans to take responsibility for
their own affairs backed by an American reassurance force in
a nearby country such as Hungary or Croatia. In theory the
US would be out of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Europeans
This position was initially advanced by Stanley R. Sloan of the US Congressional Research
Service. See Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense," CRS Report
(September 1995 30-32 and Stanley R. Sloan, "Negotiating a New Transatlantic Bargain,"
NATO Review 44:2 (March 1996) 19-23.
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would implement an ESDI under a NATO command via CJTF -
after all, why have an ESDI if it can not be effectively
used? This plan was popular among US military planners but
diplomats could not reconcile the pressure from European
members of NATO who were unwilling to take this
responsibility and who thus insisted that "we went in as
allies, we go out as allies." Thus this gradual exit
strategy took on more long-term planning over the 18 month
period of SFOR.
The French Return to NATO
An important impetus for the institutionalization of
the CJTF concept was the return of France to NATO military
structures. The Balkan crisis forced France toward a
gradual return to the Alliance out of concern that it would
be left out of military decisions that could impact its
forces there. Bosnia had also shown the futility of the
development of an independent ESDI and thus a deal with NATO
that preserved the principle of the ESDI was in France's
interest. The high costs of building an independent ESDI
(estimated to be 27 to 95 billion dollars over 25 years)
also collided with France's commitment to the EU and its
monetary union (EMU) requiring domestic austerity programs
in a climate of 12 percent unemployment and massive public
strikes. As part of its belt- tightening, and to meet new
strategic demands, French President Jacques Chirac (elected
in May 1995) introduced dramatic armed forces reductions and
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an end to conscription. The French return to NATO had two
basic conditions: that NATO will continue to adapt its
internal structures and that the ESDI should be visible and
operational. 543 Contradictory institutional commitments and
the political economy of European security had forced France
to do what the Soviet threat could not - move Paris back
into NATO
.
France's movement toward NATO military structures began
in 1993 with the agreement to place the Eurocorps under a
NATO command in the event of an emergency. In September
1994, French Minister of Defense Francois Leotard
participated in a meeting of NATO defense ministers in
Seville, Spain. This was the first visit by a French
Minister of Defense to a NATO meeting since 1966. To
accommodate French sensitivities, the meeting was labelled
an "informal" discussion. French officials from the
Ministry of Defense insisted that Leotard's attendance was
not a change in doctrine. Rather they intended to
participate on a case-by-case basis to coordinate activities
in the Balkans and to discuss Mediterranean security.
544
See "Allocution de Monsieur Charles Million, Ministre de la defense, Le 19 decembre 1995,
lors du colloque organise par la fondation pour les etudes de defense," Defense rationale (April
1996) 12-13 and Charles Million, "Vers une defense nouvelle," Defense rationale (14 July
1996) 13-19.
Interview with an official from the French Ministry of Defense, Washington DC, November
1994. Leotard had pushed to attend the NATO defense ministerial at Travemunde, Germany, in
December 1993 (where the PFP and CJTF were initially presented) but President Mitterand
vetoed his participation. Similarly when the French Chief of Staff sought to attend a meeting of
the NATO Military Committee in April 1994, Mitterand again refused. Nevertheless, at the
Brussels NATO summit in 1994 France had informed its allies that it would attend NATO
military meetings where issues that might affect French forces were on the agenda. France
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President Chirac indicated in his campaign that he was
prepared to seek closer ties to NATO. By summer 1995, he
had made a firm commitment to deepen France's NATO ties. 545
In September, France hosted the first NATO military exercise
on French territory since 1966. 546 Chirac next moved to
strengthen ties with Britain. On 31 October Chirac and
British Prime Minister John Major initiated a "global
partnership" committing both sides to exchange classified
nuclear weapons data with a long-term objective of
coordinating nuclear policy and doctrine. 547
On 5 December 1995 French Foreign Minister Herve de
Charette announced that in order to strengthen French-NATO
cooperation in Bosnia and aid the development of the
European pillar of NATO, "France has decided to become more
would not cross the line of reintegration into the military structure. Leotard had, nevertheless,
signalled Paris' view that NATO's role in Europe was evolving. In fact, a key element of
(unsuccessful) bilateral discussions between Leotard and US Secretary of Defense William Perry
at the Seville meeting was to explore ways to make CJTF work. Interview with a senior official
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, October 1994. Also see William
T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell young, French Policy Toward NATO: Enhance Selectivity,
Vice Rapproachment (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1994).
See Robert P. Grant, "France's New Relationship with NATO," Survival 38: 1 (Spring 1996)
65.
The exercise included 60 aircraft and 1000 personnel in a four day Tactical Air Meet over
Eastern France, with headquarters at a French air base in Toul. The exercise was designed to
reflect NATO air strikes in Bosnia focusing on suppressing "enemy" air defense systems,
practicing air-to-air refuelling and electronic warfare, and coordinating different aircraft types
with ground air defenses.
Chirac and Major also agreed to pursue joint development and procurement of military
equipment and to increase joint training. The respective naval chiefs were instructed to draft a
letter of intent to promote naval cooperation by intensifying an existing program of military
exchanges. They also initiated a Franco-British Euro Air Group at the headquarters of the Royal
Air Force Strike Command. Chirac described the Air Group as a "symbol of a new credible
European defense that must be based on a strong transatlantic relationship." Charles Mdler,
"France, U.K. Strike Defense Pact," Defense News 15 (6-12 November 1995) 4.
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involved in NATO's various organizational bodies." 548 Though
the extent of its long-term participation remained
uncertain, France immediately took its seat on the NATO
Defense Planning Committee and the Military Committee. NATO
officials were elated with de Charette's announcement as it
meant a return to NATO similar to that of Spain's. 549 The
announcement effectively acknowledged NATO's central role in
Europe and the need to reconsider the institutional form of
the ESDI. As Dominique Moisi, Deputy Director of the French
Institute for International Relations, told The New York
Times: "The fact is that, militarily, we have depended on
NATO and our margin of independence has been
negligible ... But our margin of political influence on NATO
was also negligible before today... This was absurd." 550
When President Chirac travelled to Washington in early
February he told a joint session of Congress that the
activity of US and European troops in IFOR signalled "...the
need for the Alliance to adapt itself to a universe that is
no longer that in which it was born." 551 The Franco-American
News From France 95. 19 (8 December 1995) 3.
On 16 January the French Ambassador to NATO told his counterparts that Defense Minister
Charles Millon would now take part in formal meetings of the Defence Planning Committee
(with the provision that matters relating to the integrated military structure are not raised) and
diat the French Chief of Staff would return to the Military Committee. He indicated that France
was considering closer relations with SHAPE and SACEUR and that it was willing to discuss
nuclear policy. France would also participate fully in the NATO Defense Colleges and in the
NATO Situation Center. Interview with an official from the French Ministry of Defense,
March 1996. Also see News From France (3 May 1996) 4 and Mariano Aguirre, "L'OTAN au
service de quelle securite," Le Monde Diplomatique , April 1996.
Roger Cohen, "France to Rejoin Military Command of NATO Alliance," The New York Times,
6 December 1995, Al.
Address to a Joint Session of Congress by French President Jacque Chirac, 1 February 1996.
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compromise on implementing the CJTF concept indicated the
sincerity of France's position and the profound nature of
the change underlying French NATO policy. 5S2 As a North
Atlantic Assembly report concluded, beyond practical reasons
related to military planning in Bosnia: "...there is a
bottom line: France's will to engage in a real renovation
of the Atlantic Alliance, including the development of a
true European pillar ... what is new is that France has
declared its will that this European pillar must be built
from within NATO, a stand that has been essential in
clarifying France's position and giving reassurance to
Americans and other Allies who had expressed concern on
French intentions." 553
Chirac's plan to restructure and reduce the French
armed forces was central to the change in Paris' view toward
NATO. As part of its commitment to attain European Monetary
Union (EMU) by 2000, France needed to reduce its $59.3
billion budget deficit. 554 With high unemployment and the
country paralyzed by strikes protesting government spending
cuts, reducing the size of the French military was a partial
solution. 555 Thus on 22 February President Chirac announced
Interview with a senior National Security Council official, March 1996.
Estrella(1996) 10.
The EMU requirements in the Maastricht Treaty require states to have budget deficits below 3%
of GDP, that the public ratio of debt to GDP be less than 60%, and that inflation be no higher
than 1.5% above the average of the three lowest inflation countries in the EU. By 1996 France
had a budged deficit of 3.7%; a debt of 56. 9 % as a percentage of GDP. and 1.3% inflation.
OECD Economic Outlook , June 1996.
See Arthur Paecht, "La defense: Le temps des choix," Defense rationale (February 1996) 7-16.
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sweeping reductions in the French armed forces to be
accompanied by a new strategic doctrine which would save an
estimated $1.2 billion a year. 556 In July 1996 Chirac
announced a streamlining of the armed forces beginning with
a disbanding of 38 regiments, closing barracks, army
hospitals, and airbases, and retiring one of two French
aircraft carriers. Central to Chirac's overall plan was a
decision to end conscription and move to volunteer armed
forces. With France's national defense capabilities being
reduced to meet the pressures of one institution (the EU)
Paris had little choice but to advance its national security
interests by pooling its defense resources with its allies
in NATO while negotiating the best deal it could get for its
return to NATO.
Under the Chirac plan, France intends to reduce its
total armed forces from 573,000-437,000 (400,000 - 250,000
when paramilitary forces are excluded) while retaining the
capacity for rapid deployment of some 50,000-60,000 troops
abroad. Some of its European allies worried that France
would rely more heavily on its nuclear deterrent - a view
hardened during France's undersea nuclear testing in the
Pacific in 1995-1996. With an eye toward reassuring Germany
in particular, Chirac announced that 15 short-range Hades
Spending on defense research and equipment is to be cut by 18% annually (about $37 bffli
1997-2002 - $4 billion less annually than had been established in 1994). Total defense wi
up to 3. 1 % of GDP (a 2 percent reduction from 1994) including military pensions. The
Economist . 2 March 1996, 45.
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missile launchers which can only strike targets in Germany,
would be eliminated. Additionally, Chirac stressed that
France's contribution (15,000) to the Eurocorps would not be
affected by the reductions. However, privately some German
officials indicated that French troops in Germany would
likely drop to around 3000. 557
The US endorsement of the ESDI made this rapproachment
toward NATO more palatable for Paris. There was, however,
some internal opposition to Chirac's plans. There will
likely be a ten-year process of retiring all of the
Gaullist, anti-NATO military officials, in France. Some
French officials wanted the Inter-Governmental Conference
(IGC) review of the Maastricht treaty in 1996 to promote the
formation of a standing European army. For example
President Chirac's former Prime Minister Alain Juppe wants
an integrated European army of 350,000 that would be
subordinated to the EU for rapid deployments. 558
See Craig R. Whitney, "Cold War Over, France Plans a Slim, Volunteer Military," The New
York Times . 23 February 1996, A3 and The Economist , 2 March 1996, 45-46. Restructuring
the armed forces also stemmed from difficulty Paris had in putting together a rapid deployment
force during the Persian Gulf conflict. As the conservative parliamentarian and defense expert
Pierre La Lellouche told The New York Times (23 February): "We had to beg, borrow and
steal from 47 separate regiments to put together a 15,000-man intervention force during the war
in the Persian Gulf... At the same time, the British army, which is less than half the size of the
French Army now, managed to deploy more than 30,000 soldiers to the same theater of
operations. Movement toward such national rapidly deployable forces has become common
practice in national military planning with Germany developing a crisis reaction force of 55,000
deployable in 1999. On 1 August 1996, Britain announced the formation of a new Joint Rapid
Deployment Force (JRDF), to be drawn from the army, navy, marines, and air force. The
British force will have some units on 24 hour standby and quickly deployable at a reinforced
brigade strength of 6000 - 8000 men.
In September" 1996, Juppe did provide a strong endorsement for the NATO/ESDI relationship.
Juppe suggested in a speech to the French Institute for Higher National Defense Studies that
because of the realignment of NATO, he expected France to integrate fully into the NATO
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In American military circles there is also some
skepticism of France's ambitions. Some feel France returned
to NATO so that it can have the greatest impact on European
security - especially when the US chooses not to lead in a
CJTF. For example, during the Bosnian crisis of summer 1995
while the US was reformulating its policy toward the
Balkans, France was able to exercise considerable political
guidance over NATO affairs. Thus CJTF could open up the way
for France to work within NATO to limit the US role in
Europe. This view was confirmed when France began insisting
on a European general heading NATO's Southern Command.
France suggested that failure on the US to hand over this
traditional American command, (which includes the US 6th
Fleet) would cause Paris to halt its return to NATO. The
subject led to an ineffective exchange of personal letters
between presidents Chirac and Clinton with diplomats hoping
at best to "kick the ball down the road" a few years so that
more urgent issues could be addressed in NATO. By the end
of 1996, Franco-American relations had deteriorated to the
point that the French foreign minister walked out of a
military command structures. Meanwhile, in the IGC Britain continued to signal strong
opposition to merging the WEU into the EU while France and Germany suggested that states
might opt out of decisions on military or peacekeeping actions through a policy of "constructive
abstention". A country might not participate in an EU military action, but would agree not to
block its implementation if others wanted to do so. This was problematic as it would harm the
consensus principle within the EU. Thus the most likely product of the IGC would be continued
support for the WEU as a medium-term effort to build an ESDI to enhance the CFSP and
contain a political solidarity clause. Going into the IGC, there was broad support for the
creation of a special planning and analysis team and of a senior post to represent the EU
internationally. "The IGC: Committed to Creating a Common Foreign Capability," Janets
Defence Weekly , 27 March 1996.
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proposed toast by the NATO Secretary General Solana in honor
of retiring US Secretary of State Warren Christopher at a
lunch during the December 1996 NAC ministerial.
The change in French foreign policy is, nonetheless,
substantial and the rapproachment toward NATO appears
sincere - in spite of the political bargaining over its role
in the command structure. In fact, France was left little
choice but to move closer to NATO because of its commitments
to another institution - the European Union and its EMU.
Weary after four years of futility in Bosnia and unable to
construct an independent ESDI, France was forced to change
its national security priorities. As a senior official from
an EU (but non-NATO) country observed:
The European Union will not within the
foreseeable future develop into an independent,
credible defense alliance. Therefore the U.S.
contribution as a guarantor of European security
remains vitally important. Europe's own security
policy interests may best be ensured within a NATO
framework in cooperation with the United States.
Without NATO Europe cann^ be stabilized: this
has been seen in Bosnia.
Institutions and their changing role - especially the
internal realignment of NATO - had a profound impact on both
the goals and the means of promoting French national
security policy.
559
Informal comments of a high level Scandinavian official addressing die Annual Meeting of
Maanpuolustuskurssiyhdistys (Society of Civil Defense Courses). Helsinki, Finland. 6 May
1996.
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Analysis
The institutional approaches toward European security
during the first half of the 1990s were largely theoretical
and designed for long term implementation. The crisis in
the Balkans reduced the US and its European allies into
"making it up as we go along", as one US official described
the process. 560 CJTF was a major institutional adaptation
which could prevent future Bosnia-style conflicts from
getting out of hand. Yet the CJTF is a means to an end -
the broader objective being the vitality of the
transatlantic relationship. If agreement could not be
reached on a crisis in Europe's own backyard for four years
in the Balkans, then disputes over Iran, Iraq, Cuba,
international terrorism, and international trade might pull
Europe and North America apart . The internal fabric of the
Western community is challenged by the possibility of war
between Greece and Turkey, Mediterranean concerns about
North Africa and the rise of Muslim fundamentalism, and
North European worries over the Baltic countries and
environmental issues. 561 These diverging interests are
Drew, "NATO from Berlin..." 11.
NATO Secretary General Solana has proposed the creation of a crisis management center at
NATO headquarters so that information can be exchanged between Greece and Turkey and
hopefully prevent small disputes from escalating into war. Addressing his personal frustration
with Greek-Turkish disputes. President Clinton said on 12 June 1996 that: "As to Greece and
Turkey I can tell you that I am very concerned about it... Both those nations are our allies and
Europe's allies through NATO, and I believe that the future of the region which they both
occupy would be immeasurably brighter if they can resolve their problems and are immeasurably
darker if they cannot. " Joint Press Conference by US President Bill Clinton and Italian Prime
Minister Romano Prodi. White House Information Service, 12 June 1996. Turkey's internal
policy toward the Kurdish minority has also provoked disputes with its European allies. In
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likely to increase absent the Soviet threat. Thus NATO's
institutional form must not only be adapted to show it is
not a threat to Russia - it must be fundamentally
transformed if NATO is to remain viable in the future of
European security. Successful internal realignment will
best be served with the following institutional form.
Tasks
The fundamental goal of an institutional adaptation of
NATO must be to attain an operational burdenshar ing
arrangement to make the US commitment to European security
politically sustainable. Implementation of the CJTF/ESDI
concept is the best means to this end - perhaps implemented
in the follow-on to SFOR in Bosnia in 1998/1999 if not
sooner. Successful adaption of NATO based on CJTF will
demonstrate that preparing and training for Article 4 style
missions will become the primary peacetime institutional
function of NATO. The US will be reassured vis-a-vis
burdensharing and the European goal of implementing the ESDI
can be met. This is not to say that making NATO a pool from
which allies draw on to support coalitions of the willing
1995, Turkey called an Article 4 consultation at NATO over the Netherlands decision to
recognize and host a Kurdish parliament in exile. Turkey argued that the Dutch decision was an
infringement on Turkish sovereignty and it thus represented a security threat to Turkey.
Additionally in August 1996 Turkey angered Washington by proceeding with at $23 billion gas
deal with Iran in defiance of a new US law which penalizes companies investing in energy
projects in Libya or Iran. Washington's response was constrained by the fact that Turkey's
compliance with US-led sanctions against Iraq had been causing a major shortfall in Turkey's
energy reserves. The US policy on dealing with these states is compounded by the fact that not
only Turkey trades heavily with these states but so does the entire EU. For example, the EU
has a combined amount of annual trade with Iran of $893 million.
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will always work. The states that are undertaking a mission
will have to get the political support of the NAC . The
important factor will be NATO's capacity to provide standing
mechanisms so that when a consensus exists to utilize CJTF,
it will be done rapidly and effectively.
Organizational Capabilities
The main physical change in NATO will be a
restructuring of its regional and sub-regional command
headquarters which will be adapted to accommodate CJTF
planning. If non-members can contribute to CJTF planning
for Article 4 missions, they should be able to join these
standing headquarters via the PFP . NATO will remain highly
formal with little autonomy but regional integrated
headquarters will allow rapid and effective responses to
crises . As PFP countries work within the CJTF framework and
Article 4 missions come to be the main focus of peacetime
NATO activity, the debate over whether a state actually
joins NATO or not will blur as expanded multinational
planning promotes practical solutions to real security
problems. Collective defense will remain the linchpin of
NATO but it will be held in reserve, through which NATO's
traditional alliance functions can flow if some unforeseen
major threat to Europe does appear.
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Principles, Norms, Rules, and Procedures.
In the case of CJTF, institutional procedures take on
an increased role with a greater opportunity for
international socialization than previously existed in NATO
- especially if CJTF headquarters are opened to PFP
countries that are able to contribute. The procedures in
NATO vis-a-vis the ESDI will remain largely unchanged - a
consensus must exist in the NAC . However, consensus need
not necessarily mean a commitment by all countries to
participate in an operation. The principles and norms
present in NATO will be enhanced because in order to use
NATO assets via a CJTF, a state must meet the approval of
all the members of the NAC. A state in gross violation of
institutional principles and norms might form international
coalitions for a particular objective - but it will be
harder to do than in the absence of the institution as it
will not be able to draw from standing NATO assets.
Capacity for Change
Absent a credible threat, NATO's future hinges on
implementation of the CJTF concept and its internal
restructuring. If it does not have the capacity for this
sort of fundamental change after the Cold War, NATO may well
go the way of most alliances. NATO has shown a potential
for adaptation - particularly in its planning for CJTF.
However, CJTF remains a concept that has yet to be
implemented. If the member states can agree to its
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implementation then NATO will have an important role to play
in the future of European security - and its primary role
will be institutional. NATO will avoid hierarchy but serve
as a standing institution from which states might call on
for expertise and assistance when a crisis occurs.
Beyond NATO: The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship
NATO is not a panacea and its future is in not
guaranteed. If NATO is to continue to contribute to
national security in Europe it will require a deepening and
widening of the transatlantic relationship between the US,
Canada, and Europe. A new transatlantic institution
established through a US/Canada/EU charter that creates
procedures for political and economic cooperation would
insulate NATO from non- security disputes spilling over into
the Alliance. This would make NATO work more effectively as
it carries out new tasks in the 21st century. If the only
tie that binds the US directly to Europe is NATO, then the
transatlantic relationship and the future effectiveness of
NATO are in danger. Thus, North America and Europe must
build upon the political, economic, and security ties that
bind based on shared interests.
Politically, the transatlantic relationship symbolizes
the promise of stable democratic societies working together
to promote common interests. Democracy itself does not
cause peace in international relations. Fragile democracies
that have not fully developed respect for minority rights or
peaceful resolution of disputes may experience high
instability and even civil war that can become
internationalized. Democracies suffering economic
catastrophes can also fall to nationalism and/or
dictatorship with expansionist goals. Nevertheless
democracy is, in the long term, the most stable system of
government because of its basis on popular legitimacy and
the rule of law. Moreover, open societies enhance
transparency in military planning so that the possibility of
uncertainty leading to instability in international
relations is lowered. Thus the members of NATO have a
unique responsibility and opportunity to serve as a model of
international cooperation in military planning so that the
possibility of uncertainty leading to instability in
international relations is lowered.
Economically, the US and Europe are deeply
interdependent with about $1.5 trillion in annual shared
economic activities. Europe has more of the Gross World
Product than any other region with 35 percent at market
exchange rates and 27 percent at purchasing power parity
exchange rates. Europe was America's second- largest
customer in 1993 with 31 percent of US exports of goods and
services; America's second- largest supplier in 1993,
providing 2 9 percent of US imports of goods and services,-
and Europe provides the US with relatively balanced trade,
with a $7 billion US merchandise trade deficit in 1993
(compared to 115 billion for Asia) . Nearly 50 percent of U!
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direct investment abroad is in Europe, and over 60 percent
of foreign direct investment in the US comes from Europe
(about $260 billion) which provides an important source of
capital to offset low national savings rates. These
investment flows account for nearly 7 percent of all jobs in
the US and 5 percent in Europe. Some 3 million American
citizens are employed in the US by European- owned business
and 1.5 million are supported by goods and services that the
US exports to Europe. Combined, the US-European trade
relationship accounts for about 14 million jobs on both
sides of the Atlantic. Culturally, the US remains a strong
relative of Europe. According to the 1990 US census, some
142.5 million Americans (about 56.9 percent) have sole or
primary European ancestry or ethnic origins. 562
Despite this political and economic transatlantic
interdependence, the greatest challenge to European security
in the 21st century will be the maintenance of the
institutionalized security cooperation developed between the
US and Europe since World War II. Though the successful US
interventions in Haiti and Bosnia have shown that Americans
can be rallied to support risky military engagement, their
willingness to continually come to the aid of others with
sufficient means to act on their own can only be tested so
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in
Transition (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995) 42. Also see Norbert
Wieczorek (Federal Republic of Germany), General Rapporteur, "Europe and North America:
Partners and Competitors," Draft General Report. The North Atlantic Assembly Economic
Committee EC (96) 7 (May, 1996).
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often. Domestic constraints on the American commitment to
repeated international interventions is especially true in
Europe where Americans often see wealthy Europeans with
strong governmental safety nets built under the US security
guarantee. This sense of frustration has strong voices in
each major American political party and is more active in
the Congress today than it was in the Cold War. 563
Leaders in the US and Europe have expressed concern
about growing trends toward American isolationism. In March
1995 President Clinton told a bipartisan audience at the
Nixon Center in Washington DC that
:
The new isolationists are wrong. They would
have us face the future alone. Their approach
would weaken this country, and we must not let the
ripple of isolationism tQ&t has been generated
build into a tidal wave.
In his address to the US Congress in February 1996, French
President Chirac lectured the members on the benefits of
foreign aid and chastised them for deep cuts in US aid
programs . The speech was poorly attended by members and
many seats were filled with congressional research
assistants and pages. The declining interest in foreign
affairs in the US Congress has combined with the lowering of
In February 1995, the US House of Representatives passed a bill to deduct from regular US dues
to the UN the amount the US pays for peacekeeping operations. Similar language was included
in the American Interests Abroad Act of 1995 introduced in the House of Representatives on 23
May 1995. President Clinton described this legislation as the most serious isolationist threat to
the US international role in the last fifty years. White House Information Service, 23 May
1994. Former Republican Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger described it in a 24 May
1995 interview with National Public Radio as "immature."
Remarks by the President to the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom Policy Conference. The
Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, 1 March 1995.
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its institutional memory with the retirement of Senators Sam
Nunn, Howell Heflin, Bill Bradley, William Cohen, and Nancy
Kassenbaum. This diminution of internationalist members of
congress has especially worried German Chancellor Kohl.
While receiving an award from the Atlantic Bridge Group in
Berlin for fostering ties between Germany and the US on 18
June 1996, Kohl said that: "The US elections in the autumn
will see a series of senators and members of Congress drop
out who know Germany and Europe and are bound to us in a
special way
. . . I do not for now see that the 'old guard' of
senators and congressmen is being replaced with successors
who approach Europe and Germany with the same intensity." 565
A restructuring of NATO can provide a means of keeping
the transatlantic security partnership vibrant in the
future. However, it must proceed beyond theoretical
applications into full implementation via CJTF . This may
require a leap of faith on the part of the US and its
European allies - and it may also require that European
members of NATO spend more money on defense. If anything
has been gained from nearly fifty years of cooperation in
NATO, then now is the time to take practical steps to
maintain the institutional security relationship between the
US and Europe. A renewed transatlantic partnership
institutionalized through a US/Canada/EU charter can focus
on non-traditional security challenges such as trade
Reuters. 18 June 1996.
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disputes policing nuclear proliferation, environmental
challenges, technology transfer, negotiating border
disputes, international terrorism, organized crime and
migration. In December 1995 the US and EU completed the New
Transatlantic Agenda. Later, in September 1996, US
Secretary of State Warren Christopher called for a "New
Atlantic Community" in a major speech in Germany. These
were important first steps reflecting shared interests that
are the basis of the transatlantic relationship. Whatever
form the new transatlantic partnership takes, its objective
must be to ensure that disputes not immediately pertinent to
national security do not damage the institutions which can
affect the peace and stability of Europe into the 21st
century
.
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CHAPTER VIII
TOWARD A BROADER RESEARCH AGENDA:
COMPLEMENTARY INSTITUTIONS
From Theory to Practice in European Security
While more research is needed on the question of
whether institutions cause security, this project has shown
that variations in institutional form can affect the degree
of security in post-Cold War Europe. While NATO's
institutional form has been primarily dependent upon the
structure of the international system, it has evolved since
the end of the Cold War. In its outreach to Central and
Eastern Europe and in the planning for IFOR, NATO has
enhanced security. However, NATO has yet to transform
sufficiently to meet the needs of Europe in the future. If
NATO is to promote security, it must move from theory to
practice in its institutional adaptation. In particular,
the degree of security in Europe's future may be
dramatically affected, positively or negatively, by the form
that NATO enlargement takes
.
Early advocates of NATO enlargement oversold what NATO
could do for new members and raised their hopes too high
only to be dashed upon the rocks of geostrategic reality.
These countries, particularly the Baltics, have suffered too
much to deserve this kind of treatment from the West.
Having raised false hopes among Central and East Europeans
and risked a cooperative dialogue with Russia which appeared
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at the end of the Cold War, NATO members have a
responsibility to shape NATO's institutional form to ensure
that it enhances security for the many and not only the few.
NATO's first attempt at adaptation was to promote
mutual gain in European security through the amalgamated
collective security of interlocking institutions. This
failure to construct a new European security architecture
confirms the realist critique of institutions and their
capacity to independently affect peace. As the bloodshed
grew in the Balkans, the multiple institutions tasked by
states to resolve the conflict - the EU, CSCE, UN, WEU, and
NATO - all failed to convince the warring parties to cease
their violence. Even ethnic cleansing bordering on genocide
could not mobilize member states to authorize institutions
to respond effectively. Without shared national interests
or independent capabilities, institutions promoted a false
sense of security as Europe witnessed its worst violence
since World War II. Paralyzed by the diverging interests of
its member states, NATO was on the brink of collapse by mid-
1995. NATO could not exist in a vacuum and if it was to
have any relevance after the Cold War, it would have to play
a role in resolving the Balkan crisis. By late 1995, a
combination of power, diplomacy, and institutions caused a
cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina which led to a potentially
stable peace. NATO's institutional attributes enhanced that
peace in two key ways
.
319
First, NATO planning substantially lowered the
transaction costs of forming and maintaining a peacekeeping
coalition to facilitate the agreed separation of the warring
parties. The Dayton accords reached during the autumn of
1995 depended on a rapid deployment of peacekeeping forces
which only NATO could adequately supply. This immediate
intervention was possible because of two years of
institutional planning and it was essential to the
reassurance that each party needed to commit to peace. By
organizing 60,000 troops for IFOR, NATO demonstrated that it
had evolved to become more flexible and adaptive in its
missions. NATO could field new and creative command
structures, and facilitate the use of power. While still
fundamentally an instrument of policy, NATO made the
implementation of a collective decision easier to attain
than it would have been in the absence of the institution.
Second, through the NACC and the PFP information
exchanges, NATO integrated non-member countries into its
military planning for peacekeeping operations based on
Article 4 consultation. A better understanding of the
capabilities available for multinational peacekeeping
lowered the transaction costs of planning and reduced the
danger that command and control confusion could harm this
multinational coalition. NATO's coordination of IFOR
included 10,000 personnel from PFP countries - some of whom
took on very dangerous missions. The provision of non-NATO
forces was politically significant as domestic constraints
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limited the amount of forces the US was willing to commit to
IFOR. NATO's new institutional characteristics thus helped
make it possible for its leading member to provide only one-
third of the forces. Additionally, IFOR would feed back on
the PFP process as operational experience helped Partners
better define their security needs in relation to NATO.
Despite these successes, NATO's institutional capacity
to help Bosnia-Herzegovina move from a situation of peace to
one of lasting security was confined. Though IFOR provided
considerable infrastructure assistance in rebuilding the
country, its limited tenure left the future of post-IFOR
Bosnia very unclear. The removal of NATO from the region
after one year would have once more exposed the weakness of
other institutions such as the EU, WEU, and OSCE. Thus the
scheduled end of IFOR prompted an ongoing discussion over
what would best maintain peace in the Balkans - and renewed
debate over the relevance of institutions in aiding
reconciliation versus the less ideal but perhaps more stable
partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The most important lesson of NATO's contribution to
peace in the Balkans was that NATO only worked when the US
was fully engaged and leading its traditional alliance
functions. NATO could conduct planning for peacekeeping,
but it was not effective in the absence of US leadership.
The US has a vital interest in European stability and its
presence and influence provides it. However, a failure of
Europe to assume responsibility for immediate security
challenges in its own backyard, could drive the US away from
Europe and thereby damage the insurance that the American
presence provides against great power conflict. While US
involvement in Europe is central to American and European
long-term interests, it will only be politically sustainable
with a major adaptation of NATO's institutional form via
implementation of the CJTF initiative.
Why Variations in Institutional Form Matter
NATO remains insufficiently adapted to the post-Cold
War security environment to justify optimism for its long-
term survival. NATO did link membership with principles by
adapting its membership rules from restricted to
conditional. However, the policy of NATO enlargement was
driven through, decided, and instigated without a full
airing of the potential false promises that it promoted.
For example, those analysts and policymakers who linked NATO
and democracy were confusing cause and effect and those who
implied that NATO had kept peace between Greece and Turkey
had not read their history. For NATO enlargement to
succeed, it must be based on the premise of promoting
stability and proceed at the same pace as the Alliance's
internal adaptation.
The strongest case for enlarging NATO is to include
Poland and the Czech Republic, not as a hedge against
Russia, but as a hedge between Russia and Germany. If
Germany has no ambitions outside its territory, as its
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behavior since unification suggests, then it should not have
problems with this expansion of internal containment.
Additionally, making NATO a hedge between Russia and Germany
is probably the only argument that Moscow can accept for
enlargement as it too has a shared interest in seeing this
region stabilized. The US also has a long-term interest in
promoting such regional stability via the reassurance that
it provides Europe in NATO. America has lost too many
soldiers this century to wars prompted by security
competition over the region between Germany and Russia.
Additionally, the US did not spend trillions of dollars
fighting the Cold War only to see Europe destabilized in
peace. It is true that the current security environment
does not merit such pessimism. However, that is all the
more reason to carefully lock in the peace and make it
lasting as Europe moves into the next century.
It would be preferable for Russia to feel at ease with
the geostrategic goals of NATO enlargement. NATO
enlargement that merely moves the Cold War line East should
be considered nothing but a failure and enlarging NATO as an
explicitly anti-Russian act in the absence of Russian
behavior that merits such a response would be a tragic
mistake. By institutionalizing the NATO-Russia cooperation
that has developed in IFOR and SFOR in the Balkans, NATO can
show Russia that its intentions are peaceful and that the
objective is to promote stability and not encircle Russia.
A NATO-Russia charter can define this process. However,
unless there is a mutual gain from such a charter, it will
have little relevance. NATO members tend to view
consultation with Russia as informing Moscow of what NATO is
doing while Russia views consultation as a right to veto
Alliance activity. If enlargement is linked to sound
geostrategic foundations and combined with a fundamental
adaptation of NATO's institutional form, Russia and NATO
will have a more solid basis for institutionalizing a
consultative arrangement for the future of European
security. So long as Russia is not a threat, NATO should
demonstrate to Russia its peaceful intentions by
transparently limiting the activity of new members to
Article 4 planning and operations that will become the
primary day to day activity of NATO. If member states are
threatened, NATO can revitalize its Article 5 functions as a
collective defense alliance. However, in current
circumstances, there is no need for NATO to spread its
infrastructure on new member territories in a way that
decreases the security of any state.
To reduce the potential for false promises to new and
aspirant members, NATO should be clear on what it can and
can not do to promote democracy. NATO can provide an
institutional forum for political and military socialization
among new and old members but NATO per se is not an
institution for building democracy. Other institutions -
particularly the European Union - must take primary
responsibility for building the substructure that lends to
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stable democratic societies throughout Central and Eastern
Europe. Overemphasizing what NATO can do to help
democracies may actually create a sense among the European
Union members that they do not need to enlarge into the
places the EU should if it is to be consistent with the
principles and norms that it promotes. NATO should play a
complementary role consistent with its principles in
promoting democracy and stability in Europe - and the PFP,
not NATO enlargement, must become the principal means to
that end
.
PFP can aid non-members of NATO in four important
ways. First, it opens NATO structures from which they can
gain technical expertise that will help them enhance
territorial national security as they see fit. Second, PFP
can help states promote stability in their immediate
regions. Integrated into CJTFs, PFP participants can more
effectively address non- traditional challenges such as
environmental catastrophes, natural disasters, and
humanitarian crises. Third, at a general European level,
PFP can contribute to stability as it has in the case of
IFOR. Fourth, as the PFP countries join Article 4 related
NATO structures and participate in other NATO programs and
planning they will have the opportunity to continue to
socialize within the principles, norms, rules and procedures
of western political and military traditions. There is a
danger that, given the high costs of integrating two or
three new members into NATO, that the PFP will go wayside.
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Thus, if NATO states are willing to invest in new members
they must also be willing to ensure that enlargement
corresponds to an increase in PFP funding and activities.
This is especially true because the states that will become
NATO members are stable and not threatened. However, by
enlarging, NATO will spread its area of responsibility up to
some very unstable areas. A broadened and enhanced PFP can
help ease this dilemma.
A Broader Research Agenda: Complementary Institutions
As institutions become more active in Europe,
institutional form will be increasingly important so that
they do not decrease security. Thus the task of the student
of international security in Europe should be to draw from
realist and institutionalist schools of international
relations to help guide the process of designing
institutions so that they can do what they do best and not
create false promises. NATO is at the center of a growing
web of institutional security cooperation in Europe.
However, NATO can not act alone and, unless it is
fundamentally transformed internally, its future is not
guaranteed
.
Collective security in the form of interlocking
institutions is not the path to a secure Europe. Europe is
best viewed as a place with complementary institutions in
which institutions perform clear tasks and are designed so
that each can do what it does best. Just as this project
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has taken a historical view toward NATO and the evolution of
its institutional form, a broader research agenda can
incorporate similar analyses of the EU, WEU, and the
CSCE/OSCE. Complementary and mutually reinforcing
institutions can form the basis of a growing institutional
framework in Europe while institutional boundaries are made
clear so that each can work most effectively.
To better understand how to avoid the pitfalls of
interlocking institutions, a broader research agenda should
include detailed study of collective security and why it has
not worked. Historical analysis of the Concert of Europe
and the League of Nations in particular can help aid the
process of enhancing complementary institutions in a
positive manner. Also as one studies NATO, it is always
worth remembering that its presence means the failure of
Europe to become a more peaceful place. The long-term
purpose of studying European security is not necessarily the
preservation of an institution such as NATO. The goal is to
promote the circumstances in which NATO will no longer be
needed - as far off as that ideal may seem. Thus, the
relationship between institutions and security communities
should be central to a broader research agenda. Finally,
after the concept of complementary institutions is fully
explored in Europe, it is worth looking at other regions of
the world and assessing whether formal institutions might
increase security, for example, in places such as Africa and
Asia
.
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Conclusion
NATO remains essential to European security after the
Cold War. While its independent capabilities are
restricted, NATO has the potential to enhance European
security if sufficiently adapted. To date, such an
adaptation has not occurred and it is up to its members to
provide the leadership for successful NATO reform. The
stakes are high because the degree of security in the future
of Europe can be positively or negatively affected by the
institutional form that NATO takes. When NATO was first
designed, individuals with creative vision assessed their
short-term national interests in the context of long-term
goals and mutual gains from security cooperation. Such
vision and leadership is required again as Europe moves
toward the 21st century. If it is forthcoming, NATO may
have a strong and positive impact on the future of European
security
.
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